GAINST RACE DISCRIMINATION: Last Article by COMMISSIONER HODSON

FREE WORLD

The Opposing Camps
by ALBERTO GUANI
Vice President of Uruguay

DEMOCRACY OF NORDIC PEOPLE
by Sigrid Undset

SABOTEURS OF PEACE
by Hans Habe

THE CHANGING EAST
by J. B. Condliffe

RETREAT FROM THE FOUR FREEDOMS?
by Francis P. Locke

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Staff of the World Organization

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FREE WORLD

A Monthly Magazine

devoted to

Democracy and World Affairs

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AT THE MOON'S ECLIPSE

NOW over most of living kind
Creeps the stealthy terror,
Sleepy birds and wakeful dogs
Tremble at the moon's error.

THE full calm eye of night shuts to
With an evil lid,
Trees that drink in silvery light
Shudder, feeling it hid.

IF I did not know the cause,
As trees do, I should do,
Seeing night's eye so dusked with blood
And shutting evilly to.

BUT I know this is a game
Of shadow and is brief,
A game foretold with exquisite
Exactness past belief.

NOW over the much vaster round
Of the earth, moon's mother,
This night is full of creeping dark
Where brother slays his brother.

ON the Volga, along the Rhine,
In the Solomons' day,
Steel and fire, whining death
Wipe all light away.

A THOUSAND men who loved sweet light
Plunge into the dark
Where never moon nor sun will come,
Never the faintest spark.

AND no one can tell when this shade
Will slide from lands and seas,
We small men tremble with the birds,
Sad watch-dogs, and the trees.

ROBERT P. TRISTRAM COFFIN

EDITORIAL

THE brilliant advance of the Russian armies on all fronts, surpassing even the most optimistic hopes which had been formulated for this winter, has increased the feeling of urgency about an attack against the nazi war machine on other fronts. The people of the United Nations are unanimous in their feeling that it would be a grave mistake to give any respite to the nazi armies, and they are fervently hoping that the offensive decided upon at the Casablanca conference will be timed to coincide with the Russian advances.

The German war machine, while weakened by the forceful onslaught of the Soviet armies, is still a formidable power. It is reported that Hitler has actually been forced to concede supreme military command, at least temporarily, to the German General Staff. If this is true, it is bad news for the United Nations because the fanatic stubbornness and intuitions of the Fuehrer are far less to be feared than the skill of the German General Staff. Still, we are far away from the times of the *Blitz* in France and Belgium.

Behind the retreating armies and throughout the whole European hinterland, the Nazis are making a supreme effort to collect new forces and to increase production for their war machine by means of ruthlessness pushed to the limit. There is a danger that in the spring the German General Staff will again try an all-out offensive against Russia.

The demand for opening of new Allied fronts against the Germans has been most emphatically voiced in England which, being nearer to the European Continent, recognizes how important the time factor is. The people of England realize that now is the time to try to disorganize the plans of the German High Command. They realize also that every month gained in shortening the war means not only the possible saving of tens of thousands of Allied soldiers, but also of tens and hundreds of thousands of lives of civilians in Europe. Finally, they hope that the opening of new fronts at the precise moment of German reverses might have repercussions in Germany. The Nazis, for the moment, are admitting their reverses, but they are doing it in such a way that, instead of affecting the morale of the German people, it may increase their fighting capacity to the limit. The demand for new fronts is thus sufficiently justified by military reasons. But many people also feel instinctively that the more the Western Allies facilitate the activities of the Soviet armies, the stronger the hopes for a complete and constructive co-operation with the Russians after the war. They feel that it is extremely important to convince the people of Russia that the Western Allies are as daring in their offensives as the Russians have been.

That these aspects have been considered and the necessary measures determined at the Casablanca Conference was clearly disclosed in President Roosevelt's speech on Lincoln's Birthday, a speech which was the most encouraging statement issued by the leaders of the United States and Great Britain of their determination to do everything in their power as quickly as possible to carry the fight to all fronts of Germany, Italy, and Japan. But it is not only in the military field that the President's speech brought new hope to

America and to the whole world. In the political field, too, he has given assurances which will quiet many fears, for he has confirmed in unmistakable language the evidence of a full agreement among all the United Nations. Even more significant than this was the fact that the President, as one of the two authors of the Atlantic Charter, has given a very necessary and thoroughly democratic interpretation of Article III in his statement that "The right of self-determination included in the Atlantic Charter does not carry with it the right of any government to commit wholesale murder or the right to make slaves of its own people or of any other peoples in the world."

We, of the FREE WORLD, were particularly happy to hear this statement. This is precisely what we have asserted again and again. In our issue of January, 1942, Professor Henri Laugier pointed out the dangers of a wrong interpretation of this Article and the need of precisely the kind of authoritative statement which the President has now made. We have been even more emphatically in accord with the elaboration of the President's statement: "No nation in all the world that is free to make a choice is going to set itself up under the fascist form of government, or the nazi form of government, or the Japanese war-lord form of government. Such forms are the offspring of seizure of power followed by the abridgment of freedom. Therefore, the United Nations can properly say of these forms of government two simple words: 'Never again.'"

We are delighted that the acknowledged leader of the United Nations has made clear that Article III is not meant to be a green light for adventurers and tyrants. Finally, the President established the interdependence of freedom when he said, "Today the personal freedom of every American and his family depends, and in the future will increasingly depend, upon the freedom of his neighbors in other lands." If the Great Powers had applied this rule in the past, perhaps humanity would have been spared the misery of the nazi regime and of the present war.

The President's speech is a clear warning to the pro-fascist elements everywhere—a warning that if they try to re-establish some of the regimes which have existed before this war, they will have to face not only the opposition of their own people but that of all the United Nations. The people of Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece, where anti-democratic regimes were established by illegal methods, will certainly get immense satisfaction from this utterance. Russia, too, will find encouragement in this statement, for it assures her that she will not be surrounded in the future by ultrareactionary regimes which have menaced her frontiers and with which she found it impossible to co-operate.

It remains now to implement the President's great speech by a more effective organization of the United Nations on the basic principles outlined in the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations declaration. These permit the immediate creation of a Supreme Council. If the Council begins to function while the war is still going on, it will provide the first constructive step toward the establishment of an organization which can cope effectively with the problems of reconstruction as soon as the Axis Powers are defeated. The President of the United States, as the head of one of the most important members of the United Nations and as a leader of world democracy, has the moral and political authority to initiate this step toward the organization of the United Nations which all the people everywhere await so eagerly.

Need for Immediate Action

PERHAPS the worst harm that Hitler has done to mankind he has done, not by speech or sword, but indirectly, as the result of his other deeds. He has made men callous to human suffering and indifferent to human needs. How else is one to explain the reaction, or rather, the lack of immediate reaction to the appalling policy of extermination which he is pursuing in regard to the Jews of Europe? How else can one account for the fact that neither officially nor unofficially have the United Nations indicated that they contemplate any measures of relief for Hitler's victims—relief which must be forthcoming, however and wherever it may be instituted?

For example, there has been no indication that the Allied Powers have taken any action to explore the possibilities of the recently publicized proposal of Rumania to transfer 70,000 Jews from within her borders to a place of refuge. Yet immediate action is demanded by all the considerations of humanity and civilized conduct. If Rumania is really prepared to place 70,000 human beings at the ports of entry either of Turkey or of Palestine, then there can be no other course open to the United Nations than to see that these unfortunates are moved to safety as soon as possible. The haven must be forthcoming; Turkey may keep them and Palestine would be glad to receive them. If the United Nations are prepared to pay the price demanded for transporting each refugee and prepared to assure whatever country may accept them that the expenses of their existence will be met, there will be no difficulty anywhere about receiving this group and thousands more. These expenses, it must be remembered, will constitute an infinitesimal portion of the cost of the war, and it is safe to say that all mankind will approve the expenditure of one millionth of one percent of the price of destruction and death for the purpose of salvation and life.

Political considerations are said to deter the action of the Allies in connection with this offer. Such considerations as have been mentioned in the report, however, cannot stand up to rational examination. That spies may be planted among the 70,000 refugees is an absurd as well as trivial argument in view of the fact that the whole Middle and Near East teems with fascist spies and agents of Arab and other nationalities; moreover, it would be difficult to find a group of people less likely to harbor an undetected spy in its midst than Jewish refugees; and finally, of course, it is to be expected that wherever this group goes, proper measures of security will be taken by the United Nations. The other argument, which holds up the long-exploited threat of Arab displeasure to Jewish immigration into Palestine, is equally indefensible. In the first place, the important thing is to get these people out of Rumania; whether they spend the interim in Palestine or Turkey or Sweden is a secondary consideration. Secondly, the Arab opposition to Jewish immigration has been grossly exaggerated. At all times it was incited by Fascists and others who were interested in creating an unsettled state of affairs in Palestine. The masses of the Arab population in Palestine are well aware of how greatly their lot has improved since Jewish immigration has rebuilt that forsaken land, and they realize how much they have to gain from a continuous influx of a people dedicated to restoring the country. And lastly, it is unfair to portray a large proportion of democratic and liberal

Arabs as more selfish and more callous than any other people on the face of the globe. We may trust them to recognize the desperate circumstances which require the admission of these refugees and to make them welcome. They certainly will do so if they are made to feel by the action of the United Nations that the world expects it of them.

A Task Well Done

WE are delighted that Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, "the helpmeet and co-worker of one of the outstanding figures of the world," as Speaker Rayburn characterized her, has recovered from her illness and is able to resume the task for which she is so supremely fitted —building morale. Mme. Chiang is one of us. She is a member of our International Honorary Board; and she has been in the forefront of the fight we are waging for world organization, not only in her own country but also abroad. We are certain that her visit will help to strengthen the ties between the peoples of America and China. She, better than anyone else, will be able to give an authoritative picture of the spirit of resistance of the Chinese people and of their will to help establish truly United Nations.

In her speech to Congress, Mme. Chiang has confirmed the confidence that her friends have in her qualities of leadership. With infinite tact she presented to America the task of winning the war and of creating a better world after victory. She gave America one of the compliments to which the people of this country will be most sensible, namely, that America "is not only the cauldron of democracy, but the incubator of democratic principles." There she convincingly scotched the prevailing opinion which "seems to consider the defeat of Japan as of relative unimportance." She urged that a global war must be waged simultaneously against nazi Germany and Japan. Mme. Chiang's great vision was even more evident when she spoke of the peace to come. She does not want a provincial, nationalistic, or continental peace. She pleads for the only peace which will be real, namely, universal peace. Despite all the suffering which her country has undergone and is undergoing, Madame Chiang does not think of a punitive peace. Her approach is constructive and her sole thought is to build a better world "not for ourselves alone, but for all humankind." Finally, she clearly stated that China will never "demean herself and all she holds dear to the practice of the marketplace," a declaration which those who would negotiate a selfish peace may well take to heart.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek represents the will of her people. Her speech indicates that China, the most important nation of Asia, is ready to do her full share in organizing a free world. She has indicated that under no circumstances will China abandon her ideals for a compromise with the aggressor. She expressed the hope that "America and our other gallant Allies will not be obtunded by the mirage of contingent reasons of expediency." We hope that the inspiration of her words will lead the people of America and all the other free peoples on earth to strive now to lay the foundations for a better world.

The Opposing Camps

BY ALBERTO GUANI

WHEN during the last war people said that the whole world was in convulsion, the statement was inexact. The war of 1914 was doubtless at the time the greatest war of history, but it never assumed the proportions of the present-day conflagration. While the United States, France, and Great Britain were the directing powers at the Conference of Versailles, still Russia was excluded and Italy in a sense was relegated to the background. Russia had already made peace with the Germans, and Italy, even if it came to Versailles as a victor, was in a very peculiar position which did not permit it to satisfy its ambitions—ambitions which have since grown continually under the influence of the conquistador spirit of fascism.

My feeling is that at the present time warring humanity is not simply divided into nations of different types of geographical aspiration, but rather that it is now definitively separated into two great camps: one camp of the peoples that struggle for liberty and an opposing camp of peoples who are the embodiment of systematized oppression and despotism. I do not believe that the peace, whenever it may be made, will have as its principal aim the fixing of geographical frontiers. To my way of thinking it is the moral frontiers of the human race that will then be determined, and so determined that the democratic peoples will offer their way of life as a model to those who have gone into the war as slaves driven by their masters.

I have allowed myself to offer this sketch since the very name of your institution, "Free World," seemed to authorize it. Indeed it is the idea of a free world that leads us on in this tremendous, this frightful world drama. What the material frontiers will be that separate the free world from the world that is now enslaved is not my present concern; what is significant is that there will be no enslaved world in the future, that within each country liberty will be supreme, and that the world's destiny will be dictated by the ideals of the Democracies. America seems to have been born to be a standard-bearer of international political idealism. For centuries it was subjected to the hateful slavery of the conquistador and suffered the physical infamy of brute force, and throughout these centuries it always sought unity as the most powerful weapon for winning freedom.

The first hero of this cause was Bolivar. Immediately after the successful struggles for emancipation, the great endeavor of his perspicacious mind was to organize means of defense for America's independence through the co-operation of all its free peoples. When, after victory, free states had been established, his lifelong dream was the Congress of Panama. Monroe's conception was based on the same thought of complete unification of this hemisphere in order to preserve in all its countries the principles of liberty. At the beginning of the nineteenth century one of my country's heroes, the great Artigas, similarly felt that all America had to be maintained inviolate in the face of the monarchies that were attempting to retain by force what they were losing through law and justice.

Through the achievement of its independence the American continent had already marked out the way we must follow during and after this war, which represents the incessant struggle, now spread over the entire world, of liberty against oppression. Unity in thought and deed, which must be an essential weapon in our gigantic battle, must also be maintained when peace brings with it the duty of adopting the fundamental concepts of the

international organization of the future.

There are three immortal words which, from the beginning of our republican life, we have been accustomed to utter with respect—liberty, equality, fraternity. The divine mother of these words today lies prostrate at the feet of dictatorship and brute force; this nation, conquered and destroyed, is perhaps the most tragic symbol of the overthrow of civilization.

Nazi oppression would have crushed many a victim in America, as it has crushed France, Belgium, Greece, Holland, Luxemburg, and so many other martyred lands, if the United Nations, in the name of the liberty of all the peoples of the earth, had not heroically decided to establish the battlefront of democracy, which has in Roosevelt, in Stalin, and in Churchill its glorious and invincible standard-bearers.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA

An Editorial

NOW that the threat of immediate invasion no longer hangs over South America, there has been a noticeable change of sentiment in the consideration of its role in the war and in the peace to come. The general public is inclined to ignore the tremendous significance of the help which Latin America can give to the cause of the United Nations. Its immediately available materials and its potential resources contribute greatly to the strength of the Allies.

These considerations were well brought out at the dinner given by the Latin American Bureau of the Free World Association in honor of Dr. Alberto Guani, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice President-elect of Uruguay. The tone set in a brilliant extemporaneous speech by Mayor La Guardia which welcomed Chile to the United Nations and called upon Argentina to make the action of the Latin American Republics unanimous, was sustained by the addresses of Ambassador Michels of Chile, Sir Noel Hall, the British Minister, Count Carlo Sforza, Czechoslovak Minister Count Papanek, J. Alvarez del Vayo, Executive Director of the Free World Association, Commander Pacciardi, Ralph Bates, and Professor H. Fernández Artucio, who presided.

Similarly, the messages sent to us on this occasion by the ambassadors and ministers of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, as well as the Minister of Denmark, Secretary of Interior Ickes, and the Consul Generals of the U. S. S. R. and of the Union of South Africa, extolled Dr. Guani as one of the champions of inter-American and world co-operation and recognized the services of his progressive nation as an advocate of international collaboration.

The speeches and proceedings at the dinner were broadcast to Latin America by C. B. S. through the facilities of the Office of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs and this action has played a prominent part in stimulating further support in Latin America for the cause of the United Nations. The numerous conferences we organized, in which Dr. Guani participated as President of the Latin America Free World Association, further aided the realization by the democratic forces in Latin America of the part they must play in the task of winning the war and establishing the proper conditions of peace. Further steps were taken along the lines originally suggested by Free World for the formation of a Latin American Expeditionary Force.

RETREAT *from the* FOUR FREEDOMS ?

by Francis P. Locke

THE last few months have brought to the United Nations a superb series of military successes. At the same time they have produced a mélange of mystifying political actions and statements. The military actions have brought us closer than we dreamed to the winning of the war. The political maneuvers appear to have made more remote the winning of the peace. On all fronts our soldiers have advanced against the enemy. But on some of these same fronts the buglers of statecraft have blown what many persons will ruefully interpret as the first off-color notes of a retreat from the Four Freedoms.

It is with no intention of embarrassing the conduct of the war that these persons feel impelled to bring into the open their fears that we are losing sight of the future. On the contrary, if they keep silent, and certain trends are allowed to move on unchecked, the waging of the war quite as much as the building of the peace may be adversely affected. In this field as in others, honest criticism is the best insurance against catastrophe.

Here are some of the straws which observers of the diplomatic weather have seen drifting downwind:

1. Prime Minister Churchill's declaration in the House of Commons on November 10, 1942: "We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."

2. Mr. Churchill's prior statement to the House of Commons, September 9, 1942, that "the joint declaration [Atlantic Charter] does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma, or other parts of the British Empire."

3. The absence of assurances about Hong Kong when the American and British Governments pledged the abandonment of extraterritorial rights in China.

4. Sir Stafford Cripps' removal from the British War Cabinet and his shift from the post of Government leader in the House of Commons to that of Minister for Aircraft Production.

5. General Eisenhower's Armistice Day broadside to the French, in which he said: "The forces under my command bring with them solemn assurances that his [Marshal Lyautey's] achievement—the North African empire—shall remain French."

6. Our dealings with Darlan; the slow pace at which General Giraud is cleaning the Vichyites out of North Africa; the deliberate appointment of the ex-collaborationist Peyrouton as governor of Algeria; the discouraging performance of our Minister to North Africa, Robert Murphy, and above and behind him, the American State Department.

7. The identification of Archduke Otto with the recruiting on American soil of a "Free Austria" battalion. (The project was indorsed by the War Department, and although President Roosevelt later described Otto's committee as only one of the many,

the latter seems to proceed on the assumption that he is the only one who counts.)

8. Our continued appeasement of General Franco, culminating in Ambassador Carlton J. H. Hayes' speech of January 15 in Madrid, in which he said: "If the political and social institutions of this country undergo change or modification in future years, it will be the work of Spaniards within Spain, not of the United States or of Spanish *émigrés*." (A point of view we might very well have espoused in 1936, but did not.)

The first four suggestions of retreat from the Four Freedoms spring from the British Government. The writer does not intend to agitate them in this article. It is easy to be critical of the other person's conduct and generous with his property. As the last four points of the foregoing list suggest, we have motes in our own eye which large numbers of Englishmen have found at least as offensive as many Americans have thought the British policy toward India. (This is a fact of which most Americans are only dimly aware because of the trans-Atlantic censorship.)

What is more important is this: England has long been mixed up in European balance-of-power politics, and in global imperialism. The motives of her foreign policy have never been universally regarded as benevolent. When she takes a backward step, people may be disappointed but they are not altogether disillusioned. But the United States stands in the eyes of most of the world as a pillar of power tempered with mercy, authority clothed with disinterestedness. When *we* deviate from this role, the shock travels swiftly around the globe. It shakes the faith of the suffering peoples to whom we have long been the Great Inspiration. It carves chinks in our moral armor into which the reactionaries, at home and abroad, drive the entering wedges with which they hope to sabotage the peace. When *we* fail to uphold democratic ideals, the repercussions are widespread and dangerous. The American people have a right and a duty to stop the retreat from the Four Freedoms.

We recognize that our responsible leaders have their eye on a peace that will be just, democratic, and durable. The most exalted aims were stated by President Roosevelt in his January message to Congress. Vice-President Wallace has kept on shooting through the raised sights that made his performance at the FREE WORLD dinner of last May 8 such a notable text of freedom. Sumner Welles and Ambassador Winant and, to some extent, Secretary Cordell Hull, appear to be awake to the more important issues. And from the outside comes welcome pressure from men like Governor Harold E. Stassen and Wendell Willkie. But it is possible for a man to walk with his eyes on the brightest star and stumble on a pebble in the path beneath him. Are our leaders already tripping themselves up on the pebbles of improvised diplomacy and day-to-day military decisions?

There have been strong arguments for the policy we pursued toward the French when we first landed in North Africa. We *did* save lives and we *did* save time, although we appear not to have taken full advantage of the early start we got toward Tunisia. We got Dakar and a part of the French fleet. Most of the ships at Toulon ended up on the floor of the harbor instead of in the hands of the Germans. Martinique and Guadaloupe ceased to be the sore spots of the Western Hemisphere. In the sense that nothing succeeds like success, much is to be said for these dispositions. But the advantages they gave us were local and short range. One may wonder if something far more vital was not traded away in the bargain. This something is nothing less than the moral integrity of the United Nations.

But what can be said for the things we are still doing in the French Empire three months after the immediate military necessities have been satisfied? The excuses urged on behalf of these are not remotely adequate. Peyrouton, it is said, is a "good administrator." This claim has been subjected to sharp question. Even were it conceded, is there such a dearth of good administrators among the democratic French that a thoroughgoing fascist must be imported from Argentina? General Giraud's failure to retire Noguès and other ex-Vichy colonial officials is defended on the ground that we can afford no political disturbance behind our lines. This excuse is questionable for many reasons. But in any case, it does

not explain why we have fortified the fascist element by importing new Vichy officials.

The failure to liberate the Spanish Republican internees from their miserable Saharan concentration camp is upheld on the theory that we must protect our rear by appeasing General Franco, who has 150,000 troops in Spanish Morocco. As Dorothy Thompson has pointed out, we control Gibraltar and are in a position to choke off the supply lines of this army at a moment's notice. To neutralize these feeble fence-sitting forces should not require any discreditable diplomatic deals.

II

WHAT has been done in Africa suggests that the United Nations are still without a grand political strategy. President Roosevel himself described our dispositions as "only a temporay expedient, justified solely by the stress of battle." That statement was generally hailed as wiping the last blemish off the deal with Darlan and the promise to resurrect the French Empire. Doubtless it can be stretched to cover the more recent "expedients." But many thoughtful persons must remain in a state of anxiety. For the President's statement appeared to be an official admission that our policy was on a day-to-day basis.

What have been the workings of this policy, be it calculated or empirical? So far, we have seen matters of global importance, for this generation and the next, decided by a single general, representing a single nation, commanding troops operating on a single front, the significance of which is still secondary to other great battle sectors. Taking nothing away from General Eisenhower's strategic gifts, and not forgetting for a moment the great and complex pressures under which he is working, it must be remembered that he is a soldier and not a statesman. Yet suddenly he is up to his neck in diplomacy and politics. The very fact that he is "the man on the spot," while qualifying him in one respect to make the right decisions, places him in a position where it would be very easy to make the wrong ones. A Tunisian foxhole is not a particularly good vantage point from which to survey a global war. Nor is the principle altered by the fact that General Eisenhower seems to be a modest soul who would prefer to concentrate on the military maps, who doubtless did not ask for the civil authority but found himself catapulted into it.

It is true that General Eisenhower has been provided with a diplomatic adviser. But Robert Murphy appears to have been a diplomatic liability. He was responsible for much that led up to the deal with Darlan, and his activities since then have been open to grave question. *The New Republic* says it was Mr. Murphy who persuaded General Eisenhower to turn the Morocco radio back to the Vichyites, in whose hands it became such a transmission belt for Axis propaganda that Elmer Davis had to warn the American public to pay no attention to it. Mr. Murphy recently defended his activities by the statement: "The Allies never came to North Africa with a panacea to cure political ills or to impose political doctrines on the inhabi-

"Don't cry. You still have a chance with the friendly Army of Occupation."

tants." This is hardly pertinent. The question is whether they came to perpetuate nazi doctrines previously imposed by Vichy officials. Obviously, Mr. Murphy is not the man to further the principles for which the United Nations are supposed to be struggling.

It is in point to ask what would happen if other Allied Governments should follow in our footprints. General Montgomery would decide the colonial future of Libya. General Wavell would lay out the policy toward Burma and French Indo-China. Long before Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek came together at the peace table, Marshal Zhukov would have decided in what form the Polish State is to be reconstituted. And to pursue the parallel, after the generals were through, the victors would consolidate their mistakes by sending in the most reactionary members of their respective foreign offices. What would happen to the democratic blueprints for a new order in Asia, Africa, and Europe?

III

ENOUGH is known of the record of the late Admiral Darlan to make unnecessary a recapitulation in these pages. What it is important to remember is that the authorities who dealt with him expected him to live and to go on being French High Commissioner, at least for a considerable period. That he was expunged from the picture was an act, not of our diplomacy, but of an assassin's bullet—under circumstances that have not been explained to the moment of this writing. Our policy can fairly be judged on the basis of what the long range political consequences would have been if Darlan had not been murdered. It can also be judged in terms of the appointment of Marcel Peyrouton as Governor of Algeria. For almost everything that could be said about Darlan can be said about Peyrouton. This man was one of the Vichy inner circle. As Vichy Minister of the Interior, he built the first concentration camp in France, arrested de Gaullists by the thousands, clapped Blum, Reynaud, Mandel, and others into prison. In 1940, he told representatives of Transocean, the nazi news agency, that he had introduced nazi methods into North Africa.

Both Darlan and Peyrouton were bona fide candidates for the post-war trials of collaborationist leaders. If Laval were the principal in crimes against the French people and the United Nations, these others were powerful accessories. (As Minister of the Interior it could almost be said that Peyrouton was the executioner.) Seeing the handwriting on the wall, they turned state's evidence. In a court of law, such a maneuver usually earns the culprit a more or less lenient sentence. Darlan and Peyrouton received no sentences whatsoever. Instead, they were whisked over to the other side of the courtroom, invested with respectability, and successively given the job of first assistant to the prosecutor.

The most discouraging feature of all this is that we seem not to have learned our lesson. For a time it was believed that the assassination of Darlan, however effusive the formal regrets, was a matter of great spiritual relief to the American and British Governments. It unburdened our diplomacy of a great embarrassment. It gave a fine opportunity for a fresh start. But now what have we done? We have taken on Peyrouton. Apparently the rule of the burned child and the hot stove is suspended until further notice. At Casablanca the conferees made impressive military plans but they appear not to have made equal progress in the political situation. A genuine understanding between Giraud and De Gaulle seems almost as far away as ever. Even if they should effect a fusion, it would leave much to be desired. For although both are luminous patriots, they represent the conservative military class from which little is to be expected in the way of post-war orientation. But such an accord would be so great an improvement over the present deal as to appear almost Elysian.

Meanwhile De Gaulle and Giraud have agreed to work together in the field, and troops under the jurisdiction of both of them are said to be fighting stubbornly against the Germans. But the Fighting French, very obviously, are not happy over developments. Will this subtract from their heretofore notable enthusiasm? And what of the millions of anti-fascist Frenchmen in France? We are counting on their cooperation if and when we cross the English Channel. What a difference—*what a purely*

military difference—it would make if we were to get there and find their spirit broken. This could happen, at least to some degree, for the co-operation of the conquered peoples must be founded on a popular trust in our purposes. It is not enough to count on the purely negative value of the Frenchman's hatred for the Germans.

IV

NOW, our dispositions cannot be looked upon as isolated issues bearing only on French Africa. We are going to be faced with analogous problems in almost every country into which we move on the tide of a swelling military victory. What will happen if we invade Italy? Will we take on Count Ciano, if he chooses to become an applicant for judicial clemency? Undoubtedly the war could be made shorter and less costly if we were to deal with Ciano, with the house of Savoy, or with some of the Italian generals. Suppose we attack Northern France and Laval deems it politic to make a leap for our bandwagon? What would happen if Major Quisling should seek to embrace advancing Allied columns in Norway? Or General Antonescu in Rumania?

What are likely to be the practical effects of these *modi vivendi,* undertaken with a short range view to advancing our military fortunes and holding down the casualties? In the long run they may have an adverse impact on the war. They are certain to cause us trouble when we take up the task of world reconstruction.

For the guarantee of the French Empire, also the Dutch Empire, and Allied sponsorship of some of the reactionary refugee governments in London, must disturb millions of democracy's most ardent friends in subjugated Europe, to say nothing of the Russians, the Chinese, the Hindus. These peoples are important in the war scheme, too. So are the Arabs. It is true that these people were not too friendly toward the Allies to begin with, but we have done little to get them on our side since we went into Morocco and Algeria. The fact that a number of natives are collaborating with German parachutists behind our lines gives some idea of the damage a disgruntled people is capable of doing. Nor can we afford to overlook the repercussions our policy is having in England. It has raised a storm of indignation, of which only the faintest echoes are strained through the censor's filter.

The dalliance with Archduke Otto, a typical example of our meandering policy, will have a disquieting effect on the peoples of Central and Southeastern Europe. Otto is the representative of a bankrupt, oppressive monarchy which was primarily responsible for starting this whole series of world wars. In 1918, this monarchy was repudiated by both the ruling and the subject nationalities within its borders. To revive it now would be a monstrous betrayal of our proclaimed ideals.

A different situation arises in connection with our Spanish policy. Obviously, there are good reasons for keeping Franco neutral. Certainly we do not want Hitler's armies to stream through Spain and fall upon the rear of our troops in North Africa. But had anyone stopped to think whether this end can best be served by appeasing Franco? With his starving and war-weary people, he holds very poor cards in the game. He does not want Hitler to come through Spain either. Appeasement under these conditions seems not only weak but unrealistic. While to announce plans to run Franco out of Spain would, at this juncture, be foolhardy, we do not have to underwrite his regime. We do not have to deny to the Spanish people, *émigrés* included, the blessings of self-determination. We do not have to restrain outside forces from rectifying a situation that was brought about by other outside forces, the fascist forces of Hitler and Mussolini. We do not have to keep the concentration camps crowded with men who fought against Hitler in the front lines in the very days when Chamberlain and Daladier were grasping his hand at Munich.

Of this we can be sure: Franco is cut from the fascist cloth. He has never made the slightest secret of his philosophy, nor of his sympathies in the present struggle. Efforts to ingratiate ourselves with him make us look foolish as well as weak. The assurances which Ambassador Hayes gave him went far beyond the military necessities in Tunisia. In the political field, they

were a blunder of the first order. They will sow questions in the minds of millions whose confidence in our motives should at all costs be nourished.

It is necessary to emphasize that in this political as well as military war we have enemies, friends, and fence-sitters within all nations. This condition is susceptible to exploitation, as Hitler has shown with such evil genius. It was the political weapon upon which he relied almost exclusively for the hoped-for conquest of America. Political warfare is potent, not only for evil, but also for good, as President Wilson proved in 1918 when he sowed the Fourteen Points among the Germans. If we really want to shorten the war, save lives, and win a lasting victory, we will give an A-1-A priority to this instrument.

From the standpoint of the peace, the course we are taking will make the masses cynical and will sap the determination of the idealists in all countries. It will strengthen the hand of the elements that hope to use the peace as an instrument of blind revenge, national aggrandizement, or personal political preferment. In the United States these same effects will be in evidence. They will be the precondition for a harsh, "realistic" peace, followed by another retreat into isolationism.

Dangerous as are our dealings with dubious personalities, the thinnest ice onto which we have ventured is that of territorial commitments. Lessons learned in the last war appear to have been forgotten, and we are in for grave future embarrassment. Actually, the embarrassment is here and now. Consider our relationships with England. How can we interest ourselves in liberating the colonies of an empire which has fought through the war bravely and victoriously, and against incredible discouragements—and at the same time promise to *restore* the colonies of an empire which was beaten, bedraggled, dispirited, and half aligned with our enemies? Indeed, lacking a victor's claims, France presented us with an invitingly clean slate for an experiment in colonial renovation. Already the slate is cluttered up with a formidable amount of doodling.

What sort of precedent have we set for future operations? Suppose we invade the Balkan peninsula. If our troops reach Hungary first, will we proclaim that Transylvania shall always remain Hungarian? But if we reach Rumania first, will we proclaim that Transylvania shall always remain Rumanian?

The lost peace of 1919 was the product of many forces, but one of the most powerful was the maze of secret commitments among the Allied Governments. These treaties were made just prior to our entry into the war and they were made with the same plausible objectives that have motivated our "solemn assurances" to the French imperialists. In the years that followed the Armistice, the cold, revealing light of historical perspective was turned on this diplomacy of bribe and blackmail. Everywhere the secret treaties were recognized as iniquitous. A large share of the reputation of Mr. Wilson was made to rest on the question of whether, when he promulgated his Fourteen Points, he knew about these arrangements. Yet now, in this war, *we are actually making the arrangements.* It is doubtless true that there is nothing Machiavellian in what we are doing and that we mean it when we say our temporary military dispositions have no permanent standing. But our good intentions, even when plainly expressed, may not be the last word on the matter. The little things add up. The bent twigs become the distorted tree trunks. Any sort of commitment will have the power to haunt us, especially ones which we broadcast to the world as "solemn assurances." As for our promise to see that all peoples (except the Spaniards?) are to have a chance to choose their own leaders, it can only be said that the results of a plebiscite are likely to depend, to some extent, on who controls the political machinery at the time of the election. It is never easy to upset a *de facto* administration.

V

WE have an Atlantic Charter which Mr. Roosevelt was at pains to point out last year is really a World Charter. But is it? At this writing, it appears to apply only to the Atlantic Ocean, and possibly to the Arctic and Antarctic. It does not apply to the Pacific Ocean. It does not apply to the Indian Ocean. It does not even apply to the Mediterranean Sea. It is a charter that

exempts the Chinese on Hong Kong, the Hindus in India and the Arabs in North Africa. That makes it a diluted formula.

This is an unhealthy condition. What we are doing may smooth the road now but it will raise obstacles later. It may save a thousand lives today but lose ten thousand lives tomorrow and ten million lives the day after tomorrow. If our dream of peace, democracy and equal economic opportunity for all peoples is worth the massive investment in human life and limb which we have already made in it, then it is worth the slight increment of blood, sweat, toil, and tears which may be the price of preserving the purity of our motives and our freedom from commitments that would wreck the reconstruction era.

It will be said by some that this is a delicate moment in the war, that peace aims should not be agitated, that American diplomacy should not be burdened with public criticism, that discussions of this sort will distract our people, offend our Allies, and worry our military leaders. A bit of advice common today is: "Leave the war to the generals!" As far as military strategy is concerned, recent events have made the generals (and the admirals) look pretty good—still, the proposition is debatable. But nobody in his right mind ever said, in a modern democratic nation: "Leave the peace to the generals." Here is an area in which the military men are not the specialists. Nor is it safe to leave it all to the professional diplomats. In some respects, they are too much the specialists. Career diplomats have made some tragic blunders in the course of history. Some of ours seem to be making them in the course of current history. Here is a field in which well-informed civilians can plan and criticize, all to the general profit.

Are we retreating from the Four Freedoms? Are we selling the birthright of the free nations and the occupied nations and the colonially administered nations for a mess of military expediency? Are the hearts of the oppressed all over the world to turn away from the Americans and the English, who have fathered many fine and fair words, and fasten their hope on the Chinese and the Russians? Were we properly jolted when Stalin sent Timoshenko to Chungking, *not* Casablanca?

Be assured that other peoples will be quick to interpret as hypocrisy courses which may merely be the product of poor planning, limited vision, or simple drifting. They will remember that President Roosevelt projected the Four Freedoms to "everywhere in the world." Against that promise they will pit each bit of performance, or lack of it.

It is time to tackle the governmental problems of the countries to be liberated and the countries to be conquered with the same foresight with which Mr. Roosevelt has approached the problem of food distribution. It is time to come together with our Allies and work out a global peace strategy as well as a global war strategy. Meanwhile, until this can be achieved and to whatever degree we are compelled to go it alone, it behooves us to give ourselves a good checkup, to balance short range military openings against long range political perils, to shun the quicksands of opportunism, to resume the straightforward role in history which, when another war ground to its bloody end, made the United States the hope of mankind and Woodrow Wilson the messiah of the world's smashed and groping millions.

If we falter now, the reactionaries in all countries, including our own, will be quick to seize the advantage. They are organizing, they are waiting. When they see an opening, they will move in for the kill, and they will run away with the world of our children. Then it will not be long until we have a new Hitler—not necessarily a German Hitler.

It is not enough for our leaders to have minds fixed on high edifices. They must look to the rock upon which they propose to build their edifices. They must guard it against the subtle wave-action of appeasement and the insidious erosion of expediency. If they fail in these precautions, their countrymen must remind them of the perils. There are millions of Americans—North, East, South, West—who understand and appreciate the real issues. Washington will be helped, not hindered, if these persons make themselves articulate. For Washington has taken the first steps in retreat. It may turn and charge again if it learns that it is being reinforced by the American people.

SABOTEURS *of* THE PEACE

by
Hans Habe

WHEN future historians write a story of the Fifth Column, they will surely devote special attention to that group of people who might be called "the unconscious Fifth Column." These historians will stress the fact that epidemics of Fifth Columnism spread like one of those venereal diseases of which the greatest danger is their victims' ignorance of having been infected. The unsuspecting victims of the brown bacilli become aware of their responsibility as soon as the dangers which threaten them and into which they may plunge their fellow countrymen are explained to them. Just as the Boston Rumor Clinic designed to combat malicious propaganda—which incidentally is one of the most intelligent inventions of this war—examines rumors, false news, and hostile reports as it were under a magnifying glass and removes their poison merely by publicizing them, so many of the dangerous Fifth Column bacilli could be made harmless if they were recognized as such in time.

We do not intend here to attempt a complete diagnosis of this infectious disease nor to discuss all the methods of curing it. But it may be interesting to show how certain delusive views, treacherous opinions, misinterpretations, and slogans, originating in unknown sources and spreading all over the country with the help of their unconscious bearers, emerge with striking regularity, become fashionable, and contaminate public opinion. Hitler's agents long ago realized that the poison of false ideology is at least as dangerous as the poison of malicious and false reports.

The slogan which is at present alamode and which, born in some dark region, is being spread through well-organized channels, runs as follows: *"Let us try to discredit or ridicule all post-war peace plans!"* The motives that inspire the Fifth Column to hand out this slogan to its agents and victims are fivefold.

1. *Hitler and his followers want to undermine every post-war plan for reasons of a general nature.* Hitler knows better than all his enemies that this religious war will be won by those whose faith is most deeply anchored. Hitler's defeat did not begin when he met with Russian resistance but—ironically—when he opened an ideological Second Front against himself. Since the day in June, 1941, when he hurled his hordes against the Soviet armies, this marshal of a lying ideology has had to wage simultaneously an anti-bolshevist ideological campaign in the east and an anti-capitalist campaign in the west. Today, his anti-bolshevist ideology, which was his strongest weapon, lies buried under the ruins of Cologne, while his anti-capitalist ideology lies buried under the ruins of Stalingrad. Hitler knows this. But he also knows that he can make up for his ideological losses by robbing the Democracies of their ideological weapon. The German soldier who in 1939 thought he knew what he was fighting for has lost sight of his war aims. If the democratic soldier realizes what he is fighting for with ever greater clarity, he will fight with ever greater enthusiasm and thus advance the date of his triumph. This is

what Hitler wants to prevent, and that is why he struggles against the clarification of our peace aims.

2. *Next come reasons of a tactical nature.* All the dissensions and misunderstandings among the United Nations, so useful to Hitler, stem from the fact that the peace plans of these nations have not been clearly stated. The propaganda against "British imperialism," the fear of a "bolshevized Europe," Chinese distrust of "dark plans concerning the Pacific," everything that causes uneasiness among the Allies, would disappear in the twinkling of an eye if a common plan for post-war organization were drawn up by the United Nations. The same is true with regard to the domestic policies of each ally. When no propagandist can tell the mothers of American boys that their sons "will be forced to fight for many more years in Europe," when no one can say that certain statesmen are demanding full war powers so that they can establish a dictatorial rule after the war—in brief, when a clear statement of war and peace aims dispels the existing distrust among the nations and among the citizens of each Allied nation, Hitler will suffer the defeat that he fears and that he tries to avert by discrediting the so-called "peace Utopias."

3. *A clearly formulated peace plan would avoid the chaos which Hitler wants.* Such a plan is necessary not only to prevent post-war chaos in Europe and in the Far East, but also to dispel the fear of chaos which prevails in the United States today. Many people who sincerely desire a victorious conclusion of this war fall prey to Axis propaganda when they are made to think that they will have to make many sacrifices after the end of the hostilities. They fear—and justly—the effect of a European or Asiatic chaos upon America. It is, therefore, imperative to work out a plan which will prevent chaos and which will reassure those who fear it. Only those who want to intensify the nervousness now prevalent in the United States and the Allied countries have an interest in agitating against the formulation of a peace plan.

4. *To lessen the effect of our psychological warfare is another objective.* A peace plan is indispensable in order to wage effective psychological warfare and to frustrate enemy propaganda. As long as there is no agreement as to the purpose of our propaganda, that is, whether it should seek to terrify the Germans or to reassure them, any effective propaganda is impossible. But agreement on methods is impossible unless we know exactly what we want after the war. There is, furthermore, no doubt that in the very near future Hitler will, directly or indirectly, start a peace offensive. In his open or concealed peace offensive he will promise anything at all, as he never feels bound to keep his promises. His peace offensive will have purely propagandistic objectives, among them the splitting of our public opinion. But no Hitlerite peace offers will be accepted by the American people if we popularize our own peace plan. This fourth consideration, too, is clearly understood by the enemies of a democratic peace.

5. *The most powerful reason for which Hitler's agents seek to demolish or ridicule every peace plan is their clear realization that their master is doomed.* The conscious and unconscious Fifth Columnists, unable to save Hitler, want at least to save Hitlerism. If our war aims are clearly defined, our returning soldiers will be able, if necessary, to remind us of our promise to eradicate fascism. If today we say clearly why we fight, it will be impossible tomorrow to transform our crusade into a plundering expedition, our war for freedom into a war for colonies; it will be impossible to betray the ideals of this struggle and to substitute by trickery the victory of any particular nationalism for the victory of a universal idea. The real aim of those who profess they fear "Utopias" is to betray our soldiers by sabotaging the peace and, above all, to help preserve the principles of the man whose defeat they cannot prevent. *They want to save fascism,* even after Germany's defeat.

II

A DIAGNOSIS of an infectious disease is incomplete without an indication of the channel through which the bacilli penetrated the diseased organism. It has been fashionable to attack the peace projects according to two methods: by appealing to pseudo-patriotism or by holding up such plans to public derision.

The pseudo-patriots, who show a predilection for those virile expressions which always find a response in wartime, argue that "we must first win the war before thinking of peace plans." They act as though Vice-President Wallace, for example, had said that we must elaborate peace plans *instead* of producing cannon, and as though the intention of his peace plan were not precisely to stimulate the production of cannon. Aside from such false arguments, they also employ the weapon of derision. The same cheap cartoonists, empty-headed lecturers, and dull orators who played an essential part in discrediting the League of Nations are now at work trying to prove that all peace projects originate in women's clubs or in the spinsterish minds of those dogmatists who proved their inanity at Geneva. Once again, they speak of "a realistic approach," and once again they imply they are wise and superior when they jeer at "Utopians."

It is perhaps useful to add here a few words intended to clarify the general confusion about so-called "realism" and "idealism." The so-called realists believe that after the war every country should be allowed to choose the form of government appropriate to it. If, then, a defeated Germany chooses to establish a new kind of fascism, we should not interfere. This war is being waged in order to make new wars impossible. To prevent new wars, all nations must have the opportunity freely to condemn all wars. This is not possible in a fascist state. Thus, if we are "realistic" and permit the defeated nations to do what they like, we pave the way for a new war.

But there is another kind of realism which consists in offering the European peoples solutions "à la Darlan." This kind of realism must also fail. We must understand that the peoples of Europe throughout these years have hungered for freedom even more keenly than for food. If we offer them the alternative between demoracy and bolshevism, they will unhesitatingly choose democracy. But if we offer them the alternative between a new form of fascism and bolshevism, they will unhesitatingly choose bolshevism. If this is what we want, we should allow our realists full freedom to act.

Consciously or unconsciously the enemies of peace planning are both victims and bearers of the brown plague which Hitler has spread over the world. But many among them are curable. For that reason we should like to conclude by quoting a few lines sent by the correspondent Byron Darnton, from the hell of Guadalcanal, which reached his newspaper after his death on the field of battle:

> The correspondent in this war, unlike his predecessor of twenty-five years ago, can find manifold evidence that the victory will be well used. Young men who are doing our fighting are, to a surprising extent, thinking about the war's end not only in terms of getting back to their wives and sweethearts and getting away from danger and discomfort. They are thinking also in terms of what kind of world we shall have after peace comes. They are thinking realistically!

To sum up, then, it is not too much to say that for the heroes of Guadalcanal, as for those of Stalingrad, Bataan, Smolensk, or Dunkirk, to think realistically means to build such a peace as is worth while dying for. Byron Darnton's last dispatch is more than a newspaperman's report; it is a testament. It contains the important message: *The saboteurs of the peace are the saboteurs of the war.*

The Democracy of the Nordic People

by
Sigrid Undset

HERE in America people still speak far too much — to our way of thinking — about our forefathers as the vikings. True, the Greenlanders of Norse descent, who were the first Europeans to set foot on the soil of this continent, probably all had some time taken part in viking raids on the shores of some Old World country. But when Leif the Lucky set out on the voyage that took him to America, he and his followers certainly did not sail as vikings, but as explorers. Like his Norwegian ancestors who had settled on the uninhabited islands of the Faroes and Iceland, like his father Eric the Red, who for years had explored the fjords of Greenland to decide where settlements might most advantageously be founded, Leif had planned a voyage of discovery and executed his plans with daring and determination. One of his aims seems to have been to look for sources other than Norway from which the tree-bare countries, Greenland and Iceland, could find supplies of timber. Among other considerations, gifts of building material for churches and the manors of the leading men were a means by which the kings of Norway could gain influence on the island. According to tradition their Founding Fathers had left Norway and their estates in the old country because they refused to obey a king not of their own choosing and laws that had been given without the consent of the governed. The Icelanders were perfectly willing to serve the kings of Norway, for gold or glamor, as warriors and court poets; their scholars took the keenest interest in the saga of their Mother country. But the citizens of the oldest republic in the world emphatically refused to tolerate Norwegian interference in the ruling of Iceland and Greenland.

With the death of St. Olav, king and martyr, in the battle of Stiklestad in 1030, the conversion of Norway to Christianity and the end of the Viking Age were achieved. In Denmark, it had happened somewhat earlier, in Sweden later. Certainly the Norsemen and the Danes still raided the British Isles, but the raids now were decently changed into dynastic warfare—to meddle in the quarrels of the Norse royal house in Dublin, or to support a Danish claim to the English realm of King Canute the Great. *And we Norwegians of today are proud, not that our forefathers were vikings, but that these same forefathers outgrew the viking mentality so rapidly, so that less than two hundred years after the battle of Stiklestad we were already in many ways far ahead of many older nations on the road that ultimately has led to present-day ideas about humaneness, justice, respect of the rights to personal freedom and to just treatment of individuals, poor or rich.*

> "A land should be built with law, But if every man would be satisfied with his own and deal justly with other men, no laws were needed. No law is so good to follow as Truth. . . . But if there were no law, he would get the most who had the power to grasp the most. Because of this, the law

must be for the benefit of every man, so that just, peace-loving, and innocent men may enjoy justice and peace, and unjust and evil-minded dare not commit the crimes they contemplate, out of fear of the law. . . . *Neither should the laws be written and made to the advantage of any in particular, but for the good of all men who live in the land.*"—Thus Denmark.

"A land should be built with law and not with deeds of violence. . . . Law must be given and maintained to protect the poor, secure peace for the peaceful, but to deal punishment and terror to the violent."—Thus Sweden.

"A land should be built with law. Because, if there were no law, no man could live in the land. Therefore law was made, *in the beginning by God, and afterwards by our king, with the consent of noblemen and the whole of the common people.*"—Also Swedish.

"A land should be built with law and not laid waste by lawlessness. *And he who will not suffer his neighbor to enjoy the protection of the law, let not the law protect him.*"—Thus Norway.

All of these statutes are from the late eleventh or early twelfth centuries. They show that the idea of government of the people, by the people, for the people, is ancient in the Nordic countries. In Norway, slavery was abolished before 1200 A.D.; in Denmark, somewhat later; in Sweden, some time in the fourteenth century. And in Norway, it was never transformed into serfdom: even the tenant farmers had only economic duties—payment of rent and upkeep of the farm—toward the owner, but they did not owe him service, and the owner had no jurisdiction over his tenants. The old Norse laws do not recognize torture as a means of extracting evidence. The punishment for witchcraft was banishment or drowning, but wanton accusation of a woman for being a witch was severely punished. Burning at the stake was the punishment exclusively for traitors toward king and country.

At first, women were legally minors; they had to be, as long as society had not developed organs for enforcement of the law. When the judges had pronounced in favor of a man, it was his duty, with the assistance of his kinsman, to execute the sentence—kill the killer or levy the fine. Later on, women got restricted civil rights and duties. But even if the husband had the management of his wife's estate, he could not sell parts of it or make risky dispositions of her property without her consent, given before two witnesses.

As in all medieval European societies, the Nordic people looked to a class of wealthy landed proprietors for leadership in peace and war. The noblemen had their privileges as well as their duties. But in Norway, the power of the nobility was severely curtailed by King Haakon V in the beginning of the fourteenth century, after the Norwegian barons during his minority had ruled or, as the King deemed, misruled the country after the fashion of medieval barons everywhere. It proved later on, when Norway became united to Denmark, that this breaking of the power of the gentry was not all for the good of the country. Scarcity of natural leaders handicapped the Norwegians' fight for equal rights within the union. The Norwegian bishops and high clergy became the champions of Norway's rights, and with the Lutheran Reformation her last spokesmen were vanquished for a long time. The king of the "Twin Kingdoms," residing in Denmark, took over the lands and the treasures of the Church; the new Protestant clergy were servants of the secular powers. But the Norwegians succeeded in saving one of their institutions from Catholic times: in Norway, the tithes had been divided in four equal parts, among the bishop, the parish church, the priest, and the poor. This last fourth, the *"Kristbu"* (Christ's property), was administered by the parish priest and a board of peasants from the parish. The king now claimed two-thirds of the tithes, leaving one-third for the Lutheran parson. But the Norwegians fought against it and saved the *"Kristbu"* for their own poor relief.

The union with Denmark came into being when Queen Margrethe of Norway, daughter of the king of Denmark, made the Danes elect her young son Olav for their king. Olav inherited the crown of Norway from his father. But Olav died when still a youth, and Margrethe had the little son of her sister's daughter, a German princeling, made king of Denmark and Norway—and for a time also of Sweden. The Swedes, however, after prolonged

struggles, broke loose from the union one century later. Norway and Denmark stayed united for four centuries. After Queen Margrethe's nephew, several German princes succeeded to the two kingdoms, on no better claim than descent from some Danish princess married to a German. In the end the royal house of Oldenborg established itself, and by and by the Oldenborgs became good Danish men. But they never became Norwegians. Though never brilliant, many of the Oldenborgs were conscientious rulers, who tried to do justice also to Norway and develop her natural resources. But Denmark, having had to fight German aggression from earliest times, now frequently became involved in wars also with Sweden, and Norway too had to fight these wars. In spite of the stubborn courage and patriotism of the Danes they often were the losers. And the highest price was paid by Norway, who had to give up old Norwegian provinces to Sweden.

With the German kings, and their German queens, German noblemen invaded the two countries, curried favors, got lands and fiefs. Sweden also suffered this invasion of German adventurers. On their new estates the Germans tried to introduce German laws and customs, destroying the age-old freedom and rights of the Nordic peasantry. Naturally the native lords of manors were more than willing to follow suit and secure for themselves the new privileges. The Danish peasants put up a tenacious fight for their old liberty, but were vanquished and reduced to serfdom. Sweden saw the same development, but here the trend was reversed by royal interference, before serfdom was fully established.

The Norwegian peasantry had better luck. For one thing, they had achieved a bad name as being stubborn and unmanageable, and anyhow their farms were small and scattered in a thinly populated country. (Villages proper, co-operating agricultural units, have never existed in Norway; each great or small farm was always individually held and operated.) It was not a country where great estates could profitably be established. And sensible and just Danish governors saw, and maintained in the face of the Government in Copenhagen, that to preserve the high fighting value of the Norwegian army it was most important not to wound the pride and the strong sense of personal dignity of the Norwegian peasants. The navy of the united kingdoms drew the best sailors and marines from the population of the Norwegian coastal areas, and if their liberties were infringed, they would simply stop being the best fighters and seamen of the navy.

On the whole the Norwegians were not dissatisfied with their state within the union. The written laws of the land were altered in accordance with the trend of the age—toward a treatment of prisoners and a penal code that make the Middle Ages seem a heaven of mercy as compared with the sixteenth or eighteenth century. Witchburning, torture, and barbaric modes of execution were introdued also in the Nordic countries. But besides the written law an elaborate system of bylaws and traditional ways of settling disputes among the people survived from Saga times, in part even up to today.

II

THE awakening of nationalism in Europe toward the end of the eighteenth century and the raising of the banner of liberty in the American colonies and in France thrilled the Norwegian intelligentsia. So, when the king of the "Twin Kingdoms" was forced in 1814 to "cede" Norway to Sweden, as a consequence of his policy during the Napoleonic wars, the Norwegians rose in resentment. They remembered that Norway had never been a province of Denmark; in fact, it was Denmark that had entered into union with the free kingdom of Norway. They refused to be "ceded." Our king had deserted us, we had not deserted him. But now it was time we took our fate in our own hands. The Danish peasants had been emancipated toward the end of the eighteenth century and were on the road to re-establishing their old power, yet we knew how superior in freedom and dignity the common man in Norway still was. In Sweden feudalism still held sway over large areas—even if more than half of the noble families whose coats of arms decorated the Stockholm Riddarhus were descended from men who had been knighted for services to their country,

as soldiers, civil servants, scientists, or men of letters or of the Church. Nevertheless, we Norwegians knew only life as an independent country would suit us.

At war with Sweden, blockaded and threatened by the European Great Powers, the Norwegians elected representatives from the whole country. At Eidsvoll, an old meeting place of the "Thing" of Saga times, the assembly of free men in council, our "Founding Fathers" met. And on May 17, 1814, they promulgated the new Norwegian constitution, the most radically democratic in Europe of that day. The war with Sweden ended when the Norwegians accepted the king of Sweden (really the elected crown prince, Napoleon's renegade Marshal Bernadotte, for the doddering old king never counted) as king of Norway too.

For almost one century, our efforts to maintain this sovereignty and secure full equality for Norway within the union tied up much of our energy and dominated our politics. The Swedish ruling classes were interested in reducing the democratic brother nation to a secondary, semidependent position. But the forces striving for democracy inside Sweden supported our fight, and were themselves as a fact supported from Norway, by following our development, feeding on our achievements in poetry, literature, and art. To all of the Nordic countries, not least through the works of Henrik Ibsen, Björnstjerne Björnson, and a number of authors less known abroad, Norway became the source of new, "radical," and progressive ideas, as well as the awakener of their consciousness of the Nordic past—the age-old passion for justice, freedom, and personal integrity which is the dominating urge of the Nordic mind.

It has been maintained that the lack of enthusiasm of the Germans for democracy was caused by the hard times, the poverty, unemployment, and social chaos coincident with the lifetime of the Weimar Republic. Unemployment and depression were, of course, rife not only in Germany but everywhere else in Europe. And in the Norway of 1814, as well as in the United States immediately after the American Revolution or in revolutionary France, hard times, scarcity of goods, inflation, and disruption of an old social order followed in the wake of the victory of democracy. But democracy—government by the people, liberty, and responsibility for the individual—were what these nations desired, and so they were willing to pay the price, as the Germans have proved willing to pay the price, in sacrifices, suffering, and blood, for a government according to their heart's desire—of force and violence and greed. No more than an infinitesimal part of the German people ever wanted to rule themselves. They only wanted to rule the world.

When the Germans brag about themselves as being "Nordics," they talk nonsense. The Germanic tribes that migrated from the east into Middle Europe some thousand years ago and mixed with Celtic, Alpine, Slavic, and Latin tribes who lived there, were not "Nordic." The Germanic tribes that settled along the northern ocean —the Atlantic, the Arctic and the Baltic sea—*became* the Nordic people. If there ever were some family likenesses between the ancient Germans of Middle Europe and our ancestors, they had entirely disappeared at the beginning of the Middle Ages, as sources to the history of that time abundantly prove. The deeds of the Germans in Norway and Denmark bear witness today that the Nordic mind is just what they hate and fear more than anything. They may proclaim their hatred of the Slavs in a more vociferous way, they may treat the Slavs with even more murderous ferocity and still filthier sadism, because the Slavs own the richer lands, the more valuable sources of raw material that have always tantalized German rapacity. And being a thoroughly materialistic breed, the Germans think it even more desirable to loot than to win a spiritual victory—which they themselves may feel they will never win. But they have proved, time and again, and prove today with all their might, that the spirit of the Nordics is the archenemy of all things they call *Deutschtum.*

In spite of the drain on our energy that went into our political conflict with Sweden, the hundred years of union was a time of immense economic and social development in Norway. The building of roads and railways was difficult and expensive in our mountainous and far-flung country. (Only one-tenth of the surface of Norway is arable land, and the distance from north to south of the country is

greater than the distance from South Norway to Rome.) But it meant that isolated valleys were opened up, cities and countryside bound together. We lived virtually in a kind of advanced Iron Age up to recently; our historians divide our national history into the Stone Age, the Age of Bronze, the Iron Age, and the Motor Age. With the coming of the motor and the exploitation of our waterfalls for electric power, possibilities for enormous improvements were opened up. For instance, co-operative dairy farming, as organized by the Danish farmers after the cheap grain from abroad had ruined Danish grain growers and the resourceful Danes switched over to cattle breeding, could not be introduced in Norway until the coming of the motor truck.

From time immemorial the Norwegians have gained a great part of their livelihood from the sea. Our fisheries and dried fish trade have traditions back in the dark ages. Since the times of the vikings we have been a seafaring nation, and our shipbuilders among the best in the world. Temporarily suppressed and exploited by the North German Hansa Bund, our shipping and export trade revived during the union with Denmark. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Norwegian sailing vessels plied the seven seas; approximately one of every ten Norwegians earned his daily bread as a seaman. By the enterprise and foresight of our shipping men, the transition from sails to steam, from steam to motors, was accomplished; by the time the Germans invaded Norway, our merchant marine was the fourth largest in the world and the most modern. Only Britain's, the United States', and Japan's were larger. And we are a nation of about 3,000,000. Eighty per cent of this merchant marine were on the oceans when Germany invaded and they were saved from the claws of the Germans. The help given by this merchant marine to the war effort of the Allied nations has been compared to that of an army of 1,000,000 soldiers, an estimate which certainly is not exaggerated. Up to now, however, we have lost one-third of our ships and more than 2,000 Norwegian seaman have been killed.

The motorization of our fishing fleet had been accomplished but a more rational organization of our fishing industries was only under way when the Nazis temporarily threw our whole society back into the dark ages. Agricultural science had helped us to develop farming and forestry all over our country. When potato growing became usual, we had no more years of famine; nobody in our country had suffered actual hunger since that time, not until the Germans came with their new order of starvation. Electric power was available for great and small industries all over Norway and for every farmer. Almost every cottage or shack had electric light—a kerosene lamp is a rarity that millions of young Norwegians have never seen. We had attained a standard of living among the highest anywhere—so much higher than the Germans' that the *Herrenvolk* was *"entrüstet"* and started its "protection" by telling us that we must get down to the German level, or under . . . The Germans have laid waste an economic structure that we had built up with unending toil and hard labor during a couple of centuries. Our cultural pattern which they are trying to tear up is the fruit of our endeavors for more than a millenium. In spite of temporary setbacks, the trend of our development has always been toward freedom, justice, individual responsibility.

III

BEFORE their conversion to the Catholic Church, the Norwegians, like all the Germanic tribes, were absolutely illiterate. How illiterate may be seen from the fact that for about a thousand years they used the runes: letters borrowed from Latin and Greek alphabets were used for carvings on stone and wood, and objects marked with runes were considered as charms, the carver of runes a mighty magician. It never occurred to them to develop these letters into a script that could serve to take down records of any kind, chronicles, poems, tales. The Church made the Germanic tribes acquainted with the book; young men aspiring to the priesthood must learn to read and write. It was the luck of the Nordic nations that their conversion took place at a time when the young European nations had gone through the classical schools of the Church, and all of a sudden a literature in the vernacular blossomed out everywhere. Snorre Sturluson is a contemporary

of Walther von der Vogelweide and Chrestien de Troyes; his nephew Sturla Thordarson was a man when Dante was born. In their old, orally transmitted poetry, in the old myths, in ancient and contemporary history, the Nordic people found marvelously rich subjects for their venture into a literature in their own languages. This interest in letters and scholarship, once quickened, was never lost.

With the coming of the Lutheran Reformation in 1536, the monastery schools disappeared, but the "classical" high schools of the Cathedral Churches carried on until today. And ever since the sixteenth century, our legislators have been interested in the education and instruction of children. Since 1889, all Norwegian children have had the right to education and all parents the duty to send their children between seven and fourteen years to school. All primary education is free. The primary schools provide the pupils with free textbooks, with medical and dental care, and in the cities with free breakfast, expertly planned. Secondary schools are mostly public or municipal. The pupils pay a moderate fee or get free instruction. The instruction at the University of Oslo is free and available to any man or woman who has passed an entrance examination. I remember when I was a small girl, some fifty years ago, one of my nurses told me that her mother could not read or write. And that is the only case of illiteracy I ever heard about in Norway. There are plenty of vocational colleges for grownups. For young people from the country there are the "People's High Schools," a Danish achievement originally, which give youths and girls a general cultural education as well as instruction in agriculture and domestic economy. Since the Middle Ages, the care of neglected and destitute children has been managed in various ways. The Norwegian law of 1900 about Child Welfare Councils has subsequently been adopted by Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. Experts from many lands used to visit our countries to study our measures for child welfare. Before the invasion, the infant mortality rate in the Scandinavian countries was among the lowest in the world.

Our system of social security has developed in various ways since the old times, when the parish priest and peasants distributed the *"Kristbu"* among the needy. The system in operation at the time of the German invasion was about fifty years old. It includes, among other features, the Worker's Protection Law, old age pension (intended to be available for every Norwegian man or woman, who lacks the means to live carefree and secure when his or her years as a working member of the nation are past), unemployment insurance, and health insurance. The latter is compulsory for all Norwegian wage earners with an income less than 6,000 Norwegian kroner, the premium being paid in part by the employer, in part by the employee. Employees with income above 6,000 kroner may voluntarily join the system if they pay the employer's as well as their own part of the premium. A Labor's Inspection Agency gives orders to the employers regarding the safety and protection of the workers. One of the reasons why the strongly individualistic Nordic nations have submitted to this extensive public interference in economic conditions and willingly cooperate for the good of the whole people is that many of these measures started as private attempts, originating in our keen sense of social responsibility. When it had been proved by experience that the measures were just and sensible, the state took over the private organizations. In times to come, other private welfare measures will certainly be taken over by the state. Only, of course, there cannot be social welfare and security until the Germans are turned out.

Laws to the Nordic mind always meant the opposite of the German notion of law as a system of commands and prohibitions given by a ruling body and enforced upon the common people by police and secret police. To us law was the expression of our own thoughts about justice or injustice, our rights and duties, as uttered by spokesmen of our own election, and therefore sacred to us as our own word of honor. We always believed that "A land should be built with law, and not destroyed by lawlessness." Through the centuries we had built our land so efficiently that we had forgotten what lawlessness is like. But today the Germans show us how a land can be destroyed by lawlessness.

In modern times voting is the right of all Norwegian men and women who have

completed their twenty-third year, are residents of the country, and are not disqualified as citizens by criminal record or feeblemindedness. They elect our parliament, the Storthing. From the party with a majority in the Storthing our constitutional king chooses his council. The king of Norway has not the right to dissolve the Storthing. Women were given suffrage gradually: municipal vote in 1901, full political suffrage by the law of 1913, passed unanimously and without debate. Women are eligible to the Storthing as well as to the king's council. Up to now, however, no woman has been appointed to the latter.

IV

WHAT do we Norwegians and the other nations hope from an Allied victory? To win back Norway and Denmark and clean out the Germans, to sweep away every trace of that obscene "New Order" they try to impose upon our countries, and to be given the opportunity to proceed on the road to more perfect democracy, economic as well as political, on which we have traveled from the beginning of our history sometimes rapidly, sometimes more leisurely, sometimes with retrogressions, but in the main direction always of an expanding view of human freedom. We shall need help to rebuild what has been destroyed of our natural resources, our agriculture, and our fisheries. We shall need help to bring our merchant marine back again to the level of prewar times. But we are willing to pay our way—we never used to beg favors of anybody—and we do not doubt we shall be able to do it. Whatever we have lost, we are still the same people who settled and tilled the inhospitable and beautiful northern lands of rocky soil and long winters and a coast washed by the waves of the stormy and foggy North Sea. We were able to create under difficult conditions a cultural and material living standard far above what is usual in nations favored by a more bountiful nature. We know we can do it again.

And we have learned that it is no good to build up a noble culture unless we are prepared to defend it against depredators. We are eager to take our part in a world order, where defense measures against would-be aggressors aim at collective security. We have learned that an organization which is prepared to put force behind its endeavors to make the world safe for democracy is a necessary condition if we are to be able to continue as the working models of democratic states, and we are willing to do our part also in the armed defence of peace and liberty everywhere. We were always in the forefront of the world's progress toward the ideals of democracy, and we know that we were able to be there just because we are small nations with a homogeneous population and therefore easier to govern well and successfully than large countries with populations of mixed racial strains. If the world after this war is heading toward universal freedom, justice, and peaceful co-operation among men, we shall be in the pioneer corps, where we belong.

EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

by

A. D. Henderson

IT is the natural function of educated persons to furnish leadership to society. In exercising leadership they must do so with some social goal in view. But to commit themselves to some goal is in apparent conflict with true scholarship. Thus is raised this important issue: How can the educator advocate a particular social action, such as democratic reconstruction, and maintain objectivity in scholarship; or, stated more simply, how can he educate for democracy, and at the same time avoid the very pernicious effects of indoctrination which have been so disastrous for humanity when used by the propagandists for fascism?

To make progress in educating on democratic reconstruction, educators must first get rid of that disease, "intellectualitis," which has gripped the schools and colleges. This disease can readily be identified by its symptoms: the educator becomes very objective, so much so that he becomes a fence-sitter on every issue of significance in society; what he teaches has little relationship to the needs and aspirations of his fellow men. Now the educator got this way because he wanted to be scientific. We are living in an era of science, and science has shown the importance of facts, of proving every hypothesis on the basis of facts. In his desire to ape the scientist, the humanist has failed to note the difference in his problem: the scientist is usually concerned with hypotheses which are capable of quick demonstration; the humanist with those which carry through many generations of life. Because the humanist has failed to see this distinction, he has lost sight of all hypotheses—and therefore has become a wanderer in history. And the scientist, in turn, immersed in his new discoveries, has overlooked his true function in society as a social engineer—to apply his discoveries to the solution of the problems of society.

What I say can best be demonstrated in nazi Germany. Germany was the nation with the great universities. Her scholarship was renowned throughout the world. Her philosophers supposedly were unequalled; as were also her scientists. And this is the country which adopted the nazi ideology with all its inhuman perversions and retrogressions. Her intellectual leaders had lost all touch with the problems of ordinary people, and so the people turned to a demagogue and a mystic for leadership.

To solve the paradox which confronts the educator, he must make two decisions: (1) that he has a moral responsibility to give leadership to society; and (2) that this leadership must be in some direction which has good social utility. The first decision must be made in the affirmative if the educator believes in the way of intelligence, rather than the way of brute force, as the directing medium for society. Every educator believes this, although he may not be motivated to act. His motivation will largely depend upon the nature of his second decision, which is the really crucial one for him to make.

What is the way of life which has best social utility? The true scholar will want to weigh the evidence, and he will want his decision to be tentative in order not to bar the way to further progress by adopting some present dogma. But to fulfill his

function of leadership he must form hypotheses which, though tentative, are sufficiently positive to enable him to give ethical direction to society. Otherwise he will be the victim of intellectualitis.

The inquiry into what constitutes the good life must go deep into the experiences of men throughout recorded history. But governing the search there must be an over-all controlling principle: the welfare of the whole of mankind. This approach, the validity of which cannot be contested on any ground of scholarship, enables one to focus his thinking upon universal aims. And it enables one to develop ethical contrasts which clearly do or do not have good social utility. Examples of these are: good will among men, versus ill will; integrity in relationships with other people, versus dishonesty; tolerance of others, irrespective of racial or cultural backgrounds, and of their religious, political, and other opinions, versus intolerance; co-operation in action, versus elbowing one's way irrespective of the rights and welfare of others.

Having oriented himself in terms of those values in human experience which have proved to be enduring, the educator can next formulate a second principle, which will serve as a guidepost to action. It is that that society is best which enables each individual to develop to the fullest extent of his potentialities in life consistent with obtaining for the whole of the group of which he is a part the fullest advantages of group association and endeavor.

If we assume that the various forms of society range from extreme individualism to extreme collectivism, we now have a principle developed which is the basis for harmonizing the interests of the individual with those of the social group. It therefore reconciles individualism and collectivism. This then is the essence of democracy. The aim of democracy should be to respect the individual and enable him to develop in accordance with his natural abilities, but to so organize society that all of the advantages of group living can be derived for the benefit of all people. This is the democratic way. This way promotes the education of free men. Indeed, if the educator believes in free education, he can hardly do other than to advocate democracy as a way of life.

II

THERE is, then, a sound philosophical foundation for educating for democracy. But democracy cannot be achieved unless the public attitude supports it. That is, the educators who believe in the worth of democracy must advocate it in their teaching in order to obtain in their students—and thus in the public—a belief in it. People generally get what they want badly enough to work hard for it. The people of the world must want democracy if they are to have it.

At this point I should clarify my views in one respect. When I speak of democracy, I am using the term as composed of guiding principles, such as those defined earlier. There are many specific ways in which democracy can be achieved. There is a considerable measure of democracy in the social organization of each of the United Nations, yet the methods of Russia differ from those in Britain, and those of China differ from practices in the United States. I doubt very much whether any one nation has as yet discovered the perfect social system. The advocacy of democracy by educators, therefore, cannot be narrowed to a particular "ism"—although any teacher may properly express his personal views regarding particular methods.

In educating for an attitude favorable to democracy, however, there are some specific attitudes which must be obtained if democracy is to be attained. One of these is respect for the individual. In contrast with totalitarianism, under which the individual exists only to serve the purposes of the dictator, democracy has as its objective to enable the people to lead the fullest possible lives. A person has dignity and significance in himself. It is his natural expectation in life that he may have the opportunity to advance himself in accordance with his own abilities, providing he does not encroach upon the welfare of others.

A second attitude is toward the function of the state. In a democracy the state exists as the servant, not the master, of the people. It is a convenient instrument of organization through which all individuals can work together for common ends.

Still a third attitude, implicit in the first two, is that there should be equality of op-

portunity for all persons. This does not mean that all people are the same in abilities. They are not. They are as different as thumbprints in their talents and capacities. But society should be so organized that individuals, or sections of the total population, are not arbitrarily prevented from using their abilities, or maintained in suppressed positions. Although needing reinterpretation in terms of present economic and social conditions, the rallying cries of the American and French Revolutions—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—liberty, equality, fraternity—are still full of meaning for the human race.

The three attitudes mentioned need application both domestically and internationally. We need, on the one hand, to develop a greater confidence in the common man. We are told that the next great age in history will be the Era of the Common Man. We have reached a point in evolution where machines can relieve the workman of his backbreaking, time-consuming slavery, where he can produce adequately for his full sustenance and comfort in life, and where through universal education he can advance himself in spiritual and cultural ways. Education, especially higher education, has tended to be an instrument for the development or maintenance of social cliques and privileges, as, for example, in England, where the "school tie," the Civil Service, and the aristocracy have constituted a self-perpetuating circle. In permitting this, society has deprived itself of tremendous sources of new, dynamic strength which can flow when education is accessible to all people. In the new democratic era, men should have opportunity to rise to the heights of achievement relative to their individual merit.

On the international scene, we need to educate for similar respect and confidence among the various nationality groups and races. The day of the "white man's superiority" has passed. His positions of leadership and of dominance in the world were perhaps due to the early start he got in reaping the fruits of the industrial revolution. He was not always in the lead, for the most ancient civilizations lie in China, in India, and in the Near East. During the past two decades we have witnessed in Russia how a nation with great natural and human resources can transform herself, almost overnight, from a medieval, agricultural economy to one of the foremost industrialized ones. During the war, we have learned to our surprise, that the Japanese, the Chinese, the Filipino, and the Negro, can fight with bravery and skill equal to that of the Western European. These actions compel respect for the people who perform them. Assuming that, along with Russia, other countries with great resources—China, India, Brazil—will develop into industrialized nations of great strength, it becomes apparent that it is in the interest, the selfish interest, of the Western European and the American to learn how to live cooperatively and on a plane of mutual respect and good will with other national and racial groups. Any other course of action will bring a third World War which will dwarf the first two in scope, ferocity, and tragedy.

It is apparent from what I have just stated, that one of the subjects deserving careful study in educating on democratic reconstruction is imperialism. For imperialism means the exploitation of other peoples. It is therefore wholly inconsistent with the democratic way. The Western nations must learn how to co-operate in the development of thinly populated areas; and in quickly bringing to the stage of self-government those areas which have this potentiality. Parenthetically, I think it would be an evidence of sincerity on the part of the United Nations if India were started immediately, possibly under the direction of an international commission, on the road to self-government. The United Nations must not only forswear imperialism for themselves; they must also continue into the future their covenant to prevent imperialistic aggression on the part of any other nation.

III

I HAVE been considering primarily the development (through education) of attitudes favorable to the democratic way. Growth in attitude must come through understanding; and this suggests the second important function of education—to supply the knowledge from which understanding can be derived.

It is clear that attitudes can grow either from propaganda or from facts. I think I need not argue the point that the method of propaganda is self-defeating in the long run, because facts have a way of establishing themselves, and their erroneous presentation leads to eventual disillusionment. Nor do I need to argue at length that the very concept of democracy requires the presentation of factual knowledge in education. The justification for educators to advocate democracy lies in the fact that true education is wholly consistent with the democratic way.

But I have a criticism to make of education in the United States, as well as in other countries. It does not adequately treat of the world as a whole. Possibly this means only that we have just arrived at the point in history when, because of present-day speed of communication and transportation, and mutual interdependence throughout the world, it has become important to extend very considerably the scope of cultural education. As we enter a new era, we suddenly become conscious of how very provincial in outlook and knowledge we have been.

The British-American concept of cultural education is much too narrow and ingrown to serve best our interests for the future. It has been the concept of producing the "cultured gentleman"—surely this is a survival from a period now gone. It has had as its content a restricted body of knowledge largely relating to past centuries in time and to Western civilization in culture—a form of introspection which has served well in the past, but is only partially valid for the future. In another writing I have suggested that liberal education be redefined at this time to give it a functional relationship to contemporary society, to supply democratic leadership in helping solve the essential problems of society and in advancing the world's culture of today.

As a phase of this redesign and reorientation of liberal education, it is tremendously important that the focus of attention be shifted to the world scene. This means the study of world literature, not just English literature; the inclusion in the curriculum of Slavic, Oriental, and other languages; greater attention to world geography, world history, and world politics; and an examination of economics which will get away from purely nationalistic policies in favor of co-operative effort in working out the best world economy.

As another phase of reorientation, it is important to arouse interest in the various cultures of the world. The tendency in the nationalistic period has been to force standardization of culture. The Germans want everybody to goose step; Americans want everybody to eat steaks for dinner; and the Russians want everybody to accept communism. Yet life is not like that. Cultural differences constitute genuine assets. They bring color, inspiration, and progress into the world. But I am not necessarily advocating the mere preservation of cultural differences; rather I suggest freedom for the cultures to grow, and to intermingle and produce new life and vigor for a tremendously interesting world. Provincialism in attitude and understanding must go, and it is the task of education to see that it does go.

I have been discussing changes which must be brought about in the democratic countries; the changes required in the Axis countries are nothing short of revolutionary. The educational problems here, with the indoctrinated youth of Germany and of Japan, are tremendous. Their solution will take time. For the present I suggest two forward steps to take: (1) to defeat the armed forces of the Axis Powers, on their own ground, so thoroughly that they cannot retain any faith in their original ideology; and (2) to prepare now to take considerable leadership in teaching the way of democracy and in developing democratic institutions when the fighting has stopped.

The necessity of the first of these steps is self-evident. For there can be no democracy where military aggression is on the march. And I question very much whether fascist youth will be re-educable until they have been thoroughly trounced and disillusioned. With them, we must find a new ground level from which to build.

The second step can be divided into two parts. First of all, the United Nations must establish better working relations among themselves in order to develop common aims based upon democratic principles. With victory will come the responsibility for building this new democratic

world. The United Nations have a common bond while a common danger confronts them. They must develop the techniques of democratic co-operation while mutually interdependent. They then will have the strength of conviction and of technique to carry through the post-war transition period, and to carry the people of the defeated nations with them.

This is not the task of educators, but it is the task of educated men who assume positions of leadership. It might well be a part of the program of every educational institution to have an active seminar in democratic reconstruction — partly to advance the thinking of the country on this subject, and partly to help educate potential leaders for the future. The suggestion of a seminar on democratic reconstruction anticipates the second part of this step. This is the job which educational institutions have to do in preparing leadership adequate for the post-war world.

IV

DURING a temporary period, following an armistice, the United Nations will doubtless occupy the defeated countries. For the purpose of helping direct the psychological attitudes which will succeed those of defeat, and the political movements which will develop, the administration of the occupied areas will need to be carried out with all the skill which we can muster. The social pattern for a considerable time to come can easily be set during this period. Relief with foods, medical supplies, etc., will doubtless be essential—it must be dispensed with good will, avoiding either vengeful or paternalistic attitudes. This relief, the rebuilding of devastated areas, and the institution of new enterprises, must be done in a manner to secure self-reliance and self-sufficiency. This is the democratic way, and the foundation for democracy must be laid in these initial actions in the occupied territories.

The persons engaged in this administrative work, if prepared in advance to do so, can also be instrumental in getting new democratic institutions — educational, economic, and cultural—started. Presumably each participating individual could, within some limits, be a nucleus for the re-education of potential leaders in the occupied countries.

I cannot believe that it is wise to attempt to occupy the defeated countries for any considerable length of time. The presence of foreign overlords in a country leads to deepening bitterness and hatreds which is the opposite result of what should be accomplished. We can see the disadvantage which Germany is now suffering through the growing hatreds developed from her occupations. We should not deceive ourselves into thinking that we would accomplish a different result. Furthermore, we should not overlook the possibility that serious misunderstandings might develop among the occupying nations. In any event, if it is our desire to build the new world after the democratic pattern, we must encourage the people of the defeated countries to build a new society for themselves.

It follows that new leadership must be found within these countries. I have suggested one way of getting this. A second possibility (which may be somewhat startling because it is unconventional) would be to select from among volunteering prisoners of war a quota of young Germans, Italians, and Japanese, to educate. It is becoming apparent, even to Hitler, that the Axis cannot win the war. These prisoners, then, need not fear reprisals from their present masters; and I suspect that a considerable number of them could be found who would welcome the opportunity now to train for possible leadership in their respective countries after the war. There would even be among them some former social democrats, who would assist in the educational program. I think we could make considerable impression upon them, and if so, they could be tremendously helpful in assuring the rise of democratic institutions in their home lands. Offsetting some present risks in this policy might be very significant rewards in the near future.

In setting out to educate on democratic reconstruction there is the necessity of designing an educational program. The elements of such a program should be clear by this time. For those who would participate in post-war relief and rehabilitation, it is important to study the language, geography, and culture of the general area in which they would work. There are tech-

niques both of administering relief and of building up self-help which are important to learn. Engineering and technical skills are also of great value.

The educational preparation for leadership in democratic reconstruction, however, goes much beyond training for relief administration. Both during the relief period within the occupied countries and following it from without, there must be brought to bear upon the people of these countries—and upon these in all countries—strong influence in favor of the democratic way. Obviously to secure this quality of leadership, there must be included in the educational program a study of the ethical and philosophical concepts underlying the democratic way. Also it is important to examine thoroughly the principles of world political federation, of economic co-operation, and of cultural autonomy. Without being committed to any particular applications of these principles, I believe they constitute, broadly speaking, essential elements in the new world pattern of social organization. Finally, to aid in securing deep conviction about the fundamental significance of democratic principles, so that leadership with genuine dynamic quality emerges, it is essential to relate the studies to the long-run human values which are at stake. It will take leadership of this sort to make democratic reconstruction a fact in the post-war world.

In looking toward the future we may as well be as realistic as possible. Wars are usually followed by periods of cynicism and reaction. There is already evident in the United States a political reaction of some proportions. It was such a reaction that initially defeated the possibility of a constructive peace following the last war. There is the need, then, for those forces which believe that we can win the peace this time to muster all of the educational effort of which they are capable in order that good understanding of the problems of the post-war world may prevail. I have suggested that we can now see a vision of a new era for men on earth. We must cling to the vision and make it become a reality.

THE GROWTH OF GENERAL DE GAULLE

An Editorial

THE political struggle which began after the Allied invasion has had one favorable effect. From the democratic point of view it has resulted in a constant growth of General de Gaulle and the Fighting French movement. This is evidenced in the support and co-operation which the General and the organization he leads have received recently from important French Underground movements, now climaxed by the collaboration of the French Communists who have been a vital factor in the forces of resistance. The entire political strategy of the Fighting French has been clarified and brought into accord with the traditions of the French Republic.

General de Gaulle has adopted two principles in all his actions and negotiations. The first is that he would fight on the side of our Allies, whatever may be the difficulties, for the final defeat of the Axis. The second is that the fundamental problem in Africa is not whether he and General Giraud can arrive at a personal understanding but whether the laws and the constitution of the French Republic will be re-established, for that is the only genuine guarantee that the people of France will be able to choose the government they desire. The statement made by General de Gaulle at his press conference in London on February 9, has emphasized these two principles. In contrast to the reactionary primitiveness of General Giraud's opinions published in a recent issue of Life, *the General declared unequivocally that, "in the minds of the great majority of Frenchmen, liberation means both to drive out the enemy and to re-establish the Republic." This thesis has been constantly put forward in our pages. We are convinced that this is true not only for France but for Europe as a whole.*

Natural Barriers to European Invasion

This relief map of Europe was especially drawn by Marthe Rajchman to indicate the possibilities of invasion and of the routes invading armies may take from the various points along the coasts. With the exception of the Iberian Peninsula and the Baltic shore of Sweden, all the coasts of Europe from Murmansk to Rostov are in the hands of the enemy. On the map, the white spaces along the shoreline and inland indicate the plains and tablelands of the Continent, but the readers must bear in mind that these coastal regions which have no natural obstacles have been fortified to such an extent that this favorable characteristic is more than counterbalanced.

In view of the long-distance landings of the Allies in North Africa, it is possible that the German "fortress Europe" will be invaded by multiple landings at strategic points without much regard to the physical aspects of the hinterland. For the worst physical obstacles, the Pyrenees and the Alps, have in the past been overcome by invading armies. Taking both political and physical factors into consideration, it may be desirable to launch an invasion by air in the mountainous regions of Greece or Yugoslavia, or by air and sea in Norway or Italy.

With the exception of the Rhone Valley and the plain lying between the Pyrenees and Cevennes all of the tablelands bordering on the Mediterranean are shut off by mountains or closed by narrow passages. Only through the North European Plain, either from the Channel and North Sea ports or from the steppes of Russia is there a short, direct, and easy route to the heart of the enemy.

LEGEND: A-Aleppo, Am-Amsterdam, AR-Archangelsk, BR-Bremen, Ba-Batum, BA-Barcelona, Bd-Brindisi, Bi-Bizerte, Bo-Bordeaux, Br-Brussels, Bt-Bucharest, Bth-Beyruth, Bu-Budapest, C-Calais, Co-Cologne, D-Dubrovnik, Du-Durres (Durazzo), G-Genoa, Gl-Glasgow, H-Helsinki, HA-Hamburg, K-Krasnodar, Ku-Kuibyshev, L-Lyon, Ll-Llondonderry, Lw-Lwow, L.H.-Le Havre, M-Munich, Mi-Milan, Me-Messina, Mo-Mosul, Mr-Marseilles, N-Narvik, Na-Naples, O-Odessa, Or-Ordjonikidze, Os-Oslo, P-Palermo, Pr-Prague, R-Reykjavik, S-Split, Sa-Salonika, Sf-Sfax, Sk-Skoder (Scutari), Sj-Skoplje, St-Stockholm, Sv-Sevastopol, Tr-Trieste, Tu-Turin, V-Valence, Wi-Wilno, Wt-Witebsk, Z-Zagreb.

A NOTE ON THE PROBLEMS OF RACE DISCRIMINATION

by William Hodson

THE last act of Commissioner Hodson before taking the plane for Brazil where he met his untimely end was to prepare the following article. It was typical of William Hodson that he modestly labeled this article, A Note. It was equally characteristic of his nature to call the Editor with whom he had discussed the essay to explain that, swamped as he was by last-minute details preparatory to his departure, he was unable to present the wider implications of the incident that he described in his article.

To Hodson, these ramifications, as they came out in the discussion with the Editor, fell into two broad classes. In the first place, he was convinced that government, whether in the administrative or legislative branches, must not make any concessions to popular prejudice. He believed with Senator Borah that the way to deal with prejudice was never to yield to it. He felt that where the policy of government was firm and clear, the general public would easily be brought to accept all the practical applications of democracy and that the proponents of anti-democratic bias and discrimination would not dare oppose it.

In support of this stand by the government, whether local or national, Commissioner Hodson favored a militant campaign of enlightenment, one which would condition a new generation to detest race prejudice and which would shame those of the old who still retained these vestiges of an ignorant and intolerant era. It was his intention to make of this article an appeal to educators and statesmen to prepare the new world for the ideas of a new age. His own life and work as well as the sacrifice he made for the sake of the people of North Africa will serve as an inspiration toward the ends he favored.

THE child-caring program in New York City differs from that of many other large cities in that there are no municipal institutions for the care of dependent or neglected children. Institutional care of the type usually associated with the word "orphanage" (a bad word, by the way, because many of the children are not orphans) is provided by the various Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and non-sectarian agencies of the community. Whenever dependent or neglected children are committed to the care of the Department of Welfare of the City of New York, they are sent to the appropriate private religious institution, and their care is paid for by the City on a per diem basis.

For some time, the Catholic institutions

have received and cared for white and Negro children without discrimination of any kind. On the other hand, the Protestant institutions have not been willing to accept Negro children. As the result of a considerable amount of interest and pressure by a special citizens committee, the Board of Estimate of the City of New York, in adopting the last annual budget, provided that no funds should be paid to any institution for the care of children which refused to accept a reasonable proportion of Negro children. The language of the so-called Race Discrimination Amendment follows:

> 5a. On and after October 1, 1942, no money shall be paid out of any appropriation made to any charitable institution for the care of dependent, neglected, or delinquent children duly committed by the Commissioner of Welfare or a court of appropriate jurisdiction if, after due notice by the Commissioner of Welfare, such charitable institution shall refuse to accept a reasonable proportion of inmates from any racial group because of race or color, provided that no institution of a particular religious faith shall be required to accept persons from any race or group other than those who belong to its own religious faith. What constitutes a "reasonable proportion" shall be determined by the Commissioner of Welfare on consideration of the nature and activities of the institution in all its branches, the vacancies occurring in the institution, and the need of a racial group for the type of service rendered by the institution.

Following the adoption of this amendment, there was a series of conferences held with interested persons to discuss the matter. The first conference included representatives from the boards and the staffs of all the agencies affected. Considerable hostility to the amendment was expressed at this meeting, partly because many felt that it had been passed too hastily and before the full force of opposition had been expressed. Others were fundamentally opposed to the substance of the amendment itself because of what they termed "practical difficulties" of caring for Negro and white children under the same roof, particularly adolescent children. Fears were expressed that the parents of white children would object to having their children cared for in an institution where there were Negroes. The danger of sex offenses was emphasized at great length.

Throughout the discussion of the dissenters the statement was repeatedly made that their objection was not based upon racial antagonism, but upon the alleged inability of the institutions to deal with the situation satisfactorily. To the argument that the Catholic institutions had apparently carried on institutional work for Negroes and whites satisfactorily, the reply was made that there were, perhaps, special reasons peculiar to the Catholic organizations which would account for that result, and which would not apply to other institutions.

Following this general meeting, all of the institutions were invited by the Commissioner of Welfare and the head of his Division of Child Welfare to discuss ways and means by which the amendment could be carried out most effectively. A few institutions availed themselves of this opportunity. Many refused to discuss the matter further. When the count was finally taken, there were five Protestant institutions, out of a total of twenty-seven, which refused to take Negro children and which were declared out of compliance and no longer eligible to receive public funds for the care of children. The ten Jewish agencies all agreed to receive children without discrimination.

In the five institutions that were out of compliance, there was a total of 405 children, who must be gradually removed and placed in other institutions. In order to round out the picture, it is important to say that even the institutions which refused to comply, so far as the care of both white and Negro children within their buildings is concerned, are quite willing to carry on a boarding-out program which would serve both races. It is the mingling of white and black children within the four walls of the institution which seems to raise the chief objection.

It is a matter of great regret that this evidence of racial discrimination should have appeared among charitable institutions and among board and staff members who are, for the most part, persons of good will and of standing in this community. The fact that such people would refuse to give up discriminatory practices indicates the extent to which racial prejudices exist here and the degree of misunderstanding about pos-

sible dangers in mingling the races. The ancient fears along these lines are still prevalent to a substantial degree and probably will not be removed except by a long, continued process of education. In many cases, if these boards had been willing actually to receive one or more colored children, and to care for them over a period of time, all doubt about the practicability of mingling white and colored children would have disappeared. The Catholic institutions have proved conclusively that where the managing group and the employees are in agreement about the desirability of caring for Negro children, no serious problems arise. Without such an attitude, it is probably true that certain problems would arise.

Whether more progress can be made through legislation prohibiting discrimination than the slower process of education is, of course, a question about which there is much difference of opinion. I think, on the whole, progress will have to be sought on both fronts. Merely to educate, and never to act, would be a frustrating experience for the Negroes and for the whites who would like to see definite progress made. We shall have to continue education on every front and act, legislatively and otherwise, where it seems best to do so. It is my own impression that, as a result of what has happened through compulsory legislation, within a year or two the agencies now out of compliance will be ready to comply fully. I doubt if this result would have been achieved in a decade without positive legislative action.

As one looks forward to the post-war problems, it is impossible to ignore the extent to which international co-operation must be founded upon mutual respect between races and, particularly, between the white and the black races. It is clear to all thoughtful people that no nation can have peace and prosperity unless there is peace and prosperity everywhere. The thing which stands in the way of the "brotherhood of man" is largely unwarranted fear on the part of one national group concerning another of different language, color, inheritance, and tradition. When we find within our communities the kind of racial prejudice which has been described in this note, we can well understand the amount of education that will have to be done to break these barriers down. What we have found here in New York City is an example of the kind of thing which we shall find on a national basis in all the countries of the world. The hope for the future lies in the extent to which we can persuade ourselves as a nation that all human beings are sacred personalities with a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, regardless of the color of their skins or the religions which they profess. This principle lies at the heart of sound and permanent international co-operation.

Europe's Migrating Millions

by

MARTIN H. SCHWARZ

THE rise of nazism in Germany and the present World War have caused large-scale European migrations. Forced evacuation and resettlement have taken place in various European regions. The Continent, from the Channel to the Russo-German front, from Karelia to Sicily, has seen the uprooting of many millions, their migration to regions far from the places of their birth, and their settlement in new surroundings. The problem of minorities, far from having been moved closer to a solution by the current European migration, has now become even more intricate. It threatens to develop into one of the most complex questions that the planners of a new Europe will have to face.

By far the largest migratory movements have resulted from German conquests and German administrative actions. This has been the case in Poland, western Russia, France, and, to a lesser extent, in all European countries now ruled directly or indirectly from Berlin. In several other cases, such as in Finland and the Ukraine, migratory movements developed that did not have their origin in German plans but were the result of the changing general military and political scene.

The migration of European labor has in recent months become a movement of growing importance. Their need of man power and fear of an invasion has forced the Germans to use every conceivable means of inducing members of other European nations to take the place of German workers and laborers in agriculture and industry. Other migrations of a more temporary nature, have been caused by recruiting among nations under German influence. The presence of a large number of prisoners of war—mostly French and Polish soldiers in German prison or labor camps —also adds to the dislocation caused by migratory movements.

A free Europe will, therefore, be faced by the problems of many transplanted millions, often destitute and helpless. Men, women, and children desiring a place to live in that is truly theirs will be competing with others equally unfortunate. While the fate of every such family and every individual represents a serious problem in itself, larger aspects also deserve our attention. In spite of the planned confusion that has in many cases been practiced by the Germans, several migratory mainstreams can be distinguished.

So far, the main idea behind the German plans has been to draw a sharp dividing line between the population of the Reich and the people of the conquered countries. In as much as districts of Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, and Belgium as well as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg have been made parts of Greater Germany, a Germanization has been attempted. Expulsion of parts of the native population has taken place in provinces of western and northern Poland, in the French parts of Alsace and Lorraine, and in the Belgian regions of Eupen and Malmedy. The Sudetenland, part of Czechslovakia, is logically part of this list.

Poland was the first country to experience the German plan of a thorough division between Germans and non-Germans. The migratory movements, enforced by the occupational authorities under instructions of the Gestapo, included the evacuation of Poles and Jews from the western Polish provinces to the so-called Gouvernement-Général. The original plan called for a settlement of four million Germans in the Polish provinces immediately incorporated in the Reich and the establishment of 70,000 German farms. In the course of this Germanization, families were broken up in order to gain labor forces for the German war industries and particularly

for agricultural work. In addition to this, whole towns, cities, and rural districts were depopulated and later repopulated by German settlers from other regions. Almost the entire Polish population of the once proud Baltic port of Gdynia, 130,000 people, were forced to leave the city within a few months after the Germans arrived. It is also known, for instance, that no less than 20,000 families, approximately 100,000 persons, were forced to leave Poznania and sent to the Gouvernement-Général.

The idea of a Polish Gouvernement-Général was, however, dropped by the German Government on August 16, 1940, when Hans Frank, then in charge of that region, declared that it "would no longer be treated as foreign territory but as under the protection of the German nation." The Gouvernment-Général was then divided into four major districts, Cracow, Warsaw, Radom, and Lublin, all ruled by the Germans directly, with Poles only in subordinate posts.

The Germanization of the seized western and northern provinces continued nevertheless. The most thoroughly planned settlement of Germans is taking place in the Wartheland region of which Arthur Greiser, formerly a leading Danzig Nazi, is *Gauleiter*. Germans from the Baltic States as well as so-called *Volksdeutsche* (Germans residing on foreign territory but considered part of the German nation) from Volhynia, Galicia, Chelm, Lublin, Bukovina, and Bessarabia are being settled in the fifteen western counties of the Wartheland region. German peasants from Bessarabia and Volhynia have been sent to two northern counties. German workers and peasants from Bessarabia plus, again, peasants from both Bessarabia and Volhynia are being settled in the Konin area of the Wartheland.

TABLE I

ORIGIN OF GERMAN SETTLERS IN THE WARTHELAND PROJECT

South Tyrol	206,000
Poland	161,000
Bessarabia	90,700
Bukovina	82,100
Latvia	52,700
Lithuania	47,000
Dobrudja	14,500
Estonia	13,400
Other regions	17,000
	684,400

According to a statement of the Polish National Council in London, on July 10, 1942, 2,000,000 Poles have been expelled from their homes, farms, and businesses in

western Poland to make room for the mounting number of German settlers from all parts of Europe.

France felt the threat of forced migration immediately after the armistice, when the Germans made the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine part of the Reich. The Germanization of these districts resulted in mass expulsions, which started in July, 1940. Four months later, the Vichy Government stated that 70,000 Frenchmen had been forced to abandon their homes and to migrate into unoccupied France. Fighting French sources, however, put the number of migrants from Alsace-Lorraine at a much higher figure, stating that 140,000 persons have been expelled, not counting those that have for one reason or another been sent to eastern Europe. It must also be noted that parts of the population of this region that had been evacuated to southeastern France at the outbreak of the war—because the Alsace-Lorraine area was expected to be a combat zone—have never been allowed to return. It is interesting to see that, in their desire to accomplish a thorough Germanization of this region, the Germans singled out (as they have frequently done elsewhere) spiritual leaders, intellectuals, and other influential citizens. Priests were expelled in large numbers; 300 from Lorraine alone.

Finland is now fighting Russia on Germany's side. The present warfare makes it impossible to ascertain current migration. Reliable figures regarding the situation after the peace conference at Moscow on March 13, 1940 have, however, been available for some time. The Finns, after ceding the whole of Karelia and certain minor provinces to Russia, withdrew their entire population from these districts. They were thus faced with providing shelter and employment for the 450,000 persons who had been living in 40,000 square kilometers. One hundred and eighty thousand of the evacuees belonged to the farming population; 270,000 were industrial laborers or had been working in handicrafts, commerce, or the liberal professions.

The Finnish Government, on June 28, 1940, passed a bill for a speedy settlement of these people. In spite of great difficulties, the Finnish resettlement program has remained one of the best organized that have been undertaken in recent years. Here, of course, was the case of countrymen helping each other, instead of the forced migration practiced in German-occupied territorities.

Rumania was in 1940 forced by the Nazis to cede Bessarabia to Russia. A remarkable double exodus took place which was, however, voided when German and Rumanian troops reconquered the Bessarabian provinces. Parts of the Bessarabian population, desiring to remain on Rumanian territory, fled westward before the advancing Russian Army; others who felt safer in territory not exposed to Berlin's influence, crossed the new borderline in the opposite direction. While the city of Bucharest remained closed to the Bessarabian population, barges across the Danube and by way of Black Sea ports helped evacuate some of the Bessarabian refugees.

The Rumanian authorities tried to organize the cross-current evacuation by shifting evacuees into certain districts; those from the Bukovina were transported to North Transylvania; people from Bessarabia proper found their way into Moldavia. More than 10,000 Jews, feeling the pressure of nazism in Rumania, crossed into Russian territory: 2,000 by way of Reni, 7,800 through the bordertown of Ungheni during the first days alone. Rumanian authorities arrested Soviet sympathizers in all parts of the country and transported them into the 50,000 square miles of territory ceded to Russia. Approximately 50,000 people were involved in this two-way migration. Since then, over 250,000 Jews have been deported from Rumania to the slaughter pits of Poland.

II

IN their program of distributing forced labor across the occupied territories, the Germans have succeeded in shifting approximately two and one-half million workers from country to country. This large-scale movement of workers has been heightened by the German fear of an Allied invasion of the Continent. Able-bodied persons have been moved in great numbers from the potential invasion zone near the European west coast. Where such movements had not already been under way in the summer months of 1942, they were

speedily initiated. People who otherwise might have been able to aid an Allied invasion army, were being moved farther into the interior of Europe, some to concentration camps, the majority to nazi-controlled farms and factories. Forced labor is also being employed in the construction of fortifications along the western Atlantic seaboard of the Continent. Again, however, laborers are forced to work in countries other than their homelands. The only notable exceptions to this rule are several thousand Norwegians who, ever since the beginning of the German occupation, have been working on fortifications along the coast of Norway. They are aided by approximately 10,000 Danes sent to Norway by the Germans. Over 2,000 Norwegians have been deported into the Reich.

The Reich Ministry of Labor stated some time ago that three-fifths of the laborers transported from occupied countries to the Reich and other territories are agricultural workers and that two-fifths are industrial workers. Their distribution according to country of origin is shown by the following figures for 1940 and 1942:

TABLE II

FOREIGN LABOR EMPLOYED BY THE GERMANS

Country	1940	1942
Poland	400,000	1,000,000*
France	90,000	200,000
Belgium	70,000	500,000
Czechoslovakia	80,000	400,000
Yugoslavia	60,000	300,000
Italy	90,000	500,000
Total	790,000	2,900,000

The most gigantic plan of combined resettlement and forced labor is, according to German sources, to be carried out in the Netherlands. Holland's No. 2 Nazi, Meinhard Marinus Rost van Tonningen, president of the German-controlled Netherlands Bank, has set up an organization that is to undertake the settlement of 3,000,000 Hollanders in eastern Europe, the Baltic region in particular. The name of this organization is the Netherland East Company. Its task will be to remove practically the whole able-bodied male population of the Netherlands, thereby reducing the danger for the Nazis of aid to an Allied invasion force and at the same time providing laborers for the exploitation of newly conquered Russian territory.

* Including released prisoners of war.

III

WHILE this article is being written, the appalling news is made public which renders academic the discussion of the migration of the Jews in Europe. For that is merely the first step in the nazi plan of extermination of that unfortunate people. The number of Jews in the nazi-occupied and nazi-dominated territory was well over 9,000,000—in Poland, 3,300,000; in the Ukraine, 1,600,000; in Rumania, 900,000; in White Russia, 400,000; etc. At the rate that the Jews are being destroyed, it is doubtful whether more than 2,000,000 will survive this war.

Before the Nazis embarked on their program of extermination, a project was adopted by the office of Alfred Rosenberg and approved by Hitler last spring to settle the Jews in a region 600 miles east of the original Lublin reservation. According to this plan, 7,000 Jews were to be moved daily from all parts of Europe and from the Warsaw ghetto to "unknown destinations in the East." Now we know that this destination was a vast cemetery. The Jews of Europe were aware of that long ago. Dr. Adam Czerniakow, the head of the Warsaw ghetto, committed suicide when the Nazis demanded that he furnish them with a list of the first 100,000 victims.

The ghettos of Poland were used as con-

TABLE III

DECREASE OF JEWISH POPULATION IN EUROPE RESULTING FROM DEPORTATION AND SLAUGHTER

Country	1939	1942
Poland	3,300,000	2,000,000
Rumania	900,000	600,000
France	300,000	187,000
Germany	200,000	40,000
Holland	180,000	70,000
Lithuania	150,000	6,000
Latvia	100,000	4,000
Slovakia	90,000	20,000
Belgium	85,000	8,000
Bohemia-Moravia	80,000	15,000
Austria	75,000	15,000
Yugoslavia	73,000	2,000
Bulgaria	50,000	9,000

centration points to which the Jews from all other parts of Europe were sent. The following table indicates the extent to which the deportations have been carried out since the Nazis overran Europe. The fact that 2,000,000 Jews still remain in Poland is attributable to the influx of those that have been forced to migrate from western countries.

There are, of course, other types of migration. As a result of the large-scale air raids on industrial cities in the west and north of Germany, many German civilians have been evacuated to occupied territory. Some 200,000 Germans have found refuge in Norway alone (in addition to 350,000 troops). About 100,000 German civilians, mostly from cities like Lübeck and Rostock, were reported to be living in Oslo in the fall of 1942. Also, there is the migration of those who were able to flee the Nazis. Today there are 250,000 adult refugees from the Continent living in Great Britain. These include 50,000 German and Austrian refugees, 10,000 Czechoslovaks, 5,600 Netherlanders, 2,200 Norwegians, 1,700 Greeks, 1,500 Poles, 1,500 Frenchmen, and 1,300 Belgians.

Forestalling possible Fifth Column activities, the Russian Government has moved 400,000 Volga Germans to agricultural regions in the Novo-Sibirsk and Omsk districts, the Altai region of the Kazakhstan Republic, and neighboring localities. In addition to this large-scale migratory movement, based on a decree by President Mikhail I. Kalinin, issued August 28, 1941, a number of Baltic German refugees, Finns from the Karelian sector, and other potential suspects were moved to the great eastern regions of Soviet Russia. They were moved by rail, during August, September, and October, 1941, and January and February, 1942.

IV

In planning a democratic Europe, the realities of current migration cannot be overlooked. Before this war is over and victory achieved, a great number of the people of Europe will have been torn apart, scattered to regions far from their homes. But there will, in all probability, be few homes to go back to. There will be others in those homes. Men and women from South Tyrol will find Italian peasants on their farms—while they themselves have taken the places of Polish farmers, now possibly living on Russian soil. The Serbs will not have forgotten what ill-advised Hungarian rulers did to tens of thousands of their countrymen. Frenchmen from Alsace and Lorraine, returning to the country where their forefathers tilled the soil, will clash with those who have been transplanted from the Baltic to these French provinces. Jews, released from the ghettos, will be eager to regain happiness and security.

There will, then, be no more war. But there can be no final peace while millions are on the march, crossing one another's paths, yearning for the soil that once was theirs. Europe's migrating millions, uprooted once again, will need a guiding hand. There will have to be a plan so vast, so thorough, so wise as to be unprecedented. The resettlement of the homeless will be one of the most formidable tasks in the scheme of post-war European reconstruction.



Economic Freedom in FOREIGN RELATIONS

by

Charles Noyes

IN plans which have been proposed for the post-war world, the vital and difficult problem of providing for a resumption of foreign trade is receiving far less attention than more obvious political considerations. Yet it is clear that political decisions will have little permanent value unless they are implemented by satisfactory economic relations between nations, and there is no better test of the feasibility of post-war plans than the likelihood that the people of the United Nations will accept the adjustments in foreign trade necessary to make the plans effective.

There is not much hope in discussion of American participation in a better world order unless the people of the United States can learn a new attitude toward international economic freedom. They must see that the free international market espoused by old-fashioned liberal economists is just as dead as the classical free market within their own nation.

Resumption of foreign trade on a pre-war basis will in any case be out of the question. Few if any of the nations which were formerly the best customers of the United States will be financially able to resume purchases even on the reduced scale of the 1930's. And after getting along with reduced imports during the war period, building up synthetic rubber plants and domestic sugar production, the United States will not in the normal course of events suddenly begin to make huge purchases abroad.

There will be no international gold standard which means anything, and settlement of uneven international balances in gold would be carrying on a fiction. Without a wholly new concept of international trade or a pretense of accepting payment in gold or credits, neither of which would have much real value, trading between nations will have to be on what amounts to a barter basis.

A new conception of international trade will be urgently needed to prevent a new grouping of "have" and "have not" nations containing the seeds of future war. In approaching the problems of international commercial relations after the war, the people of the United States should take careful stock of their past and probable future position. One of the difficulties is that the country has not been, like the other great trading nations, either predominantly an exporter of raw materials or predominantly an exporter of manufactured goods. In 1938, exports from the United States were divided into the following major classes:

Class of Exports	Value (thousands of dollars)	Per Cent of Total Export Value
Crude materials	594,298	19.4
Crude foodstuffs	248,986	8.1
Manufactured foodstuffs	184,124	6.1
Semi-manufactures	506,758	16.5
Finished manufactures	1,523,003	49.8
Total	3,057,169	99.9

Total exports thus consisted of approxi-

mately two-thirds manufactures and semi-manufactures and one-third foodstuffs and crude materials. It happened that in 1938 the United States exported an unusually large quantity of crude foodstuffs for recent years—more than twice as much as in the previous year—but exports of crude materials were relatively low, so the proportion between manufactured and non-manufactured articles can be taken as roughly typical of the years after the bottom of the depression and before the beginning of the war.

The division of exports between crude materials and foodstuffs on the one hand, manufactures and semi-manufactures on the other, was roughly reversed in the case of imports. Three-fifths of United States imports in 1938 were crude materials and foodstuffs, while two-fifths were semi-manufactures and manufactures. However, total imports excluding gold amounted to only $1,949,524,000, or more than a billion dollars less than total exports. Of the major import items, only rubber, coffee, silk, and tin, which together amounted to almost exactly five hundred million dollars, could be called strictly noncompetitive with American products. A few others, such as paper and wood pulp, sugar, and tobacco of types not grown in this country, were necessary to supplement American production and not seriously competitive. But the hard fact remains that the United States does not need to import nearly enough goods of any kind to pay for the volume of goods which the nation has normally exported. Thus resumption of United States foreign trade even in the reduced volume of the post-depression years—total imports and exports combined of between five and six and one-half billion dollars in 1937, 1938, and 1939 as compared with over nine billion dollars in every year from 1925 through 1929—must depend either upon importing considerable quantities of competitive products which would ordinarily tend to depress American prices or upon finding some new basis for trading.

A number of economists in recent years have adopted the point of view which was expressed, with reservations, in Jerome Frank's "Save America First," that since the combined imports and exports of the United States have rarely amounted to as much as 10 per cent of the total national income, foreign trade should be virtually ignored and if necessary almost eliminated in planning the national economy. According to this point of view, the United States would be much better off if it consumed at home the bulk of the products which have formerly been shipped abroad, and continued to export only enough to pay for the few things like coffee and rubber (which may be removed from the list before the war is over) and sugar and tin which cannot be produced in sufficient quantities in this country.

Such a policy would undoubtedly avoid some of the problems raised by foreign trade in a nation which is attempting to achieve the world's highest standard of living. But it fails to take into consideration the fact that the United States normally produces surpluses of some materials, especially cotton and petroleum, which could not be disposed of here even with the highest standard of living within the realm of probability for many years to come. Furthermore, because the unit cost of manufactured articles usually depends upon total volume of production and drops rapidly after the break-even point covering overhead is reached, the existence of even a relatively small foreign market helps to keep down the domestic price of such commodities as automobiles and typewriters. It would be difficult to prove, but it is at least a fair guess, that any reduction of America's foreign trade from the pre-war level would raise more problems than it solved. The immediate necessity which would arise for a complete reorganization of the economy of the cotton belt (even admitting that the job must be tackled eventually) should be enough to make the United States hesitate a long time before adopting a policy of autarchy.

II

IN addition to these purely selfish, domestic considerations, there are others which cannot properly be ignored in the formulation of United States foreign trade policy. The United States in the twentieth century has become a major world commercial power, and its foreign trade has long been substantial in the world's total. A fair num-

ber of countries, especially in Latin America and the Far East, have been almost wholly dependent for prosperity upon what they can sell to the United States. The American market has also been of great importance to Europe, South Africa, and Australia. If it were cut off, the standard of living almost all over the world would be reduced. To say the least, it would be morally callous for the United States, with its tremendous share of the world's natural wealth in proportion to its population, to turn its back on the rest of the world and keep everything it holds for itself, because its people lacked the intelligence or the good will to find a workable basis for trade. In the long run, it would be a dangerous policy for a country with so much wealth and only about 7 per cent of the world's population.

Up to now, the United States has been remarkably indifferent to the effects of its trade policies (or lack of them) on the rest of the world. It is not at all improbable that the shape of the world after the last war was more affected by the reduction of total United States foreign trade from $13,506,497,000 in 1920 to $6,944,524,000 in 1922 than by the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations. And regardless of whether the American stock market crash in 1929 is considered a cause or a result of world depression, the reduction in American foreign trade from $9,640,356,000 in that year to $2,933,790,000 in 1932 can scarcely be dismissed as a minor factor in what has since happened to the world.

In each case, the action taken by the United States was to raise further barriers to its foreign trade, by the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922, and by the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. In the meantime, a continuing excess of exports over imports (which was illogical for a creditor nation) was financed by lending additional funds to foreign nations, over and above the war debts. After the stock market crash, this flow of credit was suddenly stopped with never a thought for the consequences in other nations, or even for the effect on American exporters.

Laws of supply and demand and the gold standard were still depended upon to bring about balance in international trade as well as in the domestic economy, and only a few people were brash enough in the 1920's to point out that these laws were failing to work according to theory, while the banks which were making handsome profits from the sale of foreign bonds apparently did not care.

The reciprocal trade agreements program inaugurated by the present Administration made a modest beginning toward removal of some of the tariff barriers to international trade, and revival of United States foreign commerce more or less paralleled internal economic revival between 1933 and 1937. The State Department has compiled figures to demonstrate that, before international commerce was disrupted by the present war, the increases were substantially greater between the United States and those countries with which trade agreements had been concluded than with the rest. On the whole, evidence of the beneficial effects of the trade agreements program is persuasive, but it was far from sufficient to indicate that such a program can solve the basic dilemmas of American foreign trade policy. Exports continued to be substantially larger than imports during the 1930's; between 1931 and 1939, United States imports of foreign gold performed the same function of balancing the foreign trade account which American foreign loans had performed in the 1920's, and the resulting accumulation of gold at Fort Knox may not be much more inherently valuable in the long run than the previous accumulation of bad debts. However, as a token for the temporary settlement of international balances, gold may still prove useful, and generosity in making gold available to other countries might win good will toward the United States in contrast to the ill will which inevitably results from an attempt to collect old debts.

Neither tricks with gold nor a saner attitude toward tariffs, in any case, can resolve the dilemma which arises when a creditor nation attempts to continue as a great exporting country, selling both crude materials and manufactured articles abroad, without adjusting its economy to the receipt of correspondingly large quantities of foreign goods. During the 1920's, and to a lesser degree even during the 1930's, expenditures by American tourists

in foreign countries and payments by American firms for the use of foreign ships helped to make up the difference between exports and imports. These comparatively intangible elements may serve the same purpose again in the post-war world, but in shipping at least the situation will be greatly changed, and tourist trade cannot possibly be enough to bring about a satisfactory balance.

The free international market has worked even less well than the free market within nations, and is even more clearly doomed by modern conditions. The chances for a successful restoration of a free world market would be poor enough even if the United States and England were prepared to take the lead after the war in eliminating tariff barriers almost entirely and in furnishing credit on a scale sufficient to re-establish an unlimited gold standard and if they were also willing to allow their internal economic conditions to be governed in large measure by the progress of world economic recovery. But a free international market operating on the basis of a gold standard necessarily means that prices and the flow of imports and exports in any one country must be constantly adjusted to conditions in all other countries. It is essentially incompatible with any effective form of national economic planning or wage and price control, and it turns any program for adjusting production to prospective demand into a pure gamble. It may lead at any time to the sudden unemployment of thousands of workers. The prospect of its acceptance by any progressive nation after the war is nil.

Autarchy is not, however, the only alternative. Some steps have already been taken toward more rational international trade relationships through such devices as the International Sugar Agreement of 1937, the International Coffee Agreement of 1940, the activities of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, and the proposal for an Inter-American Bank to provide necessary credits and facilitate international settlements. It will not be politically feasible immediately after the war to set up a wholly new economic organization of international society, even if a satisfactory organization could be invented without a long process of trial and error. But it should be possible to undertake a rapid extension of the world commodity agreement method for eliminating cutthroat competition in international trade. It should be possible to revive the Bank for International Settlements (minus, it is to be devoutly hoped, any attempt to collect reparations beyond restoration of the factories and other tangible forms of wealth which have been moved from the conquered countries to Germany) and to find a working basis for international monetary exchange. Some preparation for immediate post-war resumption of international trade is needed before the war is over.

III

FOR the long run, no satisfactory basis for international trade will be possible until there has been a basic change in habits of thought about it throughout the world. The evil which most needs to be eliminated is competition between nations to keep the wages of their people down in order to preserve their international trading position. There is something radically wrong when it seems necessary to keep the cotton farmers of the South desperately poor in order to sell American cotton in world markets. There is something wrong when the world depends for cheap rubber and cheap coffee on slave wages paid in the East Indies and in Brazil. There was something wrong when Japan invaded world markets with factory goods produced by workers paid a few cents a day.

This problem cannot be solved, as the United States has attempted to solve it, by tariff barriers. Within the United States, tariffs worked to the disadvantage of farmers and the consuming public, and the effect of American tariffs on other countries was to force wages even lower. It would seem more sensible and logical for nations with a standard of living higher than the world average to spread the burden on foreign trade which is imposed by high wages equitably over the whole population; in short, to subsidize exports and imports to the extent necessary to equalize international wage differentials. Under such a program, American exporters of typewriters would be paid whatever was necessary to make up for the difference in wages

paid by American manufacturers and their foreign competitors. Under an ideal program, American importers of coffee or rubber or sugar would receive a sufficient bonus so that they could pay a fair price to foreign producers and still sell at as low a price in the American market as was considered desirable.

Such a program would, of course, promptly develop into an international racket—a competition in subsidies which would benefit only a few traders—unless it were combined with commodity agreements which divided the world market on a fair basis, and prevented the use of subsidies for the purpose of ruining foreign competitors or the weaker foreign nations. Its ultimate purpose should be to eliminate the need for the program itself by promoting a uniformly high standard of living throughout the world. But that is a dream for the distant future. In the years immediately after the war, the judicious use of subsidies in combination with international commodity agreements is the most promising method for restoring a healthy international trade without wrecking any nation's attempts to raise its own average standard of living.

During the period of actual reconstruction of countries devastated by war, the United States might well provide export subsidies and credits to an extent which would almost amount to giving goods away. Such a gesture would not be as completely altruistic as it might seem at first glance. Because of the nature of war production, the United States at the close of the war will have a productive capacity in heavy industries decidedly out of proportion to peacetime needs. Instead of cutting back production of steel shapes and copper mill products and machine tools, it would probably be cheaper in the long run to maintain production and practically give some of the products away than to start a deflationary cycle which might lead to a drop in national income far more expensive than any subsidy. Over a long period, giving goods away can scarcely be called a sensible economic policy. For a short time, it would be the easiest and probably the cheapest way to avoid a post-war depression, particularly if taxes at that time were sufficiently heavy to cover the cost out of current receipts and thus avoid an accumulation of monetary difficulties for the future.

Even on a short-term basis, the proposal obviously involves serious political difficulties, and it is not likely that either Congress or a majority of the people will be ready by the time of the armistice to accept it in bald form. But if the United States' gold hoard were used through an international bank to set up huge credits for all nations willing to enter into reasonable commodity agreements for the resumption of peacetime trade, Congress might be willing to put the credits on a basis similar to lend-lease with indefinite prospects for repayment, particularly if they promised to benefit farmers and other special-interest groups. Fair price differentials could be included in the commodity agreements. The prospect of re-establishing foreign markets for cotton, oil, and manufactured goods would win important political support—and the improbability that such credits would ever be repaid is something which the American people have almost learned to take for granted. To those who might raise shortsighted objections against lending the gold on poor security, a sufficient answer should be, What else is it good for?

The financial arrangements under which foreign trade is conducted are really much less important than maintaining a substantial volume of trade in commodities, unless or until all nations in the world become approximately self-sufficient — an unlikely and generally undesirable contingency. No real basis for determining the exchange value of commodities in international trade exists in the modern world—the exchange of cotton and wheat and manufactured articles from one country for rubber and silk and tin from other countries through the medium of money, now that there is no longer any absolute international monetary standard, is a statistical absurdity. And no country after the war will be willing to restore an international gold standard which would place its internal economy at the mercy of others.

Until nations have learned to achieve better balance in their own economies, international economic balance can be achieved only by pragmatic and somewhat arbitrary measures. The use of foreign

trade subsidies in connection with international agreements may not be ideal, but it will work. Some form of international stabilization is essential to give the United States an opportunity to work out its own economic problems. And since the fact that the United States could not avoid war has made it clear that the freedom and prosperity of this country depend upon reasonably peaceful and prosperous conditions in the rest of the world, it should be obvious that America's foreign trade can no longer safely be left to the vagaries of a theoretically free international market.

It is likewise no longer safe to leave the formulation of tariffs and foreign trade policies to the tender mercies of pressure groups working on members of Congress under cover of public indifference. The impartial fact-finding of the Federal Tariff Commission, the negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements and international commodity agreements by administrative experts, are good as far as they go. But a satisfactory foreign trade policy for the United States can be developed only when the people have been educated to see the basic issues and to choose their course with full realization of the consequences.

In the past, politicians dealing with tariffs and foreign trade have been unable to resist the pressure of special interests because the rest of the people did not care enough to give them support. The war may at last teach the American people that they cannot work out permanent, democratic solutions of domestic economic problems without recognizing and accepting the full implications of the nation's position as a great world commercial power.

The Changing East

by

J. B. Condliffe

MORE than half the people of the earth live around the shores of the Pacific Ocean. They offer the most startling contrasts of our economic world—the highest and the lowest areas of population density, the greatest and the least productive capacity, the most advanced and the most backward economic organization, the greatest and least development of urbanism, and the highest and lowest living standards. East and west, and north and south, dense masses of illiterate and desperately poor agriculturists face relatively small outposts of highly productive European settlements in large areas of rich resources.

Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand maintain the highest productivity and enjoy the highest living standards in the world. China, southeast Asia, and India, even Japan, offer a startling contrast to their well-being. It requires the labor of four people to feed five at a low diet in China. The labor of one person in Australia and New Zealand not only feeds five richly, but produces a great export surplus of food and raw materials. Death rates, and especially infant mortality rates, in the Pacific countries of European settlement are lower than have ever been achieved before. In Asia, the harsh, positive checks of Malthusian theory—famine, war, and pestilence—barely restrain the increase of abundant populations ever pressing against the limits of subsistence. In the New World, however, the net reproduction rates are at or near

unity—the scanty populations of these rich areas are at present heavily weighted in the reproductive age groups; but if birth rates do not rise soon, the time is not far off when they will barely maintain their numbers.

It is just about a century since both the New World and the old world of Asia were brought within the orbit of capitalist trading enterprise. New Zealand was settled in 1840, the same year as China was opened up to European trade. The gold rushes in California came in 1849 and those in Australia in 1851. Japan was constrained to trade with the Western world in 1852. American clippers were active in the China trade and it was an American squadron that sailed into Yokohama Bay and broke down Japan's isolation; but then the railroads penetrated the eastern mountains and middle-western wheat poured into free-trade England. For nearly a century the enterprise and capital of the United States found vent in the economic conquest of this continent. The organization of world trade in the nineteenth century, which might have been shared by Boston and New York, was left almost entirely to London.

That system of world trade, based upon private capitalist enterprise, built great trading cities in the Far East—Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong-Kong, and Shanghai. It built railways that led to these ports and such trading and even manufacturing enterprises as fed the trade that flowed to Europe. Empires grew in the Far East—British, Dutch, Russian, and French. Other European Powers came late in the struggle to establish footholds in China and the Pacific islands—the only remaining areas, except Africa, open to imperialist expansion. The United States secured its island bases—Hawaii, Samoa, the Philippines, Wake, Midway, and Guam.

Japan, led by astute and militarily competent feudal groups, was the first Asiatic power to free itself from European economic and political domination. Recognizing the secret of that domination in applied science, the Japanese built universities and armed forces on the European model. Before the end of the nineteenth century they were in a position to humiliate China. Soon after, they were able successfully to challenge Russia, and absorb Korea. The civil war in Europe in 1914-18 gave them further opportunity, and the present war has enabled them, temporarily, to acquire a vast empire of rich resources and almost unlimited man power. Empire in the East presents a different picture with a totalitarian Japan entrenched behind island forts.

The difficulties of dislodging Japan from its conquests are not to be underestimated. The Pacific fronts are not secondary in this global war and tremendous efforts are needed to break through the island ring or to gain access to land bases in China. The strategic importance of the China front has perhaps been underestimated, but the time will come when Japan will be attacked at home and forced to disgorge its conquests. The problems of reconstruction that will then face the United Nations are the theme of this discussion.

The first is the problem of Japan. Official statements have made it clear that China expects to regain not only all of the mainland territories that have been overrun; but earlier conquests as well—Formosa and the chain of islands running south. For Korea, China demands some form of independence, probably under international supervision. The opinion of the experts who know Japan best is that these colonial territories have been acquired too recently to be fully integrated into the Japanese economy. Their judgment is, therefore, that the economic prosperity of Japan would not be fatally impaired by their loss. But this is only on the assumption that Japanese industry can share in the development of world trade and particularly in the reorganization of China. There is, in fact, no solution to the problem of Japan—as there is none to the problem of Germany—along vindictive or repressive lines. The only possible solutions lie in the creation first of effective means of international policing against aggression and second of expanding opportunities for peaceful trade.

II

THIS leads us at once to the problem of China, as typifying the whole great southeast Asian area of inadequate industrial equipment and organization. For China, the external political controls that have been in force for the last century are passing

into history. The abolition of extraterritorial rights will sweep away, not only the consular courts and unequal privileges, but territorial concessions also. The end of extraterritoriality means also the end of foreign concessions such as those at Shanghai, Tientsin, and Canton. A united and integral China will be free to rebuild, without external handicaps, and without the alibi those handicaps have provided.

The problems of such rebuilding, however, are immense. At the moment, severe inflation is getting out of control and there will clearly be need for prompt action to reorganize the monetary system and establish a new currency that will not be overvalued externally and undervalued internally. Given international support, this is not a difficult operation technically; but it is only the beginning. Relief will perhaps not be as important as in many European countries. The need will be greater. Millions are already threatened with famine. But the very extent of the problem will limit relief to strategic operations—primarily the struggle against epidemics. The main effort of the Chinese Government, it is already clear, will be to create new and solid bases of permanent reconstruction.

The first of these will be in the field of transportation. No small part of the famine and inflation difficulties arise from the lack of cheap transport. Even where roads have been built, the lack of trucks and gasoline results in starvation close to areas where stocks of food are adequate if not abundant. Trucks must go to China, with refining equipment to deal with the newly discovered oil, with medical supplies, with essential machine equipment and with technicians. Rivers must be straightened, canals improved, and railways built or repaired.

The second priority for China is a nucleus of heavy industry, strategically located inland. The loss of Shanghai and the cutting of the Burma Road are graven on the heart of the Chinese people. They do not intend again to leave themselves vulnerable to sudden attack. The example of Soviet Russia's interior development has not been lost on them. With the help of their foreign friends, or if need be alone, they will construct in their mountain citadels the minimum of machine industries necessary for defense. They have the necessary coal and iron and they are rapidly developing the technical experience. The outstanding credits they have in this country are available for the necessary imports.

But, in addition, a free and united China is now ready to welcome foreign investment in a variety of manufacturing and extractive industries. If some semi-official statements may be taken at their face value, there may even be too ready a welcome for such investment. There seems to be some danger, indeed, of an ill-advised flow of foreign capital to China after this war. The expanded construction industries of the United States and many great manufacturing corporations may seek compensation for the loss of war orders by opening up new fields of operation. To such industries China may well seem a promising outlet.

There is good reason, however, to counsel prudence in this respect, for China's sake and for the sake of international equilibrium and good will in the not too distant future. While capitalist enterprise in foreign investment has in the past been responsible for greatly increased productivity, it has not always contributed to the social betterment of the industrially backward countries and only too often has proceeded fitfully—exaggerating instead of smoothing out the fluctuations of the business cycle.

While no economist would deny the essential truth of Sun Yat-sen's plea for the international development of China as a contribution to the industrial demobilization of the Western world, that development can be most effective if it is carefully planned and controlled. There has recently been some controversy concerning Mr. Wallace's half jocular statement that "the object of this war is to make sure that everybody in the world has the privilege of drinking a quart of milk a day." No one believes that the standard of living of the backward peoples can be raised by putting them on a poor-relation, W. P. A. status, receiving cheaply the surpluses of misdirected American production. But there are many, if not most, economists and students of international affairs who do most seriously believe that the fortunate peoples of the highly industrialized countries cannot continue to enjoy their present high living standards unless the less fortunate in their own, as well as other, lands are given

temporary help to enable them by their own efforts to produce more and therefore to buy more. To urge this is not philanthropy. The wisest of all social investments is in the health, education, and secure living standards of an efficient working population.

It would be sound economic strategy to plan international institutions whereby the equipment needs of the backward industrial countries could be met by conversion of war plants in the manufacturing countries so as to minimize the loss of employment. Such planning, moreover, need not and should not destroy, but on the contrary, should sustain private initiative and enterprise. A United Nations Development Corporation, co-ordinating programs of essential development worked out by competent national authorities in such countries as China, could finance the letting of contracts that would prevent both a collapse of employment in the manufacturing countries and indiscriminate investment in the receiving countries. It is essentially a question of priorities arrived at by consultation and agreement. If the post-war world, after a brief period of hesitation, is to avoid first an inflationary reconstruction boom and then a series of violent deflationary adjustments such as were experienced in 1920 and 1929, intergovernmental machinery for the planning of such priorities should be created now.

III

It seems obvious that the European empires in the East will undergo radical change. They were a by-product of a trading system centered on London and directed by private enterprise, a system in which cosmopolitan-capitalist investment was the dominating factor of organization. Already the Queen of the Netherlands has announced what amounts to effective autonomy of the Netherlands Indies. British colonial policy, ever since the Boer War and the subsequent federation of the South African colonies into a self-governing Dominion, has moved away from trusteeship to partnership as a goal of policy. India will surely control its own destinies. Some way will be found to break the present deadlock and to draft, under Indian auspices, a workable plan of co-operation among the dissident peoples of that great sub-continent. The smaller colonies will be grouped in more efficient areas of regional administration with a larger measure of international supervision and control, if only as a step toward collective security.

The colonial issue is at the moment one of the most destructive causes of Anglo-American misunderstanding. Such misunderstanding would be greatly alleviated if it were realized on both sides that the old colonial system is as dead as the nineteenth century organization of world trade out of which it developed. No one in his senses would expect a responsible colonial power to abandon its responsibilities overnight; but there is every reason to expect that such a power will direct its policies toward preparation for self-government and will be ready to accept international supervision of those policies in a collective system of security. This is in fact British and Dutch policy. The only colonial empire which is guaranteed by official American statements is the French.

It must be added that the welfare of the dependent colonial peoples, as indeed the welfare of all peoples, depends essentially upon prompt and effective measures for the restoration of an expanding system of freer multilateral trade. It can be shown that the network of multilateral trade built up in the nineteenth century rested on fundamental geographical and economic conditions. The League economists have demonstrated a symmetry in its operation which is not the result of chance. They are able to arrange the trading countries in a serial order in which each country has an export balance with all others preceding it and an import balance with all that follow. The network of trading connections so demonstrated has made us all members, one of another. No country, however great and nearly self-sufficient, can afford to withdraw from this network. It has indeed been proved statistically that the United States, which of all the great countries except Russia, seems to be least dependent on world trade, in fact suffered most from its interruption and restriction in the pre-war crises. This is a natural result of the fact that the greatest and most complex superstructure of credit relationships tumbles

most heavily when severely shaken. As the Chinese proverb says, "He that sleeps on the floor never falls out of bed."

Unless there is prompt action to restore multilateral trade—such trade as will enable the United States to buy raw materials from southeast Asia, sell its characteristic manufactures to countries with high living standards, enable those countries to export food in turn to Europe and Europe to complete the chain of transactions by exports to Asia—unless these and similar chains of trading are established again with payments cleared multilaterally—there is little use discussing capital investment to raise living standards or any other measures of economic collaboration. A co-operative specializing world needs organs of co-ordination—for exchange stabilization, for clearing of payments, and for removal of trade barriers. The key to the problem internationally is a sweeping trade agreement between the United States and the British countries; but for this and similar agreements it is necessary to renew the executive powers of trade negotiation. The problems are complex and technical, but not beyond expert competence, given the political will to create effective machinery of international co-operation.

Finally, behind all economic, social, and political issues in Asia, there lies the fundamental problem of population increase. A billion people, massed in the river valleys, toiling incessantly in a primitive agriculture, live always on the verge of misery. Any lifting of their productivity, any improvement of social organization, any alleviation of hunger or control of disease, is swallowed up by increased survival. They are too hungry to be ambitious, too ignorant to strive for any but the elementary satisfactions.

There can be no easy or unplanned solution for this vast problem presented by human fecundity. Migration would take away but a few and they the more enterprising, whose places would quickly be filled. The conscious control of numbers is the last phase of developing control over the natural environment, possible only to a community capable of scientific understanding. The history of European populations since the Industrial Revolution shows clearly that the first effect of industrialization is a rapid increase in numbers which continues cumulatively through several generations.

The only practical method of attack upon this problem is by a rapid industrial development, deliberately planned and stimulated, so that productivity jumps ahead of increase and the surplus is drained off for essential social purposes, and primarily for education in all its varied phases, rather than being dissipated in slight increases of living standards soon checked by renewed increase. Even so, numbers will grow and even a slight rate of increase in such large masses will be great in absolute numbers. The bolder the attack and the more complete the planned modernization, the greater will be the chances of success, leading ultimately to a stabilization of numbers at higher living standards.

The alternative to such direct and far-reaching measures is not reversion to the *status quo.* If Europe, in its great period of expansion, had wished to keep its political and economic dominance of Asia, it would have been wiser not to have introduced Asiatics to its scientific and political and economic knowledge. Macaulay prescribed for Indian colleges Milton's "Areopagitica" as an English text. The defense of liberty against tyrants, however, is an idea as comprehensible to the Indian as to any other mind. Japan and Soviet Russia stand as living proof that what the West has done the East also may do. The genie is out of the bottle and cannot be put back. The Asiatic peoples are treading the first steps of the road of scientific knowledge applied to human affairs. Our only chance of living successfully in the same world with them is to help them by all means in our power to cover the first difficult stages as quickly and as painlessly as possible, so that they may join us as equal partners in planning a more rational world order. They have much to give and we have much to learn from their social wisdom—at least as much as they have to learn from our scientific and material efficiency.

No Weapon but Faith

SECRETARIATS OF INTER

In connection with the Round Ta discussion of what will constitute efficient staff for the future world orga ization, the Editors believe it will be luminating to present the structure a operation of the existing secretariats international organizations and of t Secretariat constituted by the League Nations. While these have many poin

League of Nations

The organs of the League of Nations: (1) The Assembly; (2) The Council; (3) The Permanent Secretariat.

Auxiliary Organizations: (1) Economic and Financial Organization; (2) Communications and Transit Organization; (3) Health Organization; (4) Intellectual Co-operation Organization; (5) Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions; (6) Permanent Mandates Commission; (7) Commission of Enquiry for European Union; (8) Advisory Committee on Social Questions; (9) (a) Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, (b) Permanent Central Opium Board, (c) Supervisory Body; (10) Supervisory Commission; (11) Committee on the Allocation of Expenses; (12) Advisory Committee of Experts on Slavery.

Autonomous Organizations (under financial supervision of the Assembly of the League): (1) International Labor Office; (2) Permanent Court of Justice.

1. *The Assembly:* The Assembly consists of representatives of the members of the League. Each member of the League may have not more than three representatives, and has one vote.

2. *The Council:* The Council of the League is composed of three categories of members, namely, Permanent Members, semi-Permanent Members with the right of re-eligibility, and non-Permanent Members.

3. *The Permanent Secretariat:* The secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General. He is assisted by a Deputy Secretary-General and several Undersecretaries-General. Administratively, the secretariat of the League consists of offices of the Secretaries General, the Deputy Secretary-General and Undersecretaries, fifteen sections, various administrative services, auxiliary offices in different countries, and a library. The fifteen sections are Central, Political, Legal, Information, Minority, Mandates, Disarmament, Financial, Economic, Communications and Transit, Health, International Bureau, and Intellectual Co-operation, Opium, and Social Sections. Besides these sections there is the Treasury.

Actually the work of the League is prepared by the members of the sections, who are under the guidance of the Directors of their sections. The Directors act under the directives of the Secretary-General, who is responsible for the execution of the resolutions adopted by the Council or the Assembly of the League.

Free World Association

The policy of the Free World Association is determined by the annual Congress composed of representatives of various national sections. The occupied countries are temporarily represented by leading citizens and representatives of popular organizations. The Congress elects an Executive Committee in which each national section has at least one representative. The Executive Committee appoints the general secretariat which consists of the Executive Director, the Secretary-General, Associate Secretary-Generals, and the Treasurer.

International Red Cross

The international policies of the Red Cross are determined by the International Red Cross Conference, which meets normally every four years. It is composed of delegates from the states which have signed the Geneva Convention, delegates of the International Red Cross Committee, and delegates of the League of Red Cross Societies. The Committee, an independent body composed of eighteen Swiss citizens, is under the direction of a President elected by the Committee and is supported by subvention from the National Red Cross Societies.

The League of Red Cross Societies is directed by a Board of Governors, which consists of representatives of each national Society. This Board elects the Executive Committee of Chairman, three Vice Chairmen, and six members, and appoints a Standing Finance Committee of

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

common, there are significant differences which will repay study. The organizations chosen cover the various types of world groups which have diverse functions ranging from the League of Nations itself to the Free World Association which is a crusading body having hundreds of affiliates in every nation of the world.

three to five members. The Chairman has general supervision over the work of the secretariat, which includes also a Secretary-General, Treasurer-General, and a technical counsellor appointed by the Board of Governors. The secretariat has a relief division, a health division, a nursing division, and a Junior Red Cross division. The Secretary-General's office co-ordinates the work of the secretariat as a whole and deals with matters of organization, information, and publications.

Universal Postal Union

Every member—practically all countries of the world belong to the Universal Postal Union—is invited to send delegates to the Congress, which meets every five or six years. The voting system gives every metropolitan country one vote irrespective of size or importance; colonies and dependencies receive votes by an allotment which is revised by the Congress at each session. In cases of dispute between postal administrations, the Union has adopted the principle of compulsory arbitration.

By virtue of a mandate of surveillance held by the Swiss Post Office from the Congress, this body chooses the Postal Administration which mans the International Office (Bureau at Berne). The expenses are borne by all the administrations of the contracting states. Although the Bureau is placed by the Congress under this supervision, its organization is in the hands of its Director. There is a staff of nine. This staff prepares the work of conferences and congresses, prints documents, publishes an annual report and a monthly magazine, *Union Postale.*

Pan-American Union

The Pan-American Union is under the general direction of a Governing Board composed of the Secretary of State of the United States and representatives in Washington of the other American Governments. These representatives are named by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of each nation and their duties are determined by each Government, although they are free to organize the internal administration of their offices. The executive officers of the Union are a Director and an Assistant Director, elected by and responsible to the Governing Board.

International Federation of Trade Unions

Management of the IFTU is vested in the Executive Committee, which consists of the officers (President, five Vice Presidents, and General Secretary) and meets six times a year; the General Council, which consists of the members of the Executive Committee and one delegate from each affiliated national center; and the Triennial Congress, which consists of the General Council and the representatives of the affiliated national central trades union organizations and three delegates from the international trade secretariats. Each national center has votes according to the number of members.

The Congress elects the members of the Executive Committee, the General Secretary, and Assistant Secretaries. These hold office for three years, subject to suspension and replacement by the General Council, which also has the power of fixing salaries.

Rotary International

A President and a Board of Directors, elected in annual convention by representatives of all Rotary Clubs, administer the affairs of Rotary International. At least seven of the fourteen directors must be from countries other than the United States.

The International Secretary is appointed by the Board of Directors. His staff numbers roughly 180 members. He is authorized to recommend personnel for appointment to the Board, which makes the final decisions. This permanent secretariat, consisting of the Secretary, Assistant Secretaries, and staff, is maintained with offices in Chicago, Zurich, Bombay, and London.

STAFF

of the World Organization

SOONER or later, and the sooner the better, the United Nations will have to begin to lay the foundations of a World Secretariat. The importance of this body lies in the fact that while governments come and go and the representatives of the various countries in the United Nations organization will naturally be changed, the Secretariat will remain as the permanent functioning unit.

Convinced that the Secretariat will play an important role in the establishment of an international organization, FREE WORLD has been stimulating seminars and discussion groups which will lay the foundations for the participation of enlightened officials and public-spirited citizens of the various countries in the work of the Secretariat. The success of the staff will depend not only on official representatives but on the constant co-operation of enlightened democratic forces.

The participants in this discussion were: Max Beer, international journalist and former official of the League of Nations Secretariat; Henri Bonnet, Director of the International Organization for Intellectual Co-operation; Charles A. Davila, former Rumanian Minister to the United States and Honorary President of the Rumanian-American Alliance for Democracy; General Julius Deutsch, former Minister of War of the Austrian Republic and one of the leading representatives of Austrian labor; Max Lerner, author of "Ideas Are Weapons" and "It Is Later Than You Think," at present Professor of Political Science at Williams College and editorial writer for PM; Carlos Garcia-Palacios, former member of the Political Section of the League of Nations and at present assistant-in-charge of Public Relations for Latin America at C.B.S.; Michael Straight, author of "Make This the Last War," who was one of the editors of the New Republic until he joined the United States Air Force; G. F. van Dissel, former member of the Communications and Transit Section of the League of Nations and at present technical adviser to the Dutch Purchasing Commission; Dr. Wousaofong, former member of the Political Section of the League of Nations.

ROUND TABLE No. 14

In addition Judge Dorothy Kenyon, member of the League of Nations Commission on legal status of women; Arthur Sweetser, official of the League Secretariat for the whole inter-war period; and Quincy Wright, professor at the University of Chicago and author of "A Study of War," who were unable to be present at the discussion, sent in their observations in writing to the Round Table. Louis Dolivet presided.

LOUIS DOLIVET—Tonight we are going to discuss a very important subject, the world secretariat of the United Nations, under whatever name they may finally be constituted. We realize that the world secretariat can be strong and vital only if the United Nations themselves will become a powerful international institution, for a secretariat is merely the instrument of execution. But the efficiency, the political aspirations, and the world consciousness of each of the members of the world secretariat will have an important bearing on international affairs. The members of the secretariat will be the prominent advisers of the various international assemblies and councils. They will be experts with special knowledge concerning the various situations in different parts of the world. Therefore it is necessary to consider the best way of organizing such a world secretariat, the best methods of recruiting a personnel which will really be devoted to democratic principles and to the world as a whole, and which will be capable of assuming some highly significant functions in international administration.

But before going into the subject of a future world secretariat, I should like to ask those of our colleagues who were in the League of Nations Secretariat to express their opinions on what were the essential weaknesses of the Secretariat of the League of Nations?

WOUSAOFONG—The weaknesses of that Secretariat were first, that the League of Nations was dominated by the British and French Governments which were unfortunately far too conservative; and secondly, that the Secretariat consisted partly of representatives of the British and the French Governments, who took orders from their respective Foreign Offices.

DOLIVET—Mr. Bonnet, do you agree with these observations?

HENRI BONNET—Not entirely.

DOLIVET—What is your opinion?

BONNET—Well, I think—to make it short—that the weaknesses of the Secretariat of the League were largely the weaknesses of the League itself.

MAX BEER—That is what I would say exactly.

BONNET—People will disagree with what Wousaofong said about the League's be-

ESSENTIAL FINDINGS

1

A World Secretariat can be efficient only if the parent organization has effective power in international affairs.

2

The Secretariat will have immense importance in constantly advising the international assemblies and councils concerning the essential problems that affect the world.

3

It should consist of men and women chosen without reference to their nationality but allowing for the representation of all nations; this personnel must be capable and technically trained, in touch with popular sentiment and with organizations interested in world affairs; it must be inspired by a truly international spirit.

4

The members of the Secretariat should owe exclusive allegiance to the world organization and not to their respective governments.

5

The Secretariat should have a powerful radio and publicity machinery in order to educate public opinion all over the world in favor of the principles of democracy and international organization.

ing exclusively dominated by the French and the British and more as to the role of the majority of national officials of those two countries. You cannot have a strong Secretariat if you have a weak organization, and it was so in this case. In addition, one should distinguish in the history of the Secretariat, as in the history of the League, several periods. The history of the League itself is already closely linked to the whole history of the world between 1920 and 1940, and the history of the Secretariat is linked up with the history of the League. You had a very different League and a very different Secretariat in 1920, in 1930, and in 1940.

DOLIVET—Mr. van Dissel, what would you characterize as essential weaknesses of the Secretariat?

G. F. VAN DISSEL—I can perhaps point out one that I know a little better than the others. It is in the technical sections. We felt very strongly the lack of relationship with the existing international institutions. We had the world postal union, the unions of communications, broadcasting, railroads, and so on. We had contact with them but we were considered as a little too involved with political problems to be able to work with them. That is one of the points I should like to see settled once and for all in the future organization.

DOLIVET—Would you apply this to the technical institutions in various countries?

VAN DISSEL—In various countries it was exactly the same. Those institutions had been working a far longer time than the League, and they did not want to collaborate with the League because it was mixed up with political problems. They carefully avoided those complications. That difficulty was never bridged.

DOLIVET—Mr. Palacios, may I ask for your observation about the weaknesses of the Secretariat?

CARLOS GARCIA-PALACIOS—To my knowledge, the majority of the members had the impression they were representing their countries. But this point was never very clear, and in some technical sections we really did not know whether we were international members or whether we were representatives of our countries. Many of us were sent on missions to different countries where we worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We had to come back to Geneva and transform ourselves again into international functionaries.

It was a very tough job. We were obliged to maintain contact with our representatives who came to Geneva each year. Of course, you couldn't always agree with what the delegates said but, after all, you were human; you were born in such a country and you were inclined to adopt the viewpoint of your government. Another point is that many people who were only temporarily connected with the League of Nations thought it was better not to oppose their governments because they always hoped to go back to government service and get a better job there.

WRIGHT—Precisely. The Secretariat of the League of Nations was not sufficiently independent of governments. The higher officials tended to be agents of the governments of which they were nationals in spite of the requirement that they take an oath of loyalty to the League of Nations. This arose partly from the insistence of certain governments that persons favorable to them be appointed, and partly from the hope of these officials that they would later obtain important positions with their governments.

DOLIVET—Before continuing with the weaknesses of the Secretariat, I should like to have Mr. Sweetser tell us the essential contributions of the Secretariat to the principle of international collaboration.

ARTHUR SWEETSER—Far and away the greatest contribution made by the Secretariat of the League of Nations in the interwar period from 1919 to 1939 was the demonstration which it gave, beyond possibility of doubt or question, that men drawn from all races, languages, and religions of mankind can unite together to form an efficient, smooth-running mechanism of daily international collaboration. This demonstration is of vital importance to the future history of the world and to the chances of creating after this war an agency strong enough to prevent a repetition of the present agonies.

I think it is not an exaggeration to say that practically every visitor to Geneva, whether he was for or against the League as a whole, was astonished at the efficiency and speed of its Secretariat. Here, indeed, was an international staff of some seven hun-

dred permanent officials drawn from over forty countries in every part of the globe, who lived and worked together with a very large degree of devotion to the common interests of the international community. It was an agency which by its size and importance was unique in human relations, and it caused a thrill not only of surprise but very often of deep satisfaction to those who came upon it.

It was not only that its mechanical side was extremely efficient and rapid, that its translators wove back and forth between French and English with startling ease and accuracy, or that its papers and minutes were available within a few hours' time. There was something far beyond that in both the intellectual and even the spiritual lead which its members gave to the work of the League. Not only were many of them foremost experts in their field, capable of adding their own direct contribution from the international viewpoint to the contributions made by the national delegates, but a very appreciable proportion of them also possessed a world outlook and philosophy which often helped to lift the discussions to a far higher plane and even to get out of some of the narrower difficulties. I think it would be generally agreed that the Secretariat was the most valuable single agency and development of the League in its first period between the two World Wars.

DOLIVET—Mr. Beer, you were one of the most faithful inhabitants of Geneva for years. What is your opinion?

BEER—I think the weakness of the Secretariat of the League of Nations was derived from the weaknesses of the League itself, as my friend Bonnet stated. I also agree that the essential weakness of the Secretariat lay in the fact that the officials were not the servants of the League, but very often were servants of the governments which sent them there. The Secretariat was what one could expect from such a League. But we can say there were times and circumstances when the Secretariat functioned better than the League—that is to say, better than the governments composing the League.

DOLIVET—When was it, Mr. Beer?

BEER—I think, for instance, that in the Abyssinia affair the majority of the officials of the League had a much better understanding of the real tasks and duties of this international organization than the delegates of the governments. Finally, among the officials in Geneva there arose something like the spirit of the League—which people called the spirit of Geneva. This was a thing which greatly troubled the governments, and sometimes the heads of the League. They didn't like it at all.

DOLIVET—I know the difficulties under which the Secretariat operated, but it must be stated that in many cases the common people did not feel too friendly about the Secretariat of the League. Sometimes it seemed to them too rich, too far away from the sufferings of the people, and too bureaucratic, too conservative. You see, humanity expected so much from the Secretariat, and somehow the latter was identified with the whole League, and made responsible for its weaknesses.

DOROTHY KENYON—I'd like to add to what Mr. Beer has said, that, from my rather restricted but fairly intense and very recent experience with it, I felt that the Secretariat was on the whole infinitely more liberal than the governing body of the League. The Secretariat members were always pleased when something courageous was done and often worked hard to get it done. Some of the bitterest critics of the weaknesses of the League were its Secretariat. But they spoke out far too rarely, mainly because their futures depended so much on their home governments just as League policy did. And so they were afraid to speak their minds. Furthermore, though they developed, many of them, a strong sense of loyalty to the League and world government as such, this pressure of their home governments stood in the way and made it difficult. The power was with the governments and not with the League, and they knew it.

I remember how struck I was when I went one day to dine with a member of the Secretariat in his charming country-place outside Geneva where he had lived for over fifteen years. I asked him how much land he owned and he replied, "Not one square inch. I rent on a month to month basis so I can get out any time and go back home. You see I'm a Scotchman."

Allowing for the canny vagaries of a Scot, this man's lack of sense of roots in

Dorothy Kenyon

the place was startling. Later I saw him again after everyone had scattered before the storm of June, 1940.

"The Secretariat just dissolved," he said. "We turned into Frenchmen, Swedes, British, Dutch—everybody thinking of nothing but how to get home as fast as possible. There wasn't any League left because what had made us feel like a League had disappeared."

Yet, in spite of national pulls like these, that "feeling like a League" feeling did exist in the Secretariat and can, I am sure, be re-created. Only the Secretariat members must be severed somehow from the influence of their governments back home. The governments' power over them must be lessened.

BONNET—There were weaknesses in the Secretariat of the League. Some of them have been indicated. But it was also a strong and good organization. I have said that there were several periods. Do not forget the first one. The years between, let us say, 1920 and 1924. The governments were not interested very much in the League at that time. There had been a good lot of cynicism and skepticism about the League even during the peace conference. It was the Secretariat of the League, the officials of the Secretariat, who took advantage of this period to build up the system of the League. The Covenant was, after all, a set of moral rules. The machinery was only indicated in a few lines. The procedures had to be devised.

I take only two examples. One was in the political field. It was entirely the work of the Secretariat to establish a procedure for the protection of the minorities. Perhaps that did not work very well in postwar Europe but the reasons were political. The procedure which had been instituted by the Secretariat of the League was the best possible one in the circumstances the Secretariat was placed in. The second example, still more striking, is that the technical organizations of the League—economic, financial, and communications—were conceived and organized by the Secretariat as early as 1920.

The very first year the Assembly met in Geneva, this Geneva spirit, to which Beer referred, existed very strongly among practically all the officers of the Secretariat. The bulk of the Secretariat people in 1920 were devoted to the League of Nations. They were more or less what might be called international officials. Few of them, comparatively, had come from Foreign Offices at this time. It was later on that the Secretariat was obliged, under political pressure, to recruit with the approval of the governments and to invite people of the Foreign Services. But in 1920, they were independent people. It is true they were obliged, they were asked by their chief, by the Secretary-General, to deal especially with their own countries in the difficult circumstances. But they had a lot of fights with their Foreign Ministries. The Secretariat had a very good technical relationship with the foreign officials and a very bad political one. It was a continuous fight. The Secretariat represented the international spirit, and national administrations represented, of course, purely national interests. But the very existence of the Secretariat has proved that it is possible, if certain conditions are fulfilled, to create a good body of international officials.

SWEETSER—Like all human agencies it had weaknesses. The greatest of all, as several of the speakers have pointed out, was the weakness of the League itself. A permanent staff can be somewhat better than its parent agency but it is wrong to expect it to be vastly better. It can do a little more than it is formally given authority

to do but it cannot get too far in the lead. As the servant of the principal agency it will inevitably reflect the weaknesses of that agency, though perhaps in a softened form. It cannot, however, take political actions or initiatives which go far beyond the views and desires of the member-states, nor can it even do essential humanitarian and technical jobs unless the parent agency gives approval and provides funds.

But the Secretariat had other weaknesses inherent to itself or its position. It was hard to keep it free from political influences when foreign ministers sometimes threatened to make their national financial contribution dependent on certain appointments or actions. But even if this sort of nationalistic blackmail did not exist, it was often difficult to find the right type of men, particularly experts, and at the same time preserve what deserved to be preserved of a fair and equitable distribution of posts among the various nations and regions of the world. Moreover, it often happened that a man who was first-class in his own country proved completely unadaptable internationally; either he did not like or understand foreign peoples or he became homesick and nationalistic.

Even at that, however, the degree of homogeneity developed during those twenty years was both striking and gratifying. Some officials, particularly from the more backward countries, undoubtedly took orders from their home governments; the total of this, however, was small, was confined largely to secondary officials, and was probably largely cancelled out by the general high sense of responsibility. There was even the tragic picture of some officials of Japanese nationality staying on after their country had been internationally condemned for aggression; of certain officials of Italian nationality staying on after sanctions had been decreed against Italy; and of certain technical officials of German nationality staying on even after the outbreak of war. The real malaise in the Secretariat began to set in only after it became clear that the world was heading to disaster because of the blindness of national governments. Officials in Geneva saw the storm coming but were powerless to avert it.

JULIUS DEUTSCH—The international spirit of the officials in Geneva was contrary to the national spirit in the countries, and I know that in my country the officials of Geneva were not liked because my Government wanted these people to be the agents of the Government. And I remember in our Parliament that the feeling of the majority was against the international spirit and for the national spirit. They would like people to go to Geneva who are willing to serve as agents of the country rather than as officials of an international secretariat. But the real reason of the weakness is not the technical thing; it is lack of power in the League of Nations itself.

II

DOLIVET—Let us tackle the next question. What are the chief problems in the organization of an efficient Secretariat of the United Nations and what should be the political powers of the Secretariat in relation to the assemblies of the United Nations—the Supreme Council and so forth?

WRIGHT—The qualifications for membership in the Secretariat should be intellectual capacity, including for the higher

Carlos Garcia-Palacios

officials general ability rather than technical training. There should be an adequate participation in the Secretariat by various cultures and nationalities of the world. There should be complete independence by the members of control by national governments, and loyalty to the world order. In order to assure this, members of the Secretariat in the higher ranks should have a secure tenure with a system of pensioning, and a provision of ineligibility for the holding of any national office. The aim should be to make the Secretariat a world civil service, loyal only to the world order.

MAX LERNER—Mr. Chairman, I come to this almost wholly without any of the experience that the gentlemen who have just spoken have had. But from what they say, I should say that the central problem was one of power rather than one of personnel. You can make that distinction.

Let me make a suggestion here as to the way I approach this question—what is the essential nature of administrative organizations; what are the bounds that are placed on their operation? For instance, in the New Deal in our own country, we have had in the last ten years a remarkable example of the administrative revolution. We have had the example of a country which has transformed itself from a relatively ineffective democracy into a relatively effective one and which has done so primarily through a strengthening of the administrative axis. Now, that would seem to argue that the administrative branch of any political structure—let's say an international structure—can go through a similar process. But the interesting thing about the American situation is that the reason we were able to have this administrative revolution was that it was part of the executive power of the Presidency which was in itself so indefinitely expansible that it could allow the necessary powers to that administrative organization. In other words, we were able to have what I regard as, on the whole, a very effective administrative development because there was the power behind it.

If you apply that analogy to international organization, the question arises: What corresponds in the international organization to the executive power of the President? If there is something that we can get which would correspond to that, then the problem of power would be whether the personnel of the Secretariat would have the strength to use it. If, however, that does not exist, then I would say that we would be bound to repeat the mistakes and the weaknesses, certainly the weaknesses, of the League of Nations Secretariat.

DOLIVET—Mr. Straight, would you draw the conclusion from what Mr. Lerner said that it is important to have a Supreme Council of the United Nations which should be invested with much larger powers than the past League of Nations? And what should be those powers?

MICHAEL STRAIGHT—I entirely agree with Lerner, but I feel somewhat pessimistic about the possibility of obtaining a very broad delegation of power under a world constitution to any executive of a federal world organization. Therefore, if the functions of the Secretariat are not to derive from a broad delegation of power, they must arise in a more or less empiric manner, mainly out of habit which could be one of the most positive of influences. If we get in the habit during the course of the war and the years after the war of exercising the kind of power in relations between nations that Mr. Lerner mentioned, we have a fair chance in perhaps ten or fifteen years after the armistice of finding the legal expression of the revolution we have accomplished in the form of a constitution which recognizes what has been done.

LERNER—I certainly believe that whatever development such a Secretariat has is likely to come in the day-to-day growth in the empiric way. I would like to suggest that the New Deal administrative revolution came about in exactly that way.

DOLIVET—But that is the situation in one country.

LERNER—But the important thing is that those empirical changes had this meaning because they were taking place within the framework of a recognized presidential power. Now, I don't think the issue should be the issue of whether you start with a definite constitution. I am perfectly willing to have the constitution written after the fact, so to say. That is, have it written after we have set up the working machinery.

Michael Straight

STRAIGHT—Really I don't think the difference between the New Deal revolution and this world revolution is as great as one might suppose. In fact, during the New Deal revolution the conservatives constantly maintained that the constitution was being written the entire time. I think the point being made by Lerner is that if we get in the habit now of doing what is necessary to discharge the responsibilities of men who are faced with tremendously urgent day-to-day problems—which is the situation which the President found himself in in 1933—we may accomplish this same revolution although it is not within a stated framework. That is to say, if now we undertake to form what amounts in function to a world government for the purpose of meeting the day-to-day problems which arise in winning this war, we shall find by the end of the war that we have created a very broad power in what will amount to a world Secretariat.

At that moment of the armistice, we shall take away the underpinnings of the scaffolding we have set up which are the common necessity of working together for the defeat of the Axis. We shall have to find other underpinnings which can only be the continuing necessity of maintaining world organization to meet the equally urgent problems of relief and reconstruction. If during the relief and reconstruction period we discover that we have been able to maintain in existence the kind of international, or rather supranational, machinery that is being set up simply in answer to these pressing problems of world mobilization, we may then discover that there is a general willingness among the peoples of the world to give expression to this revolution that is taking place in a legal and constitutional form. That is what I mean when I say by habit. We may find we have arrived at a position some years after the armistice in which we can recognize in the working machinery of the United Nations the efficient world Secretariat which we intend shall be a permanent method of discharging our responsibilities.

DOLIVET—You suggest to have during the war the creation of more and more international working organizations for the United Nations for winning the war which would grow into a Secretariat?

STRAIGHT—Exactly. I think that anyone who studies the problems of inter-Allied organizations at this moment can only conclude that from now on, if we wish to heighten the prosecution of the war, the only intelligent kind of domestic reorganization of government is to bring all of the governments of the Allies into harmony with each other so that the coalition at the top level may cease to be international and may become supranational.

DOLIVET—What difference are you establishing here?

STRAIGHT—In the last war there was a substantial inter-Allied machinery created. Sir Arthur Salter, who is the principal interpreter of it, described it by saying that as it approached the level of executive action, it became more and more national and that the functions—this is an interesting commentary perhaps on what was said about the Secretariat—the functions of the executives of the inter-Allied machinery in the last war were to represent their governments in the inter-Allied machinery, and before their governments to represent the new identity of the machinery itself. So

that each official was a dual personality that represented a very important advance from the simple principle of collaboration between governments. But it represented an advance which was insufficient to maintain itself against the shock of the armistice and peace.

I think that if we now wish to create an organization which will survive that shock we have to go beyond the stage of what Winston Churchill called the Council committees, at which the power of the inter-Allied organization is a derived power—derived from the fact that the executives on them are men so important that if they make an informal decision at the Council, that decision bears the weight of authority of the members of the Council. We have to go beyond that to a position in which the power of the international organization is an original power with an identity of its own, so that the men who are on it cease to represent this dual personality of men who are consciously aware of their own national responsibilities, and represent instead a body of men who regard themselves as world citizens and permanent members of an international organization.

MILOS SAFRANEK—I would like to mention some of the fears about an international organization that I know from my personal experience, and some hopes. Each government as well as the future international government was and will be per definition political. The question before us today is how will the future international organism function, may it be called the League of Nations or otherwise. I would like to touch upon the question of the future international bureaucracy, in whose hands will lie an undoubtedly larger power than in the hands of the distant and changing governments. I know from experience that in no branch of civil service was there less actual control than in the diplomatic service.

The Anglo-Saxon countries have an effective judicial review of administrative acts; in France, quite to the contrary, administrative acts were held to be outside ordinary law. Such was the case in many European countries, with the exception of totalitarian powers, where all civil services were controlled by a secret political police. Each government, consequently, had such a type of civil service, as it deserved. As far as diplomatic service is concerned, it is not sufficient to apply judicial review inasmuch as the substance of diplomacy is imponderable and not administrative. It is a question of persons, not laws. It is a matter of politics. Many diplomatic agents facilitated political service by becoming a letter box for the various governments of their country. Some cases, however, prove that a minister or an ambassador played often a more important role than any other member of the government, without having transgressed the administrative regulations.

DOLIVET—Would you give some examples to that effect?

SAFRANEK—For instance, the French ambassador in Berlin, Francois Poncet, who openly represented in Germany the interests of the Comité de Forges and not the interests of his State. Many unofficial agents have often accomplished more important missions in foreign countries than the accredited representatives—but many diplomatic agents became letter boxes, where the individual governments or powerful factions of political parties or economic groups would deposit their respective orders. The results of the executed orders or of their fulfilled wishes depended

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upon how these governments or groups were politicaly informed and to what degree they followed public, party, or private interests. The pre-war era, unfortunately, had some cases where the diplomatic agent did not remain loyal to the public interest. Interests of his class or his personal career were too often the decisive factors in the acts of various diplomatic agents.

However, it is not necessary to exaggerate the role of bureaucracy, domestic or foreign; in principle it depends on government and parliament, which are responsible for a precise execution of their policy. It may be presupposed that a part of the diminished state sovereignty will be delegated to the new international organism which will require, besides capable policy-making delegates, a large and stable bureaucratic apparatus. All problems and difficulties which occurred in the past will become more apparent and will grow in the future. It will become necessary to prevent this international bureaucracy from becoming omnipotent and to assure that political decisions be handled by political men and not by judicial or technocratic eunuchs, who would like to apply *a priori* plans regardless of the opinion of the people. I am fully aware of technical difficulties so frequently referred to by bureaucratic virtuosos and inventors of despotic bureaucratic rules. I, however, give preference to government of men and not to government of laws, and consequently I am for a strong layman element in the future international organism.

The greatest error in the past international relations was in my opinion the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs. President Masaryk urged a democratization of modern diplomacy and foresaw the time when foreign representatives would speak in parliaments. Should this principle be applied, the entire international organism would become more political and less routine and bureaucratic. International democracy, which is one of the greatest principles to be realized in the post-war world, requires now men politically-minded, loyal, and courageous.

DOLIVET—What would you call a layman element in the international organization?

SAFRANEK—No diplomats nor men who were in the international civil service. We know they were educated in a very, very narrow field of activities. I am not speaking here about the bigger schools. Perhaps you have in America some schools—

Milos Safranek

STRAIGHT—I wonder if I might interrupt there. I think Mr. Safranek's point is very important. And the principal source of strength of an organization which is built up in time of war as against one which grows in time of peace is that in war the problems are so tremendous and so urgent that they can only be dealt with on a technical basis. In time of peace there is always a danger that the international Secretariat will be established on a representative diplomatic basis. Probably the greatest achievement of the last two years has been that the international controls we have established are established entirely on a technical basis by experts without regard for diplomatic representation.

LERNER—May I also make a remark? On the whole, I am in sympathy with Mr. Safranek, if I understand him—and I am not completely sure I understand him. With regard to what Mr. Straight says, I agree that much of the strength of what we have done in the past two years has

been due to the fact that we have had technicians. But I remember the time not so long ago, Straight, when you and I were both worrying lest the technicians should take the bit into their own teeth and forget about the fact that they were, after all, subject to political directives from the political leaders of their countries. I am referring of course to the fears that we had about the technicians as generals, generals as technicians, on the issue of a Second Front. At that point, I began reconsidering this position and I felt very strongly that what was necessary was real technicians who were bound by the political leaders with regard to political matters and who did not themselves make essentially political decisions. Now, if you go too far with Mr. Safranek in what you and I understand to be his view, you come very close to the thesis of a sort of managerial group that runs things—

SAFRANEK—On the contrary.

LERNER—separated from the real sources of strength, from the people themselves.

SAFRANEK—You misunderstood me. As I said before, I am for a strong lay element in bureaucracy, especially in the foreign service. Political science and the art of diplomacy require much more than a blind and unimaginative application of administrative rules. Consequently, I am against managerial groups in diplomacy. It happened in the great international crisis just before and during this war that some courageous and honest diplomats acted contrary to the orders of their foreign ministers or against their governments. Politically they were right, but not from the administrative point of view. More than that, they saved the honor of their respective countries.

On the other hand, we saw during the Munich crisis that, through the influence of an outsider, Sir Horace Wilson, the counsellor of Neville Chamberlain, the methods used in the solution of social conflicts were applied to diplomatic questions. Consequently, I am not speaking against the rule of laws but for the rule of the right men in the foreign service, the right men in the government as well as in all the branches of the diplomatic service.

LERNER—You agree with the danger, but I think the danger is inherent in what you call a government of persons and not of laws. If I may just add a footnote here on the question of government of men and not of laws, American judicial review is technically a form of the concept of the rule of law, but it isn't the only form. It happens to be a specialized form of the concept of the rule of law. If you really look at it closely, you cannot have any kind of government without the rule of law, because the essence of the rule of law is to protect individuals and groups against the arbitrary—

CHARLES A. DAVILA—Who would give them authority? There must be someone to give them authority. Without authority they couldn't do anything.

DOLIVET—Would you give them authority through international legislation?

DAVILA—I wouldn't give them any authority at all. I would first find out what the international authority would be. Once the international authority exists, as it exists naturally in every country, then the technicians can work under the supervision of the political authority as Mr. Lerner very well said. But the question is not between international technicians and let's say, government of men. I think the question is how can we build an unquestionably international authority. Once we have that, I think the rest is rather easy.

BONNET—We were outlining for the future the difficulties of the past, if I may say so. There is no question about that. The world will not be ruled by a body of bureaucrats, you may take that for granted. If there is a world agency, as we all hope, it will be primarily a political agency with some subordinated and extremely important technical councils for economics, finances, transportation, development of the undeveloped countries, and all that.

I want to express the hope that these technical councils will have much more autonomy than they had in the past with the League of Nations, but each of them, as autonomous as it may be, will be ruled, governed, directed by a governing body, and this governing body will not be a governing body of bureaucratic officials. This governing body will possess authority. It will be under a supreme political council, but it will have a certain delegation of authority; only the action decided upon will be carried out as well as possible by a body

of officials under necessary guarantees. I agree that we shall not obtain this in time of war. That will be the work of peace.

DOLIVET—Why not, Mr. Bonnet? The United Nations is an entirely new type—if it is really carried through—of international co-operation. It goes much further than any military alliance.

BONNET—I agree for the future, but if you have tomorrow a political council of the United Nations, don't be mistaken—these officials will not be, probably, the officials for the future. Comparatively few of them will be. Others will be appointed by their governments—many of them governments-in-exile. You will then have something like the French-British committees of 1939 which sought a complete integration of the resources and economies of those countries.

DOLIVET—But not the unity of both countries.

BONNET—After that you shall have an evolution toward what we ask today, a real international organization which will not be an emergency one.

III

DOLIVET—This question brings us to another point: Which is the best method for selecting the officials of the Secretariat, and how should the renewals of the staff be secured?

SWEETSER—Officials in international service must have all the capacities of a technical nature possessed by an official of a national civil service, plus other special qualities to permit him to work in an international atmosphere. He must at one and the same time have the technical requirements which will fit him to command respect among his technical colleagues, together with a cosmopolitan point of view which will permit him to understand and to sympathize with men of very different origins and views. He must be free of prejudices and dislikes; he must be open to new stimuli and ideas; he must be interested in foreign peoples; he must be ready to travel, especially, perhaps, to refresh himself regularly in his own national atmosphere. But above all, he should be imbued with the conviction that the best good of his own people lies in the best good of the world community and that, in serving the world community, he is very directly serving the best and the long-range interests of his own country. It is easy to find thousands of men who possess some of these qualities but hard indeed to find many who possess all of them.

WOUSAOFONG—In my opinion the officers of an international organization should be recruited solely on their merits and experience. A new principle should, however, be introduced in the recruiting of officers of an international organization, namely, an internationalistic spirit. The recruits should begin as young as possible so that their international spirit can be intensified in working in the international organization.

WRIGHT—The Secretariat should not have political powers, except the power of the Secretary-Generals to call emergency sessions of the Council or Assembly. It should be competent to advise the Council and the Assembly, which would exercise political power on all matters.

DEUTSCH—I think the selection of the officials must be one of the duties of the Supreme Council, and the selection must be in such a form that the best man will become the official and not an Austrian or a Frenchman or such. If you choose the officials as you have done in the past from the various countries, you must come to a bad selection.

DOLIVET—But, Mr. Deutsch, if it is selected by the Supreme Council and if the Supreme Council is composed of representatives of certain governments, and you represent the Government of Austria, let's say, and another gentleman represents, well, Holland, and so forth, automatically there is a danger that everyone will try to have a representative of his country as a member of the Secretariat. You get back to the same system as in the League of Nations.

DEUTSCH—It is a danger, but we must try to avoid the failure of the past. It is true the Supreme Council can do that, but they must select delegates of international spirit. They must know that the whole thing cannot work unless the men are men of experience in international affairs. I think it is absolutely necessary to select leaders of all the big organizations, of international organizations like Free World.

If we get men from these circles, then we get men of international spirit, and that I think would be the important thing.

DOLIVET—Thank you for having put our candidacy forward.

BEER—As to the best method of selecting and replacing the officials, we have to decide, first of all, whether the Secretariat as a whole shall be international or whether each official shall be international in background and spirit. This depends, of course, upon the conception we have of the organization itself. I think that there must be two kinds of officials, because there will be two kinds of departments: those departments where the work requires a strong international bent on the part of each official, and those departments where the official is to be the representative not of the politics of his country but of the civilization and of the technical achievements of his country. In the latter case, the department ought to be international in the sense of being a synthesis of all the nations represented.

In any case, the officials of the Secretariat should be men and women who understand other peoples and who have a strong feeling for international co-operation. In the choice of these officials, persons trained in international organizations and international schools will certainly be of great help. This applies especially to the younger officials. It is, indeed, necessary to introduce into the Secretariat a large percentage of young men and women, since we have to think not only of the immediate tasks of the post-war period but of the future as well.

However, it is my conviction that thorough experience gained through practical and responsible work is the first requisite in the selection of the Secretariat. Take, for instance, the political, economic, and juridical, as well as the information departments. It would be unthinkable to constitute an international Secretariat without utilizing all the great and important experts in these fields. You know that this was not always the case in the old Secretariat of the League of Nations. There were some very capable journalists in the Information Service, some good doctors in the Health Department, but where the Political Department was concerned, the governments sent some young beginners, who were called home as soon as they began to learn their jobs. Thus, the qualifications which a member of the Secretariat must have are not only an international understanding, a thorough knowledge of his own and some other specific nation, and the competence to do the work with which he has been entrusted, he must also be animated and inspired by the desire to work permanently on the Secretariat and not merely to consider his position as a stepping-stone to a better job in his own country.

DOLIVET—Mr. van Dissel, would you agree with this conception?

VAN DISSEL—Completely. We have had many examples of employees who came from the various countries who had only a very vague idea of the League. After they had taken to it, however, they were called back to their countries.

DOLIVET—I think it is very important that the labor movement, the co-operatives, and other vital popular forces feel themselves much more identified with the activities of the Secretariat—something they did not feel in the past, and which was certainly one of the reasons why they did not trust and did not support the institutions. Mr. Wousaofong, how would you see the selection of the officials?

WOUSAOFONG—I favor having the future Secretariat of the United Nations composed principally of truly progressive elements. We ought to recruit men as far as possible from the progressive international organizations, such as the trade union movements, co-operative organizations, and so on. In the past there were many schools founded in various cities of the world, such as the Institute of International Studies, which inspired a great many young men with an international spirit.

WRIGHT—The Secretariat should maintain close relations with private organizations, both international and national, in order to follow trends of public opinion and to acquire information that might be withheld from official sources. The World Bill of Rights should assure the freedom of national organizations to communicate with the Secretariat.

DOLIVET—Mr. Lerner, is there preparation in this country for this international spirit and understanding of international

problems, because America will, I hope, have a great part in the future world organization.

LERNER—So far as I know, we haven't taken any considerable steps in that direction.

KENYON—May I say that I believe some of the women's colleges and many large women's organizations, particularly those with international affiliations, have gone a long way in training women to the international viewpoint and that there are many women with considerable technical qualifications, knowledge of languages and foreign cultures, competence within one or more of the technical fields of the League's work, etc., who would be available and would make splendid material. The Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, under Mrs. Catt's guidance, has gone wholly in the direction of world organization and has done a grass roots educational job and developed a good deal of potential leadership in the field. Women perhaps even more than men, because of their instinctive passion for peace, lean to international organization of world affairs. The young women in particular eagerly absorb this sort of thing and some of them would make excellent material for minor positions in the new world government.

LERNER—I am very skeptical about some of the things that have been said. In the first place, I hope we will not have in this organization young men whose principal preparation has been the study of international law.

DOLIVET—Correct.

DEUTSCH—The international spirit is better than the international law.

LERNER—It is very difficult for me to understand how you study the international spirit or how you prepare yourself to get it. I think much of what has been said recently about this has to do with our hopes, our wishes, and our aspirations in this direction. Actually, however, we shall have to use the people that are available who do have plenty of technical training and experience in difficult and great affairs. I am very skeptical as to whether you are ever going to get away from the idea of getting men who, after all, represent their nations. It may be desirable ultimately, but I wonder whether you are going to do it in the calculable future. I was particularly struck with what Mr. Deutsch, I believe, said. You don't want nations represented, and yet you want men to represent groups within nations, that is, trade unions, for example.

DEUTSCH—No, they are not representatives of groups. They are representatives of international spirit and international experience and international work. There is a difference.

DOLIVET—Mr. Lerner, may I say that I think the international trade union movement has produced a great number of men with a strong international spirit?

LERNER—Do you have in mind any American leaders?

DOLIVET—I don't know about them.

LERNER—I can only tell you about our knowledge of the American experience. There are no American labor leaders who had either international experience or who have an international outlook. That is a fact. On the other hand, there are any number of young labor leaders in America who would make excellent material in a Secretariat of this sort. I can name three or four of them off-hand.

STRAIGHT—How would you train them?

LERNER—I think they are already trained; that is, they are trained in the sense that they have been brought up to see that what is good for the nation and for the world is also good for their trade unions. They have an intuitive or pragmatic sense about that. But you will have to do something with these people in the sense of giving them exposures afterward to an international environment.

If I may just continue on one other point on this, I haven't heard as yet a discussion of who is going to select these men.

KENYON—And women. I would like to assume you use the word "men" in its generic sense.

LERNER—Right. I think that is very essential. We speak of certain men with certain qualities being selected on a certain tenure—but who is going to do it? Your alternatives, presumably, are that it will be done by the political leaders of each nation or that it will be done by the political leaders of the Supreme Council of the United Nations. I have a third suggestion which seems to me to be practicable. That is, that it be

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done by the Supreme Council, but in collaboration with specific groups in each of the nations whose task it is to have a sort of pool of people for this purpose.

DEUTSCH—I agree with you.

LERNER—That is to say, an advisory council within each nation for the appointment of such personnel. Your great problem, of course, is that you have no one recognized profession or tradition to draw on. For example, in the United States we have today a Supreme Court which in terms of both technical ability and in terms of social perspective is outstanding. We have managed to get that Supreme Court largely through the development of a great tradition in the legal profession itself, a liberal tradition which has insisted upon the appointment of such men as Justice Cardozo and Justice Holmes. You have no corresponding profession or tradition for the appointment of men for your international organization, and so you have got to make the beginnings of it. I suggest you can make the beginnings of it only if you think in specific terms of advisory councils of this sort in each of the nations which will be advising the Supreme Council on questions of personnel.

The people whom they are likely to select are likely to be not people who have already had international training or careers, but men like Winant—who, before he entered into the international picture, had very little international experience, but who, nevertheless, has shown the capacity to expand his horizon. They may select people from the Securities and Exchange Commission or from the Tennessee Valley Authority or from any of the administrative commissions in America. The important thing is that the selection be made by people who have in mind these ultimate objectives, but the men to be selected had better be, I think, those who have had administrative experience in their own countries.

DOLIVET—There has been a suggestion that there should be an examination for all officials of the League of Nations by an international body. Would you agree to having that?

LERNER—Our experience with civil service examinations in America would, I am afraid, not bear that recommendation out.

KENYON—As an administrative official I've had some experience with civil servants and regard the system as anything but perfect. But there is a certain protection that both sides derive from examinations that shouldn't be altogether ignored. We at least keep out those who can't read or write.

IV

DAVILA—I think Mr. Lerner has stressed the main point, who is going to do the selecting? There is a way of selecting the supreme authority and every government official after that is selected by that supreme authority. And that supreme authority is created by the laws of the country. And that brings the whole issue to this. If we can't have an international law, which will be a set of rules that must be accepted by everybody, we can't have any selecting done because we won't know who has the authority to do that selecting. Nor will we know how the selecting should be done. It is putting the cart before the horse if we try to find out what kind of individual should be selected and what group of people before we know who will do the selecting. The only way to find the supreme authority is by creating an international law that will be accepted by everybody—a set of rules. Once that thing is formulated, then it will be relatively easy to find a su-

preme authority who will do the selecting.

DOLIVET—Would this international law affect all the fundamental principles in the internal organization of each nation? Because, after all, we had it in the past; I mean, we had it in the Covenant—a new conception of international law.

DAVILA—We did not, because it had to take care of the decisions of every nation. That law should be a law that will be above the local laws of every nation. Here we come to the point of national sovereignty. As long as international law can be challenged by national sovereignty, it won't work. To mention a last point, if we want to have a supreme organism that will select these people, we must have a common point of view in the United Nations. We know even today how far the point of view on rules of the game differs between, let's say, Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. How can we believe that we will be able to set up a set of rules before a complete understanding has been reached between one side and the other? No set of rules would be possible. No selection of the authorities would be possible. If we should try to set up a new League of Nations Secretariat, it would not work. First of all, there must be a general political doctrine and understanding, and the setting up of a very simple, understandable, and rigid set of rules. If they are proved to be wrong, then, as Mr. Straight puts it very well, slowly, by working in an empiric way, the set of rules will be changed and will be perfected. But we must know what music we are all playing to start with.

WOUSAOFONG—The formation of this set of rules will be a very important duty of the future world organization. I suggest that you, Mr. Chairman, ask our friend, Mr. Bonnet, in his capacity as Director of the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, whether the future League of Nations should have an international university with the duty of rearing international officers.

DOLIVET—All right. I am asking you the question, Mr. Bonnet.

BONNET—It is a very complicated one to answer. I don't think there will be an international university, properly speaking. There are so many universities already existing in the world. However, there must be a system, a complete system of international co-operation in higher education. There must be a common viewpoint, agreement on basic principles, and a lively exchange between these universities. I don't think the solution is to create an international university.

WRIGHT—The officials of the Secretariat should be selected by examinations, and promotions should be based on the service record, as in most civil services. The opportunity to take examinations might be based upon recommendation by the leading universities and institutes, with due consideration to a fair distribution among the various cultures and nationalities.

DOLIVET—Mr. Beer, you wanted to say something?

BEER—Some of these gentlemen have asked the question of who will appoint the international officers. I have brought with me this evening to this dinner the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in this Covenant, Article VI gives an answer to the question which has been raised. Paragraph 3 says, "The secretaries and the staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council." That was the law, but unfortunately the Secretary-General could never apply it in actual practice. Generally he asked the governments who their candidates were, and then the candidates were appointed. In all unimportant cases, the governments did not trouble about the appointments, as they did when it was a very important member of the international staff. Even in these cases, it was very seldom that there were appointments made without ascertaining the government's opinion.

DOLIVET—Would you give the Secretary-General supreme power to appoint?

BEER—I would propose that among the departments we ought to have a special appointments department assisting him.

DOLIVET—A nominations committee?

BEER—For the composition of the staff, and this department should be in constant contact with governments, with international organizations, with those groups in the different countries of which some of these gentlemen have spoken this evening.

DOLIVET—Mr. Straight, Mr. Davila brought into the discussion a very interesting suggestion for a sort of juridical and

political unification of a certain number of principles. The spirit of the Atlantic Charter, or the text, doesn't seem to be sufficient. What is your point of view?

STRAIGHT—One of my remarks on what Mr. Davila said would be that in the last two years we have created an effective world government within limits of which it would be very difficult to find a basis in authority. If we sought to find now the authority under which actions are taken by the combined boards, it would derive simply from the Executive Order under the President's wartime power and similar authorities of the Prime Minister. Those are entirely secondary powers. I am not sure that it isn't possible to create an effective world organization which is derived initially from these powers and which, as I say, by sheer momentum of its own creates a situation in which it is possible to define the original powers. At the moment, I don't see how we could create a set of laws which would have a kind of living relation to the world of the post-war, with its indefinite amount of social revolution and its indefinite destruction or recreation of sovereign states.

DOLIVET—Before we go on to the other questions, Mr. Palacios, what would you think about the general problem of selection?

GARCIA-PALACIOS—It should be composed of men who have the experience of the past and of young men who are the hope for the future. I believe that the staff of the League must not have any political powers, but I think, too, that a small council of functionaries should act as advisers who can say without any fear, "We are working under certain rules, and these rules are such and so." In the last year of the League, when we were at Geneva, we knew very well what was written in the Covenant, but we knew too that the Covenant was not strictly applied for obvious political reasons.

WRIGHT—The Secretariat should maintain cordial relations with the different governments, but not be in any way dependent upon them. The officials should owe exclusive allegiance to the world organization.

WOUSAOFONG—It is obvious that the officers of an international organization should be entirely independent of the governments of their countries. These officers should be provided with diplomatic passports to be given, not by the governments of their own countries, but by the central secretariat of the international organization itself.

DOLIVET—Mr. Safranek, did the discussion quiet your fears about the bureaucracy?

SAFRANEK—Yes. I am afraid of a bureaucracy which makes out of rules something that is omnipotent and mechanical. I spent time in the diplomatic service, and I met people in high position who would strike certain things out of a political report because they said they were officials and could not speak about politics.

BONNET—We need not fear that now. We shall have after this war a trained personnel who will have worked in many of the inter-Allied organizations, who have been dealing with the political and various technical aspects of the war. We shall have to recruit people devoted to the ideal of world co-operation. Wousaofong has insisted on that quite rightly. He knows from experience that some people joined the Secretariat of the League of Nations without having any faith in the League of Nations and in the idea of the League of Nations. A certain number of precautions should be taken. There are many administrative ways of taking such precautions.

DOLIVET—Which should be the most essential departments to function within a world Secretariat?

SWEETSER—That will depend, of course, on the nature of the parent agency, but on the whole, the best procedure would seem to be to consider the Secretariat not as an original authority or a kind of separate entity but rather precisely what its name implies, the servant and executor of the political agency. On that basis, it should be as technical and non-political as possible, with a single chief responsible to the political authorities for the good administration of the service, a series of aides and assistants to advise him on matters of general import and to take part of the burden of representation off his shoulders, and then a series of technical bureaus corresponding to the main lines of work entrusted to the Secretariat. A hydra-headed affair such as the Germans endeavored to establish would not work at all; the responsibility of the head should be to the political body which

appointed him and not to his subordinates. Similarly, while there is advantage in short contracts and frequent refreshment of staff, on the whole, long contracts and fixed tenure lead to more devoted officials, particularly if they are given frequent leaves of absence in their home countries.

The choice of personnel, particularly technical personnel, should in general be left in the first instance to the immediately responsible official whose own success will be judged by the skill of his subordinates, but it should be checked by a committee of personnel and approved by both the head of the service and the ultimate political authority. Officials should be required, as they were in Geneva, to accept an obligation to serve the international community without fear or favor, those of the higher rank making a formal, public statement before the ultimate authority. Servants of the international community should have full diplomatic status and privileges, as did, indeed, the officials of the League of Nations. They should maintain close and friendly relations with their own national authorities but should not in any way be subject to them so long as they remain in office. A particular effort should be made for close relations with officials in other public or private international agencies, particularly in the technical field of each particular official.

LERNER—Before you get to that question I want to add a footnote to what Mr. Bonnet has said. I agree there is danger that we shall not get people who will be international-minded, but I think there is another danger, and that is of developing a rather narrow and ingrown international group. To me, that is a greater danger. There is a tendency in all movements of this sort to get a rather exclusive group who have in the past been thinking in these terms or who have been moving in these circles. If this United Nations is to have deep roots in the world of actuality, it must draw upon all kinds of people who have not in the past been exposed to these influences; people who have on the whole been thinking in national terms, but who, because they are transferred into this realm, can transfer their experiences and give this group a vitality which it would not have otherwise.

G. F. van Dissel

BONNET—I am inclined to think that the national spirit will not be lacking.

LERNER—It is a question of whether you will draw on the resources of leadership that do exist in the world.

BONNET—There is no question about that.

LERNER—And the experience we have had in any kind of relatively exclusive group, whether business organizations or trade union organizations or international organizations, tends to show that their great danger is in getting thin and in running dry and in becoming inbred.

I would like to add one note on a different matter. You spoke of judicial review, and I believe someone up here mentioned something about a supreme court. At this point the only reaction I can have—and I am speaking now as one who did not participate in any way in the League of Nations—is to say, "Keep away from the idea of a supreme court as the center of this organization; keep away from the idea of an international parliamentary assembly as the center of it." The center of it must be an administrative group, and in so far as you have any kind of judicial review in it,

it must be administrative review rather judicial review.

SAFRANEK—Not in the sense of the old international law.

LERNER—Not in the sense of setting forth a body of rules. I think at this point, perhaps, Mr. Davila and I part company.

DAVILA—I am sure we do.

LERNER—I am very anxious that we should get clear on what I might put in the form of a question: what is the real focus of the energy of this international organization? Clarence Streit, for example, when he thinks of Union Now, thinks of it as a parliamentary organization. I remember he had an article in the picture magazine *Look* in which the editors made some suggestions as to who would belong to an international parliament, and there were representatives from every interest in this country. Lindbergh was there, and John L. Lewis was there, and Wheeler was there, and so on. I felt rather horrified at that.

STRAIGHT—Was Ham Fish in it too?

LERNER—Undoubtedly he would be part of it. On the other hand, you don't get an international body if you have jurists; even though they are the competent people, they are not the life of the international body. So my plea is to move away from the parliamentary conception and from the juristic conception to a genuinely administrative conception. In that you will have administrative rule-making and administrative review just as we now have it to determine whether the members of administrative bodies in America have moved outside the scope of their powers. To that extent, but not in the sense that you think that you can govern a world through a set of written rules—

SAFRANEK—That means that no domestic efforts are too sacrosanct to be treated as an international effort. That is one of the most important questions of the future of the United Nations.

DOLIVET—How would you provide for international intervention in domestic affairs?

DAVILA—By having a set of international rules by which that League of Nations and its Secretariat would have to intervene in various countries where minority rights have been suppressed by the various governments.

LERNER—But you had those rules in the League, didn't you? They were not effective.

DAVILA—There was a rule of unanimity in Geneva without which nothing could be done. A country could withdraw and the whole bedlam would start. There must be a right of intervention. It can be a passive intervention, an exclusion of the country from all the benefits of the international club. That would work because the economic benefits and the collective benefits, the benefits of collective security of the democratic club would be very great. I have enough experience to ascertain that no statesman in the smaller countries, not even in a bigger country, would dare to take it upon himself to lose all those advantages because he wants to bully a minority, a political minority, even an ethnical minority. If we have a set of international rules, then the Secretariat will have arms, will have a law to apply.

V

DOLIVET—Now we come to another very vital problem. In Europe there are reactionary forces, nationalistic or militaristic leaders, who will do everything to keep in power. Were peace to come tomorrow and some of the existing set-ups remain, then despite all the joint boards created by Great Britain and America, there is a tremendous risk of having a reactionary, although a non-Hitlerian, counter-revolution. And certainly they will not offer any international co-operation at all; they are much more likely to start hostile maneuvers against Russia as soon as the firing will cease.

Or perhaps they will co-operate for a short time because they will have received loans or will be begging for loans. We know that technique. We have seen them come many times to Paris and London to beg for loans, and as soon as they got the money, part of it was transformed into the machinery of civil war and terrorism against the freedom of their own peoples—all of which, incidentally, gave immense encouragement to German fascism.

In America, you have one great tradition, the democratic tradition; while in Europe, you have everywhere a tyrannic tradition which is regarded as legal. If the international organization, whatever its na-

ture may be, is not capable of protecting the spread of the democratic system of life,—and I am fully aware of the size and complexity of this problem even without considering a world state—then there will be no really effective guarantee of peace.

I was going to ask about the different departments of the Secretariat because I wanted to suggest a Department of Democracy. If the war would end tomorrow and many of the temporarily appointed or self-appointed leaders were to proclaim themselves chiefs of state, what would be the situation? The international organization, being a purely administrative body, would refuse to be interested. We had many cases in the past, when we saw the dangers and went to Geneva and we spoke about this and that situation, and the Secretariat said, "We are powerless." Therefore, it seems important to complete the administrative set-up by a statement of principles which would serve as a sort of framework. How about it, Mr. Straight?

STRAIGHT—If I am not mistaking Lerner, the reason he and I have stressed the administrative significance of what is being done is that in the last ten years the greatest progress, particularly in America, has been in the field of administration, and we may be influenced by that. None of us would say for a second that the administration of the United Nations is now anything like adequate. I would say at once that the United Nations will have to formulate a statement of purposes far more explicit than the Atlantic Charter Declaration and the Four Freedoms, which can be regarded as the most elementary bill of rights. I would say that it is probably possible at this moment for countries as diverse in their purposes as Soviet Russia, as China, perhaps as Brazil, certainly as Britain and America, to announce that their purposes as nations are to promote the general welfare of their peoples under self-government and to promote world solidarity among all peoples for the purpose of maintaining—

DOLIVET—You are reading the preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

STRAIGHT—I am saying that from now on this must be stated in very much more explicit terms than the Covenant. I think that it probably could be stated perhaps not so much in terms of achievements as in terms of intentions which are expressed in actions on the part of the governments which belong to the United Nations.

It is perfectly clear, as you point out, that the United Nations at the moment cannot express any common purposes which are thoroughly democratic. The United Nations include states like South Africa, where the majority of the people are far indeed from being free. No state such as South Africa could sincerely sign any constitution or covenant which explicitly endorsed the principles of self-government. Either the covenant would have to be explicit and South Africa would have to be forced out of the United Nations or the United Nations would have to be constituted as they are at present and the covenant would have to be general.

I would say that our objective must be to state that all members of the United Nations must show in action, not simply a yearning, but a progression toward these explicit principles of domestic and world democracy. This progress would have to be interpreted by a Supreme Council, not an Anglo-American Supreme Council, but a Council which would certainly include China, Russia, Britain, and America, and which might later on include India.

I would say then that if the United Nations could state the purposes which are really explicit, they would then have the right to say that because they are the world organization any government which cannot by its internal nature be permitted to join the United Nations and which expresses a definite hostility toward the United Nations can be seen as an outlaw from international society. Not simply in the passive sense that Mr. Davila indicated, or an economic boycott, but in the active sense of definite intervention by the United Nations to enforce self-government among that people. The moral basis on which we could do this will be the extent to which we constitute ourselves as a world society through international economic and social collaboration. If we were not a true world society, we would have no moral right to assert ourselves as one to a people which was not a part of our world society. If we were a thoroughgoing world society we would have every right. You asked us as Americans to comment, and this point I make is thor-

Charles A. Davila

oughly borne out by American history. The American people fought a very bloody civil war to assert the right of a Federal Government, to insist that a movement to take out of its society a part of its people who are essenial to its well-being as a whole must be resisted by force.

If the United Nations, with a constitution based upon explicit purposes of democracy, should constitute themselves as a world society with a federal government, they would have the legal right in accordance with American tradition to intervene against a fascist dictator.

DAVILA—Might I interrupt? You didn't intervene in Louisiana where Huey Long was practically a dictator?

LERNER—God intervened in that.

DAVILA—Then where is your power of intervention?

STRAIGHT—My power of intervention lies in the progression.

DAVILA—Even passive measures against Louisiana—if Louisiana had been punished, let's say, by getting out of the economic circle, believe me, Huey Long wouldn't have lasted twenty-four hours. But you didn't even intervene that way. Louisiana and Huey Long were able to do exactly what they wanted as long as that fellow was able to keep himself in power.

STRAIGHT—I absolutely agree. I mentioned South Africa. America, to a certain extent, represents the same kind of state in that we deny to ten million of our people the right to vote. America, too, must demonstrate in action an active desire on the part of the people and of the Government to progress toward a higher type of democracy, and I think that in this case of Louisiana, in the case of the poll tax, America could demonstrate that we were actively engaged in the search for a higher type of democracy.

LERNER—I would go along with what Straight says to a certain extent. To state purposes is one thing, to establish standards and legal sanctions is quite another thing. I think what Straight says represents the directives, the objectives toward which we must work, but toward which we must work within our own countries on a political and economic and social plane. I mean, all of that is fine, Straight, but I don't see how it becomes part of the machinery of a Secretariat or even of an international organization.

Let me illustrate what I mean. It is going to be absolutely impossible even under a liberal Administration in the United States to get a definition of democracy which will bring within it, let us say, the Russian Government. To be sure, if you have Mr. Wallace as President, given his speech several weeks ago with respect to Russia and democracy you could do it. But think of Mr. Robert Taft as President.

STRAIGHT—Don't, please.

LERNER—Those are, if not probabilities, at least possibilities, and just as soon as you begin talking in terms of what Dolivet called a department on democracy in the Secretariat, you immediately get into the whole tangle of the definition of democ

racy. And the definition of democracy will not be made by us sitting around a table here, nor by Vice-President Wallace. It will be made by and large by a group of political leaders who have political axes to grind in order to show the people of their own countries that they are against godless, atheistic Russia, let's say.

DAVILA—Well, we are trying to formulate the ideas for them.

LERNER—Yes, but we are trying not to do it in a vacuum. And that reminds me, I think it is very important for us not to set our objectives so high that it will be impossible in the calculable future to achieve them. The thing that really creates disillusion is to set up standards which are impossible of attainment. If you do that, since you necessarily fall short, it casts a stigma upon the whole machinery—even including machinery which would have been able to achieve less lofty aspirations.

STRAIGHT—That is why I tried to say that the important point was not a definition, a legal definition, of where we stand now but an interpretation of the direction in which we are advancing. It would be completely impossible for China to rise at this moment to any standard of democracy which would be acceptable or which would be required for most countries in the West. But it would be perfectly possible for China to demonstrate that she is actively engaged in raising hers to that level. This is the important thing when peoples are at different stages of development the world over.

BEER—All this proves that we should not be afraid of a stronger international body. We cannot discuss the power of the Secretariat without knowing what is the power of the Executive. But I think if we would establish rules, as you put it, Mr. Davila, if we are in favor of a very strong democratic feeling in this new order, if you propose even to have a special department for democracy in the framework of the Secretariat, all this means to me that we must have a powerful Secretariat.

The Secretariat cannot have political power. This political power is in the hands of the Council or the Assembly, or the other bodies we hope to create in the future. But the power of the Secretariat is, as one of our colleagues some moments ago mentioned, to watch that the principles of the League will not be broken, will not be violated.

BONNET—We require a Secretariat, an international Secretariat, which will be much more important than the Secretariat of the League. I have never seen an organization succeed if there was not a good Secretariat and a powerful Secretariat.

WOUSAOFONG—I am in favor of democratic control which should be an important function of the future world organization. Of course, it seems to be difficult to find a standard for democracy. I wish to submit that the democracy which has been applied in America or in England or in France is not really an ideal democracy. In China and in Russia also, people don't consider that democracy as it appears in America or in Europe is a true democracy. The Chinese revolutionists consider that the democracy in America or in Europe is a superficial democracy. I think the Russians have the same feeling toward democracy in the West. In the early days, it was not very difficult to find who would stand up for democracy. For the Chinese revolutionists or for the Russian revolutionists, a true democracy means equality between the nations, equality between citizens of a country, and also economic equality.

LERNER—Each country must understand the other.

DOLIVET—Can we then agree on this? Given a certain real expression of the will of the people plus a will of international co-operation for peace, can we base on minimum internal democracy and a minimum international political orientation against aggression—considering aggression as something which violates the constitution—can we find there a minimum practical international organization which is not vulnerable to adventurers in various countries who could very readily undermine the whole machinery and philosophy established by the international organization?

LERNER—I think you put your finger on a very constructive approach. The dangers are the dangers of trying to express either maxima or minima in positive terms. The declaration of either maxima or minima is something not for a constitution but for a manifesto. For example, in American history, the Declaration of Independence states objectives, whereas the Constitution

gives guarantees and states prohibitions.

DAVILA—Very good.

LERNER—I am not against starting with some kind of constitutional structure. I just think it is rather impossible to write into a constitutional document standards which will be either very difficult of achievement or at any rate of definition and application. I would like to see in the manifesto the kind of thing that Mr. Straight is talking about. I would say that such a manifesto should go farther than either the Atlantic Charter went or the Four Freedoms. I should think it would embody some of the revolutionary conceptions that you spoke of. But when you come to a constitution, it should run in terms of the things that will not be allowed. For example, discrimination against groups on the ground of color or race shall not be allowed. For example, religious discrimination shall not be allowed. For example, the persecution of political offences as political offences shall not be allowed. You can put those things very specifically without in any way alienating the United Nations.

BONNET—What about the social rights?

LERNER—If you put it in terms of the prohibition of social wrongs, I think you can get somewhere. As soon as you begin to put it in terms of the declaration of social rights you are in a morass.

DOLIVET—We have in many countries no abrogation of social rights but we have a great number of social wrongs which leave the individual practically powerless. Let's say, under the Republic of Weimar, you had six million unemployed. They weren't forbidden anything. The only thing they couldn't do was to buy enough food. Now, how would you solve this in the constitution?

LERNER—That is not going to be solved by any constitution. That is what I am trying to say. That is going to be solved by a group of working economic and administrative arrangements between the nations. For example, if you can get some kind of economic unity in Central Europe or in Baltic Europe or in Europe as a whole, then you will create the conditions upon which you can build freedom from want, upon which you can build economic security. You cannot write that into a constitution. Constitutions just aren't of that character.

VI

DOLIVET—The last question is, how can the Secretariat of the United Nations prevent fascism and aggression—the control of conditions which can lead to aggression. I think we can find international importance in every field, even in those to which the League did not attach any significance—in education, in nationalist agitation, in political parties, in the military structure, even in the economic structure. The typical example, of course, is the nazi party. The nazi party was considered as an internal problem of Germany, but we have learned through bitter experience that it was an international problem.

WRIGHT—The Secretariat can assist in preventing fascism and aggression through studying systems of education and the development of tensions in the world community, and advising the political organs appropriately. The Secretariat cannot act effectively in these matters except with the co-operation of the political organs and the co-operation of the member states. The problem of fascism and aggression is one of modifying the structure of world politics from a balance of power structure to a world federalism, and this involves the development of a consciousness of world citizenship among the leaders of the various nations prepared to support a world political organism with adequate power to deal with aggressions. The Secretariat is an indispensable agency in such a system, as it would continually provide to the political bodies the information and the ideas upon which to act.

BEER—I think the Secretariat can prevent fascism and aggression in several ways; first, by influencing the organs of the union and the governments—that is to say, by watching all international developments from an anti-fascist and anti-war point of view, and by preventing all decisions and lack of decisions which might encourage fascism or aggression. There were many opportunities in Geneva for that if the Secretariat had had power to act.

DOLIVET—Mr. Lerner, would you write into the constitution the outlawing of fascism, which the United Nations still haven't done?

LERNER—I would write it into the con-

stitution with a prayerful hope that those who would have to interpret the word fascism would not interpret it to mean any form of social democracy.

BEER—Secondly, the Secretariat can fight fascism and aggression by acting constantly and directly upon public opinion in all the countries, and not only in those countries which are included in the union. This leads us to stress the tremendous importance of the Information Department of the future Secretariat.

DOLIVET—This is a total revolution compared with the practice of the old Secretariat.

BEER—It should be established on a wider basis and should have more far-reaching aims than the Information Section of the old Secretariat of Geneva—which did very good work, but in the nature of propaganda for the League itself and its activities. It should be the task of the new Information Section to gather and to disseminate information about all questions pertaining to international co-operation, to combat misunderstandings by challenging news which is false, and to give out news which is true. In that way, the Information Section would be the best investigating commission.

DOLIVET—A sort of world OWI?

BEER—It would become a reliable and authoritative information center for all the United Nations—and I would like to add for the entire world.

DOLIVET—Mr. Palacios, would you agree with this conception about the Secretariat in order to prevent aggression?

GARCIA-PALACIOS—We know a little bit about the power of the Information Section. All the sections in the League can do a good deal through publicity in the papers and in the radio. I really think the most important thing after the war for the Secretariat will be publicity. That is the main weapon. And this weapon is to be given to the Information Section, to newspapers, and radio.

BONNET—First of all, the political problem of international organization and collective security will have to be settled. The experience of the past proves that the most generous international enterprise run by a League of Nations or by other world agencies or bodies is bound to fail if the problem of the political organization of the

Max Beer

world is not settled and if such an agency has not wider powers, through reduction of sovereign national rights, than the League of Nations had. The world agencies should have a department of information of the kind which was outlined by Beer, and I should call it also a research department. There was not in the League of Nations a real research department.

BEER—That is a very good idea.

BONNET—We had started one in the International Organization for Intellectual Cooperation under the name of International Studies Conference. That took into account the problems of collective security, of the intervention of the state in economic life, of the reconstruction of world trade, of colonies, population, raw materials, etc. Those are concrete problems, and we did have some research on them, but of course it was done with very poor means and on a very limited scale. The world agencies of the future, whatever may be their name, should have the means for research and for organization. They will also have a powerful education department, because as we learned, fascism was not a domestic problem of Germany, of Italy, but an interna-

tional problem. We have learned, I hope, that the problem of education of youth is an international problem really and primarily.

VAN DISSEL—I think education will play a big role in the future. If an international educational agency has not the power and the possibilities to intervene in national education, if national education is left completely free, it can run into channels that are completely contrary to international thinking. And I think the future organization has to take up this point of influencing or controlling national education.

LERNER—In this connection, the problem of bucking the *Chicago Tribune* or the *New York Daily News,* or even for that matter the *New York Times* on certain things, ought not to be underestimated. We have at our disposal now an instrument that we did not have after the first World War, and that is the radio. And it is possible to so organize radio publicity that we are able to either cut under this structure of the opinion industries in the various nations or to go over the heads of them. That requires, however, a very specific allocation of radio power.

I can't conceive of even starting such a section as the Information Section of the United Nations unless it is definitely and explicitly understood by each of the signatory powers that the Information Section will be offered a clear radio channel, clear to anything which this Section wishes to give publicity to. Without any question, if we can't have that, we might just as well sign off.

Of course that represents a diminution of national sovereignty at the very start, but it is a minimum consideration, and I think it could be done. For example, there are in America at least three big chains. There is no reason why one chain should not be taken over by the Government for the express purpose of serving either for the dissemination of governmental publicity or information, for the dissemination of international publicity, and so forth.

DAVILA—I think the Secretariat of the new League of Nations should have correspondents in every country, observers and correspondents of its own.

LERNER—You mean newspaper correspondents?

DAVILA—No. These would be the delegates, special observers in the various countries, for the Secretariat of the League of Nations. They would be there to see how the general set of rules in the various specific cases are being carried out in each country. For instance, education. We know that in many countries history books are written in such a way as to arouse a nationalist feeling, antagonisms between countries, and they misrepresent facts very often. It would take a certain length of time before that would come to the attention of the Secretariat. But if an observer were there on the spot, he could forward that information. It would be a quicker and better way of getting it.

DOLIVET—In conclusion, I think we all agree on the immense importance of the future world Secretariat. Already in the various boards and committees of the United Nations there is the beginning of an administrative set-up which could be very useful in its organization. We all agree in this discussion that it cannot be better than its parent organization. Should the ideas of imperialism prevail, then of course the Secretariat will be nothing but an imperialist instrument. But if, as we hope, the ideas of international co-operation prevail, then this organization can become a living example to all people of successful international co-operation.

There is no doubt that if the United Nations do become a great political reality, then tens of thousands of men and women of all countries will be needed in the Secretariat in order to work on political problems, on problems of transit and communications, of education, scientific research, health, economic organization, juridical organization, labor and agricultural problems, and many, many others. In the beginning, it will have to fight against many prejudices—extreme nationalism and chauvinism, shortsightedness of different national services, hostilities, and jealousies. If the Secretariat is composed of technically well-qualified persons, working hard to prove constantly the advantages possible to all people in international organization, if they are in constant touch with the aspirations of the various countries, then they will make international democracy a workable system and overcome that hostility.

PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE

In considering the proposals for post-war reconstruction and organization which are regularly presented in this section, it is well to bear in mind that the reports of governmental departments cover specific aspects of the question more often than they deal with the entire problem. The following account of the work of the Post-War Division of the Department of Labor comes quite appropriately after the statement of the peace objectives of the American Federation of Labor which we presented last month. As in the case of the previous governmental reports, this one offers the latest information of the progress of the work to date; we shall publish the results of further investigations by this agency.

XI—Department of Labor

POST-WAR DIVISION, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

JOHN H. G. PIERSON, *Chief*

EMILE BENOIT-SMULLYAN

EMORY Q. HAWK

MARION HAYES

WASSILY W. LEONTIEF

IN the spring of 1941, Congress appropriated the sum of $96,000 for the Department of Labor: "to conduct studies relative to problems connected with labor likely to arise upon the termination of the existing emergent conditions in connection with defense activities throughout the United States, in co-operation with the National Resources Planning Board." A Post-War Labor Problems Division was immediately set up within the Bureau of Labor Statistics; by December, 1941, this Division, then under the leadership of Dal Hitchcock, who served as chief until December, 1942, had its program well under way; in the spring of 1942, the appropriation was considerably increased by Congress.

This Division differs from the National Resources Planning Board both in the fact that its inception was ordered by Congress, while the NRPB is an executive agency, and in that its primary purpose is to undertake post-war studies. The two agencies co-operate closely at every point where either can assist the work of the other. There is also regular exchange of information with other planning agencies, such as the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare, in order to prevent duplication of effort.

The central objective of the Division, according to its chief, John H. G. Pierson, is the assurance of full employment in the United States after the war. Associated with this objective are two others: the creation of an environment in which private enterprise and competition may provide as much as possible of this full employment, with government spending used only where private enterprise is unable to carry the burden; and progress toward the achievement of the common man's charter—his rights to social security, health, housing, education, food, clothing. The importance of the fundamental objective of full employment has been emphasized by D. H.

Davenport, Chief of the Employment and Occupational Outlook Branch of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, within which the Post-War Division is set up. He stated:

> It is unfortunate that we have fallen into the habit of calling the last phase of the present war the "post-war period." Actually the war will not have been won until America and the other nations of the world have passed successfully through a period of readjustment looking toward the realization of the ideals expressed in the four freedoms. When every man or woman who wishes to work is assured of an opportunity to do so; when every American who wishes to freely engage in a private business venture finds conditions favorable to doing so; when every American youth who is ambitious to equip himself with a college education or specialized vocational training can find the opportunity to do so; when every American can look ahead to old age without fear of insecurity and want; and when the nations of the world have adjusted their political and economic relationships so that the peoples of each can work toward the improvement of their own welfare without fear of exploitation or international gangsterism — when these things have been done, and *only* when they have been done, will the United Nations have won the war.

Regarding jobs as the crux of the problem, the Division seeks to establish fruitful working contacts with organizations throughout the country rather than to concentrate efforts on publishing reports. Through the channels of organized labor, particularly the post-war committees of the A. F. of L. and the CIO, through industrialists, and through agencies such as the Association of American Colleges and the Committee for Economic Development, the Division will place its findings at the service of active public and private bodies. Some reports will be published, but on the whole the work of the Division is being made known to its audience in other ways. A description of two or three of the major current projects of the Division gives an idea not only of the kind of work carried on but also of the means by which this work is to have effect in the post-war period.

Current Projects

ONE of the reports to be published is the Input-Output Study, conducted under the direction of Dr. Leontief by a separate staff in close co-operation with other governmental agencies, such as the Bureau of the Budget, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, and the Bureau of the Census. This study attempts to give a basic analysis in functional terms of the mutual relationship between various branches of the American national economy in 1939, and to trace the distortions brought about in our production system by the development of the war economy. In an article in the *Harvard Business Review* (Spring, 1942), Donald H. Davenport and Dal Hitchcock stated the questions underlying this study as follows:

> Looking at the picture in terms of manufacturing, transportation, agriculture, services, etc., and also in terms of individual industries within these major divisions, what did the American economy produce and in what industries and occupations was American labor at work in 1939, before the defense program was started? What too was the nature of the interdependence among the various industries and other economic components as indicated by the records of their input and their output relations with one another? Since then, as the demand for war materials has steadily mounted, what expansions and what shifts have been recorded? Finally, on the basis of current war production plans and what is known about the time-patterns of demand for labor in shipbuilding, aircraft, and other branches of armament production, what further changes are definitely in prospect in the near future?

A second important current study is that of Areas and Industries, under the direction of Marion Hayes. This work undertakes a county by county analysis of the 413 counties (or 200 areas) of the United States which account for more than 85 per cent of the nation's mining and manufacturing employment. Reports are made up in loose-leaf working notebooks of data which picture the economic composition of each area, industrial and employment trends from 1919 to 1940, conversion and expansion of industrial facilities for the war effort, current and future wartime shifts of employment, and migration of the labor force. In addition, facts are given indicating the relative adequacy of the communities' housing, health, educational, recreational, and other service facilities. At present, these notebooks are used in planning civilian and military production and, when completed, they will provide the Government with a panorama of local conditions against which post-war readjustments will take place. They are also designed to provide local groups with background material and an outline for intensive study of war and post-war problems. In the hands of local unionists, teachers, industrialists, and other civic leaders, they will give invaluable information on community prospects and will serve also as a way of interesting the people in national policies. During 1942-43, basic data for four hundred counties will be assembled and fifty area notebooks completed.

The Full Employment Studies section, which constitutes a third project, is concerned with a number of investigations which bear directly upon the central objective of the Post-War Division. If men and women are to have the right to a real life, they must, according to Dr. Pierson, "be able to participate in the activities of their community by having jobs and thereby earning money with which to support themselves and their families. In *Life and Labor Bulletin* for January, 1943, the Chief of the Division points out three conditions necessary to maintain full employment:

To keep the economic system running at the full-employment level, with as little direct government interference with production as possible, it is necessary that the country be able to count on the continued existence of an ample over-all market for the maximum output of goods and services our farms and factories can produce in a reasonable working week and working year. A deflationary gap is just as disastrous as an inflationary gap can be.

Secondly, besides taking steps to give the assurance that the over-all final market will be maintained, Government must see to it that private monopolies are prevented from destroying the beneficial effects of that consumer demand by means of restrictive policies that result in needlessly high prices and low levels of production and employment.

Thirdly, to the extent that fiscal measures for keeping up effective demand and monopoly control measures for assuring low-price and large-volume business policies do not result in jobs for all those willing and able to work, Government must take the responsibility for giving jobs to the remainder at prevailing rates of pay on public work projects.

Each of these requisites for full employment in the post-war world was underlined and explained somewhat more fully by Dr. Pierson in the *Antioch Review* (Summer, 1942). The first point is said to mean literally this: "The Government should give an unconditional guarantee of aggregate consumer expenditure." The spending guarantee should within limits of feasibility be presented for a number of years in advance, and orderly and just means must be provided for putting additional purchasing power into the hands of consumers:

> Congress should therefore determine in advance how the additional income money is to be distributed if and when such distribution proves necessary—whether through established channels of the social insurance system in the form of extra benefits, or by payments to all family units and individuals in the nation, or in some other manner. In deciding upon the formula for distribution of additional income money, so far as that is required, Congress should take into account the desirability of reducing existing income inequalities.
>
> The point need scarcely be labored, today, that it is as essential to prevent an excess of consumer spending as to prevent a deficiency. Monetary measures undertaken without full recognition of this fact carry with them the grave danger of inflation. Congress should therefore legislate in advance the form of taxation or other means whereby consumer spending is to be brought down to the stipulated level in case it tends to exceed that level.

In regard to the second point, the control of monopolies which may interfere with full employment by destroying the amount of consumer spending necessary to assure normal competitive profit throughout industry as a whole, Dr. Pierson suggests restraints and controls which "may take the form of publicity, price regulation, vigorous action under the anti-trust laws, encouragement of co-operatives to enter into competition with monopolies, measures to give small companies access to the loan markets on terms more nearly equal to those enjoyed by the big corporations, public yardstick plants, revision of the patent laws, obligatory output rules based on criteria other than maximum profit—or such other forms as may be held advisable."

The Transition to Peace

THE task of guiding the nation through the final phase of the war—the transition to peace—was discussed in an office memorandum prepared by Dal Hitchcock in June, 1942. The task breaks down into three parts. The first aims to safeguard the American free enterprise system by means of action taken by the Government immediately upon the coming of peace in order to stimulate a resurgence of peace-time business activity. The suggested measures include the reduction of corporate income taxes (governmental income to be derived from "liberally defined excess profits taxes, from personal income taxes, and from increased inheritance and gift taxes"). Other moves to be made for the preservation of the free enterprise system are the following: improvement of the availability of business investment funds, clarification and enforcement of the anti-trust laws, improvement of laws regulating business.

The second proposal for the transition period —a carefully planned program of needed public works "to make use of otherwise idle labor and to draw materials from the heavy industries whose war production will be curtailed" —is directed to a specific end. "The public works program should be planned for rapid

expansion immediately at war's end, but, if the over-all transition program of the Federal Government is effective, the demand for labor in private employment should result in the reduction of public employment to a level required for essential, continuing works, within not more than twenty-four months. Thereafter, with the economy adjusted to sustained full employment, the programming of public works as an instrument of national economic management would not have as its primary objective the prevention of general unemployment or the alteration of the secular trend of total capital formation. Rather, its objective would be to aid in the prevention of violent cyclical fluctuations in the capital goods industries."

Similar in its effect upon the economic system to the public works program will be the extension of assistance to other nations for relief and rehabilitation. The products which will be required can be measured, purchased on government order, and produced in advance of public works to offset the curtailment of military production. "It is proposed that the requirements of goods for relief and rehabilitation be estimated in detail immediately and that deferred orders for their production be placed now throughout industry so that management will be able to make advance plans for expanding such production as other war contracts are terminated. To the extent that the production of goods for relief and rehabilitation sustains industrial employment during the transition period, the need for a heavy expansion of public works will be reduced. Hence, the public works program should be planned in light of the anticipated labor requirements for relief and rehabilitation."

The third proposal concerns the Government's fiscal policy, which "should be treated as an instrument of national financial management, rather than simply the means of financing government operations. The transition period from war to peace will threaten the nation with violent maladjustments of purchasing power and it will be necessary that the Federal Government act through appropriate fiscal measures to maintain a stabilized demand for the nation's economic product at rates which will induce an orderly expansion of peacetime business activity toward a sustained level of full employment."

In addition to these major proposals, Mr. Hitchcock recommends also the establishment of universal higher education, adequate universal old-age insurance, universal health and accident provisions, and the elimination of sub-standard housing and sub-standard communities. Thus economic maladjustment will be eliminated.

International Relations

WHILE the work of the Post-War Division of the Bureau of Labor Statistics concentrates mainly upon questions of domestic policy, it is making a study of critical aspects of post-war international trade and investment where these problems impinge upon internal affairs, The Division is represented in the inter-departmental committee which has been set up to include representatives of numerous governmental agencies, called the Committe on the Relation Between the Domestic and International Measures Contemplated in Article VII of the Master Lend-Lease Agreements. The study which the Division is making in this field deals, first, with ways and means of guarding the domestic monetary-fiscal apparatus, and second, with the possibility of promoting greater freedom of interchange in general.

According to Dr. Pierson, foreign trade and investment "are desirable insofar as they serve to promote an *effective use of resources* by securing a balance of trade based on regional (international) specialization in accordance with comparative efficiencies, but undesirable where they are used in an attempt to expand the *volume* of domestic production by securing foreign markets not offset by home markets opened to foreign producers, or to exploit foreign labor or foreign natural resources or achieve political domination abroad. The effort to avoid or eliminate domestic unemployment by finding convenient foreign outlets for goods, money, or population leads down the road of economic imperialism to war."

Asserting that this approach is the opposite of the isolationist, even though it advocates the development of domestic sources for many previously imported strategic materials, Dr. Pierson states that superior foreign sources should be kept open if it does not take war to keep them open. "When requests are received for funds for development of backward areas, loans should if possible be granted, provided repayment seems assured and the terms are generous and fair, i.e., not such as may drain the wealth, restrict the economic independence, or infringe the political sovereignty of the borrowing countries." Every effort should be made to move toward a condition of free trade, "for in that kind of free-trade world, producing a surplus of those things at which we are most efficient to exchange abroad for those things at which we are least efficient, we can have a higher national standard of living than if we are obliged to be our own jack-of-all-trades. Indeed it is obvious that the more international co-operation . . . the better."

His conclusion, which carries the weight of

the Division which he represents, though he is not speaking officially, is the following: "What is essential, however, as the foundation for any kind of sound foreign policy, is recognition that the problem of *quantity* of production and employment—the problem of securing prosperity in the sense of full employment—must be solved by *domestic* economic measures. Only on this foundation can be built a structure of durable peace in which the good will that Americans feel toward other peoples can find adequate practical expression."

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The work of the Post-War Division of the Bureau of Labor Statistics has been unspectacular, but its solid accomplishment deserves the interest and support of the public. It is to be hoped that much labor of this quiet and progressive kind is being carried on in many government bureaus. The Division concentrates steadily upon its object of determining those conditions within our own borders which will provide full employment here, the sound state of domestic health which will be the basis not only of our own prosperity but also of our attempt to foster health in the rest of the world. Without talking much about the values of democracy, the Division assumes that economic democracy at home can and must be insured by a policy which will protect and utilize full employment and which will allow no gap between the present state of total mobilization for war and the ultimate mobilization for peace. This kind of practical planning will enlist the support of voters and of Congressmen, for the thought of a new depression after the war can be a more paralyzing fear than the thought of defeat.

Although the Division applies its major research and educational effort to the domestic economy, its theory embraces international trade. In this field the underlying ideas are more controversial. The repercussions of international trade upon our own economy—or that of any country—are not sufficiently stressed. Recent history shows only too strikingly that an attempt on the part of any nation to solve its economic problems by primarily internal measures is an important factor in the development of fascist ideology and pressure for war. International free trade is conceivable only as based upon a world economic policy. Since the aim of democracy is not rightly the preservation of free enterprise but the satisfaction of the needs of all people and not merely the raising of living standards in America alone but in all the world, even the argument of self-interest, upon which the Division's program insists so strongly, demands a concept of post-war economy which is world-wide. On this point, the Division needs to amplify its discussion; since its aim is so practical, its explanation must be beyond misinterpretation. Likewise, its concern about the Government's interference in business and its insistence upon the value of the free enterprise system need elucidation. Although the Division recognizes tacitly that when the Government "interferes" in the interest of the well-being of the consumer or for the sake of opening new fields of productive expansion, business enterprise is no less "free," its emphasis upon the protection of the free enterprise system may play into the hands of special-interest groups.

One of the most interesting features of this program is the method by which its findings are being carried to the people themselves in local communities. To have considerations of this kind brought to the active concern of leaders in the most crowded and busiest centers of industrial life in America and to make the relation between immediate and local business prospects and international economy loom clear and important, will have a valuable effect in the long run on the development of enlightened democracy.

THE UNDERGROUND REPORTER

Repercussions in France—by R. L.

THE allied invasion of North Africa was greeted with infinite joy by the French people. On the other hand, it caused deep consternation in the camp of the enemy and the collaborationists. To counteract its effects, the Germans and their scribblers are now launching a huge propaganda campaign which develops mainly along these two lines: (1) America has imperialist designs on the French colonies. (2) Europe is threatened by communism.

These slogans are addressed chiefly to the middle class and the peasants; the collaborationists are trying to drive a wedge between them and the workers. At the present moment, internal resistance constitutes a solid bloc, and the Nazis are determined to break it up.

But the time is past when Axis propagandists could count on people who would listen to them. By now everybody realizes that the slogans, New Europe and New Order, are nothing but empty phrases. The Germans need slaves, not partners. Released prisoners of war and workers who managed to come home from Germany after the expiration of their contracts—and God knows it is not easy to refuse their renewal — are democracy's best spokesmen. They know what nazism really means.

The arguments the Nazis are using are pitiful. To show that the Americans intend to occupy the French colonies and keep them, the *Pariser Zeitung* wrote, for example. that "the gangster Roosevelt has already occupied Saint Pierre and Miquelon." It was useless. From B.B.C. broadcasts all France knew the real story about the occupation the very day when De Gaulle's marines set foot on the islands and freed them from Vichy's influence.

The Red Herring

AS for the anti-bolshevist argument to which all Europe is being treated since the German reverses in Russia, it is apparently destined to assume an increasing importance in nazi propaganda. The entire press is playing it up with a unanimity which indicates that it is acting on specific instructions.

Unbelievable as it may seem, the collaborationists even appeal to the De Gaullists in their attempts to raise the "Red" bogy. Guy Crouzet, who has rapidly risen to unsavory prominence on *Les Nouveaux Temps,* the paper of the notorious Fascist, Jean Luchaire, is in charge of this campaign.

"Who has constantly tried," he has been asking for a year and a half, "to poison the relations between France and Germany? Who instigated and carried out the terrorist attempts which provoked those reprisals under which all France is suffering? Who mimeographed those leaflets and pamphlets against the Government of the Marshal [Pétain] and Franco-German collaboration which were secretly dis-

tributed everywhere? The Communist party whose bloody, sharp claws reach out everywhere! We can discern its sinister influence behind those caught in their criminal activities. It betrays its presence likewise in the spirit of the literature which is being circulated.

"We ask those De Gaullists who don't want to have any truck with bolshevism: Doesn't it occur to you that nine times out of ten Moscow has its paw in every opposition movement? And that the defenders of the Soviet Union are always those who cannot heap enough abuse on nazi Germany? Don't you see now the real nature of the entire issue? To those who are willing to face the facts and to look beyond the surface, it is quite clear that the Franco-German misunderstanding is but a weapon, fortunately enough blunted by now, in the huge arsenal known as bolshevism, which sees its main objective in breaking up human society. He who stubbornly opposes the Government of the Marshal and Pierre Laval thus becomes the accomplice of the men in the Kremlin. He helps these men, whose astonishing armed might is now sufficiently known, to carry out their murderous, hate-dictated schemes."

All One Movement

THIS article caused much rejoicing in the ranks of the Underground. Things must be going badly indeed with the enemy if he resorts to converting the De Gaullists. So far he has had nothing but abuse for them. Such appeals are of course completely ineffective. The Communists are an integral part of the opposition movement. This, to be sure, is a recent development. Even before now they "co-operated" with the De Gaulle movement; today they support it unreservedly.

So far the various Underground movements, Combat, Libération, Franc-Tireur, the syndicates, the Republican parties, the Radical-Socialists, the Socialists, and the Communists signed proclamations jointly only on important occasions—on May 1, on Bastille Day, on Armistice Day. Today, however, even the daily sabotage routine is performed in close collaboration, and appeals to strike, at Lyon as well as at Paris, bear the signatures of all the opposition groups.

The Opposition is constantly planning new acts of sabotage against factories and transports. Production in the Paris area is always below capacity, and the railroad workers display a patriotism which fills us with justified pride. Unfortunately, dozens of these patriots sacrifice their lives in their efforts to disorganize the transportation system. Trials have been started against hundreds of them. If the Nazis are running amuck because their anti-Communist campaign does not work, it is because this failure also affects the success of another of their plans. Hitler is in need of cannon fodder. *Le Matin* is the chief recruiting journal of the Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism. It asks for Franco-German military collaboration with the Legion the nucleus of a new army which is to fight against the Russians.

"In view of existing conditions, military as well as political," writes *Le Matin,* "the Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism points out once more that Franco-German collaboration is an essential prerequisite of an improvement of our situation. The L.V.F. is at the moment the only organization which offers Frenchmen who understand this necessity the opportunity of effectively serving their country.

"Ours is the part of the soldier. We refuse to be dragged into domestic quarrels which rend our countrymen, for we believe in the total concept of a rejuvenated France. France must side with Europe, for it is in Europe that she will either live or be destroyed. To enlist in the L.V.F., inquire of the Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism."

Except for two or three thousand mercenaries, this appeal proved entirely ineffective. Offices of the Legion, moreover, are being blown up every so often to the great joy of the patriots. Legionnaires returning from the front are social outcasts in France. Nobody speaks to them; nobody wants to work with them; they are the lepers of collaboration. Even Déat admits that life has become impossible for collaborationists in small towns.

Voice of the Underground

IN discussing the situation in North Africa, the Opposition simply states that wherever the Allies are victorious, democracy is bound to triumph in the end. It is naturally astonished that this is not yet the case in Africa, where the hangmen of yesterday still go unpunished.

"Everyone," comments the Underground paper, *Libération,* "must acknowledge the republican form of government as the only legitimate one. As long as the nation cannot express its wishes and until a Government can be formed in

accordance with the Constitution, only the leaders of the Opposition groups can represent the French people with those who have the actual power. General de Gaulle has shown that he fully appreciates this fact by calling to his side the fighters of the opposition.

"Because of this close contact between the internal Opposition and De Gaulle, he is our spokesman. He defends our democratic institutions; he restores the laws of the Republic in the territories which are siding with him, and thus faithfully complies with his mandate. We, in turn, are following his instructions, regardless of our personal safety. In North Africa, however, we have been cheated."

Laval's Uneasy Triumph

WE cannot speak about developments in France without mentioning the duel between Laval and Doriot. Laval is the great favorite. The situation is now too serious for the Nazis to "swap horses mid-stream." Marcel Déat who backed Laval against Doriot likewise finds his position greatly strengthened in the collaborationist camp. His slogan is: "Everything depends on Pierre Laval. For the people cannot by itself launch a revolution whose idea has not yet been outlined clearly to it."

Pierre Laval, however, has no time to clarify his own ideas on the "national revolution." Most of his time is taken up with reorganizing the police. The man fears for his life and does not dare make a step, either at Vichy or at Paris, without his two bodyguards who are only too ready to use the guns in their bulging pockets.

Panic—this word sums up best the state of mind of the collaborationists.

—Translated by Andreas Dorpalen

A Swiss Traveler in Germany

by L. B.

IN Germany, the political and moral atmosphere varies noticeably in different regions. For example, confidence is much greater in the South than in the West where the population suffers not only from bombings, but also from a greater scarcity of food. The German people have withdrawn into themselves more than ever, and only those with intimate contacts among them can break through the barrier of silence.

It is not true, as I had been told before my trip to Germany, that train windows are painted and must not be opened. It is only on bridges that they have to be closed and at night they are covered with a dark cloth. Full of curiosity, I left the Cologne railway station which up to the present has suffered little damage in the bombings. But the appearance of the city itself was the more depressing by contrast. On all sides charred ruins pointed to the sky. Whole streets were destroyed. The damage was most serious in the old town and in the business district. But I repeatedly noticed that the outlying sections had also suffered greatly.

I was told that from 20 to 25 per cent of the dwellings in Cologne had been destroyed by the terrible bombing and that 200,000 inhabitants were homeless. Most of them were evacuated, while others were put up in emergency military shelters. Destroyed buildings have been left untouched; only those slightly damaged were repaired. Factories necessary for war work have been reconstructed or transferred elsewhere. The victims receive certificates which they can hardly put to any use, since there is nothing to buy. They must all wait for the war to end.

At the fair, I was present at an auction of "non-Aryan" property. The victims of bombings had the right to pre-emption upon proof of their status. The Jews, were sent away from Cologne, had to abandon any belongings they still possessed, and their property found eager buyers, although it was often without value. In order to raise the morale of the people, they were granted extra rations of coffee, tobacco, eggs, and other foodstuffs for two weeks after the air attacks.

The War of Nerves Against Germans

I found no trace in any Rhineland village of the famed Rhineland gaiety. I saw nothing but careworn faces everywhere. Indeed, life is no longer easy for these people. They have to work ten hours a day and even more, and often at night as well. Added to this is their anxiety about relatives at the front. The repeated air attacks oblige them to take refuge in shelters. Usually on such occasions there is not much chance for sleep.

It is the children, dragged from their beds and unable to find any rest in the cold shelters, who suffer most from the continual explosion of the bombs and of the anti-aircraft defense. It is hard to describe such moments. I saw women burst into tears whenever they talked about them. And it is not simply a matter of individual or exceptional cases. There are places where the alarm sounded on thirty successive nights, more than three hundred times in all.

I had occasion to realize personally the effect of the bombings. In a large, well-known city of the West, I wanted to call on a restaurateur of my

acquaintance, the owner of a big four-story building. Nothing was left of it but a crater filled with debris and fenced off. A direct hit had destroyed not only the large building but also all the human beings it sheltered.

In another case an English bomber was brought down. The crew managed to save themselves by using their parachutes, but the bomber fell on a public square in a workman's section and exploded. The effects were terrible—all the houses were destroyed. Seventy were killed, and more than two hundred wounded. One can see that it is a very risky business to bring down enemy airplanes.

Visiting the stores brings one face to face with an emptiness and a scarcity that we Swiss people cannot imagine. There is nothing to buy, except textiles, and these are substitutes with a cellulose base. They are only to be obtained in exchange for coupons. Kitchen utensils cannot be found anywhere. As for elastic suspenders, one must not even think of such things.

Films are reserved for the army. Indeed, one constantly sees in the stores signs inscribed, "Reserved"; no one dares to protest. I made several families marvelously happy by giving them part of a small amount of tea, cocoa, coffee, and chocolate that I had brought with me. A lady of my acquaintance, to whom I gave an ordinary cake of toilet soap, did not know how to thank me. I had the same experience with shaving soap. I even made people happy with socks that I had worn.

Undernourishment and Profiteers

IN the West, the population is suffering from almost complete lack of vegetables. That is why it was necessary to introduce vegetable cards. Nobody has even seen ordinary fruit. Those who have no garden and must be content with officially fixed rations are greatly to be pitied, and they are the majority of the population in the industrial West. And so the effects of undernourishment become more and more obvious. It is the age group of those over forty-five who suffer most. I met acquaintances who had lost fifty pounds, and whose clothes folded and flapped about their bodies. I was told that people feared the worst in the coming winter.

To my astonishment I often met with groups of well-fed, well-dressed SS men, who showed no signs of the general distress. They do not go to the battle front, but are entrusted with policing the internal front. Their function is to guarantee that there will not be another 1918, I was told. And when I asked a friend, a manufacturer, how he managed to look so "well," he answered: "I supply myself. At the proper time I bought myself a farm, like most of my business associates, and that is where I get my provisions, quite legally." He explained to me that the upper crust of the Nazi party, including the *Gauleiters,* supplied themselves in the same way. And they had a diplomat's card as well which permitted them to eat without coupons in the best hotels.

While the workingman must sacrifice his strength, his health, and often even his life—to say nothing of his possessions—industry is enjoying a period of prosperity. It is strengthening its position. Since their margin of profit is severely restricted, factory owners are preparing for the future by acquiring new machinery. This became clear to me when I visited a plant. "So," said the smiling manufacturer, "we are in shape for the post-war period, however the war turns out."

A party member with whom I discussed the food situation complained bitterly of the injustice which permitted certain people to escape from the hardships of the times. While it was the duty of everyone to take his share of the sacrifices necessary to insure victory, these people went to the summer resorts of Allgäu, Upper Bavaria, the Tyrol, and Voralberg, and deprived themselves of nothing. According to my informant, this state of affairs gave rise to much dissatisfaction and grumbling.

The phrase, "The worker always holds the bag," is constantly repeated. As there is

nothing to buy, the workingman can do practically nothing with his hard-earned money. Therefore, there is an accumulation of savings, due in part to "forced savings." These funds can be used only after the war, but people already wonder if it will be possible even then, and if their money will not be lost or at least devalued.

I wanted to find out what the Labor Front was doing for the defense of workers. I learned that the worker's relations with the Front were strictly limited to the payment of his dues. The ordinary member has nothing to say, since only the councils of "militants" are in contact with the Front. Therefore, no one dreams of appealing to it when, as frequently happens, the decree which "freezes" wages, forbidding and even punishing increases, is retroactively applied to reduce the workingman's pay.

Morale of the People

THE question, "How is the military situation judged abroad?" was put to me time and again. The people are plainly worried. So far as I could see, there was but moderate enthusiasm for the war, and the great victories caused no unmeasured joy. I had the feeling that the people would be happy if the war could be stopped, no matter how. But the thought of a lost war terrifies them. They are afraid of sinking to the level of pariahs, and of having to rebuild everything that has been destroyed. This fear makes many people cling to the regime, even today.

It greatly surprised me to find that almost nobody was informed regarding the nazi policy of reprisals carried out in the occupied countries. The fate of Lidice was completely unknown.

In any case, it is a very grave error to believe that Germany can undergo an internal upheaval. There is no longer any real power of resistance. People abroad who occasionally count on the army are indulging in airy speculation. Nevertheless, the spirit of liberty is not yet dead in the German people. I spoke with old-time militant members of the workingmen's movement who, in spite of everything, remain faithful to their ideal. But they have no illusions.

Fascists of the Polish Underground

by G. K.

THE Polish people are naturally proud that the Germans have not been able to find a Quisling for their country and that, notwithstanding the savage persecution which does not stop at torture and mass murder, they have not succeeded in breaking the resistance of the population. But there are in Poland some groups which, despite their hostility to Hitler, cannot be considered anti-fascist. In their hatred of democracy and in their ideology of racism they are in no ways different from the Nazis.

The Underground movement recognizes these Polish Nationalists for what they are—Fascists. Typical of the statements which have appeared in the democratic Underground press is the following description of these people:

"They are unable to understand the meaning of the present World War. They are always thinking that Hitler is their enemy simply because he attacked our Fatherland, not because he has created a barbarous system of which we were the victims among others. They refuse to recognize that the war is being fought, not in order to decide which imperialism will rule the world, but in order to determine whether imperialism as such has a right to exist. The struggle is being waged for the great ideals of freedom and justice. While these people have broken off relations with the nazi dictator, they have not broken with the system of dictatorship. They merely consider it evil because someone else imposes it; they would consider it praiseworthy if they themselves were the dictators.



"The psychology of the Polish Nationalist is remarkable indeed. For the Polish Nationalists Hitler is a two-faced image. When he shows his anti-Polish face, the Nationalists shake their fists at it; when he turns about and reveals his anti-Jewish face, they bow before him.

"Like ourselves, the National-

ists oppose Hitler's intention to create a 'Greater Germany.' However, in place of a conquered and oppressed Europe we want to create a Europe of free and equal nations. What are the plans of the Polish Nationalist? What does he want? He sits in his study and draws the map of the future Slav empire, and he naturally takes it for granted that it will be ruled by Poland. It will include 160,000,000 inhabitants and it will become the greatest European power. Thus Hitler's record and his insane dreams are beaten—on paper. Millions of Germans of Polish origin, he insists, will have to be 're-Polonized.' We shall have *Volkspolen.*"*

Catalogue of Fascists

THESE Polish Nationalists are the direct successors of the pro-fascist and pro-nazi groups in existence before the war. At that time, there were two main trends in Polish fascism, expressed in the National-Radical Camp (ONR) which was ideologically related to the Endeks, the traditional Polish reactionary and anti-Semitic party founded by Roman Dmowski; and the Camp of the National Union (OZON) which was organized by the Smigly-Skladkowski-Beck regime, and had its ideological background in the Pilsudski dictatorship. There were also some smaller fascist groups like Falanga, an imitation of Italian and Spanish models. All these groups are now collaborating in spreading nationalist, pro-fascist, and anti-Semitic propaganda.

Their principles are expressed in an illegal paper *Szaniec* (The Rampart). "It is false that the democratic regimes contribute anything to the maintenance of civil liberties," states a characteristic example of its propaganda. "We are adversaries of democracy and liberalism. We favor a national revolution."

As late as 1940, although before Italy's entry into the war, a secretly published bulletin presented in detail the ideas of this Polish fascist movement. It included a scurrilous attack on democratic countries; it described Franco with enthusiasm as an ideal nationalist; it placed the hopes of Polish nationalism in Mussolini.

Thus the democratic Underground movement has to fight both the Nazis and the native Fascists at this time. It has made no compromise with these Nationalists. It has announced publicly: "It is impossible to fight against Hitlerism effectively when one is spiritually Hitler's tool. The purpose of the present struggle is not to replace German nazism by a Polish, English, or some other brand. It is a war between two worlds, and he who belongs to the world of dictatorship, who has the fascist mentality, has no place on the side of the barricade over which waves the banner of freedom."

* This is an allusion to the nazi term *Volksdeutschen* referring to the Poles of German origin.



BOOKS

The Menace of Peak Organizations

BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER, by Robert A. Brady. With a foreword by Robert S. Lynd. xx + 340 pages. Columbia University Press; $3.00

ROBERT BRADY has been at work since 1934 on a study of "the rise of bureaucratic centralism" of which this book forms one part. If subsequent volumes contain as much interesting factual material and provocative interpretation as this one, Mr. Brady will have done a great deal to help us understand our society. The chances are that he will also have started whole series of arguments which will not be settled by shelves full of books.

The present book is a study of industrial "peak associations" like the National Association of Manufacturers or the Federation of British Industries. Peak associations are comprehensive national industrial organizations which are concerned with "presenting industry's case" to the government and public and at the same time providing some degree of "self-government for industry." The nature of these organizations and the policies they follow are not matters of technical interest that concern only businessmen and scholars. The peak associations are important to all of us because they try to influence basic economic and political conditions in every country and do so, if Mr. Brady is right, with increasing success. They are active in the present debate on post-war problems: it requires no great insight to see the contrast between the war aims stated by United Nations leaders and the views expressed by Mr. Witherow in his parting speech as president of the National Association of Manufacturers and by the Federation of British Industries in its recent report on post-war problems. Mr. Brady's work helps us to understand this contrast and to speculate on its full significance.

The book's main line of thought is as follows. The dominant tendency of industry in all advanced capitalist countries, including those that are now fascist, is toward greater concentration, culminating in peak associations. Large corporations tend to dominate peak associations, particularly the "laboratory babies" that are of increasing technical importance to all industry. Peak associations move on from the presentation of "the viewpoint of industry" to assume cartel functions for national industry as a whole. They become more and more "political" in their functions, working for the maintenance of a "status society" in which they play a dominant role. The pattern of development of peak associations is the same in the Democracies and in totalitarian countries. In Germany, Italy, Japan, and Vichy France, the peak associations have reached the logical conclusion of their development, becoming virtually official organs. The policies of peak associations are essentially anti-democratic. Unless checked, they will take over more and more of the functions of democratically-elected Governments in Britain and the United States.

About two-thirds of this book is devoted to an account of the growth of peak associations in Germany, Italy, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There is a mass of detailed material in these chapters and though some of it has been published before by Mr. Brady and others, its collection here is enough to guarantee the book a place on the shelf of important volumes on contemporary problems. Large gaps remain in our knowledge of this field, but Mr. Brady makes excellent use of many sources to assemble his data. Americans will be particularly interested in Mr. Brady's account of the rise of the National Association of Manufacturers, its relations to large corporations on the one hand and small business on the other, and the development of its policies. There is less detailed discussion of the NRA than one would expect, considering its importance to the development of trade associations in this country.

One striking fact of immediate importance emerges from this comparative analysis. War has been one of the great promoters of peak associations. In almost every country studied by Mr. Brady, the peak associations have either been formed in wartime or have received a great impetus to growth and power. In war-

time, governments have often specifically asked industrialists to form comprehensive bodies that can speak for industry as a whole and take some responsibility for organizing the economy. The resultant bodies tend to carry over into the peace as peak associations. The whole process bears out Adam Smith's famous dictum: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices." Here is one more aspect of our wartime economy that wants watching.

The latter part of Mr. Brady's book is devoted to a comparative analysis of the economic, political, and social policies pursued by peak associations. Protection against competition—foreign and domestic—is the central economic tenet of these bodies. While pleading for "self-government in industry," they press for government aid to provide such protection, to enforce the decisions of groups controlling the peak associations, to relieve business of some of the burdens of depressions, and sometimes to make membership in trade associations compulsory. The social policy of the peak associations "keeps up with the times" by stressing the service which business owes the community. In practice, as Mr. Brady shows in one of the most interesting and original chapters in the book, "service" becomes large-scale paternalism based on the idea that society's "natural leaders," the businessmen, should guide it toward the "harmony of interests" which is assumed to exist. The "political" functions of peak associations only begin with their work as pressure groups. They build up bureaucracies and establish power relations affecting almost every part of society. Only in this way can they hope to carry out their economic and social programs successfully.

Mr. Brady is going to be misinterpreted. There will be those who dismiss him as "unscholarly" and an alarmist because the membership of peak associations falls far short of including all industrial firms, or because government measures are frequently contradictory to the programs of the peak associations. Others will cite this book as "proof" that the businessmen of America and Britain have a complete system of monopolistic self-government that makes the political process a sham. Neither of these views of the book is justified. Mr. Brady qualifies his conclusions very carefully although some individual statements are unguarded. He makes it clear that the book is about a dominant trend, not the whole complex of industrial organization. The pattern of development is the same in all countries, the author argues, but the speed and strength of the movement varies from nation to nation. There are forces working against the peak associations, but only government action has any prospect of success. What that action should be Mr. Brady does not say.

The omission of these counterforces is perhaps the key to the book's major weakness, its failure to deal directly with the question: How much power do the peak associations really have? A detailed answer for each country would go far beyond the scope of the book, but without at least some general discussion of the question the author's thesis limps. The differences among the positions of the peak associations in various countries show that some conditions are more favorable than others to the growth of trade associations and the success of their policies. What are these conditions? We know that there are people, including businessmen, who oppose the formation of peak associations. How strong are they? What has enabled the peak associations to defeat them elsewhere? Any account of the growth of peak associations has a serious gap if it omits these elements.

Unless governments are able in some way to check the growth of the power of peak associations, says Mr. Brady, "the mantle of political authority is simply shifted *de facto* from its former popular, or constitutional, basis to another which stems from the inner councils of these huge corporate complexes." He does not undertake to tell us how governments can check the peak associations and with what chances of success. That is the next problem we must face in order to use the data and analysis supplied by Mr. Brady. Public policy toward peak associations is one aspect of policy toward the concentration of economic power generally. The basic choice is among three ways of treating the concentrations, whatever their form: breaking them up to restore competition, regulation, or socialization. Mr. Brady has done a great service in helping us to know the facts about peak associations and to understand what is at stake. We must know still more to formulate intelligent and effective policies.

To all who think that the peace is being largely made during the war, this book is timely in the accurate sense of that overworked term. It is another very good demonstration that democracy and freedom, and the opportunity to create security and plenty, require not only a victory over the Axis, but the defeat of anti-democratic forces in many forms and all places.

WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR.

The Soviet Union

SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1939-1942, by David J. Dallin, translated by Leon Dennen. 439 pages. *Yale University Press;* $3.75

WE'RE IN THIS WITH RUSSIA, by Wallace Carroll. 264 *pages. Houghton Mifflin.* $2.00

THE TRUTH ABOUT SOVIET RUSSIA, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. With an essay on the Webbs by Bernard Shaw. 127 *pages. Longmans;* $1.50

OUR industrial and naïvely practical civilization admires efficiency and fears the unconventional. The intense interest in Russia today is usually colored with anxiety and admiration and not a little suspicion. The interest is somewhat of a shock to many who during the past twenty-five years have become accustomed to be critical of Russia for her revolutionary economics, and contemptuous of her alleged bureaucracy and inefficiency. But her recent military victories over the Fascists and the unity of effort and purpose she has revealed to the world have brought forward the need for reviewing our attitude toward Russia and for revaluating some of the abstract values and yardsticks which have been used in measuring her. The Russo-German pact of August, 1939, appears now in a somewhat different light than it did on the fateful week preceding the German invasion of Poland.

David J. Dallin has done a competent job of compilation, based primarily if not solely on newspaper clippings, yet even this compilation makes one feel embarrassed for what is usually called the "common sense" of the average man. One can find little if anything in Mr. Dallin's compilation that one has not read in the newspapers, yet it can clearly be seen that the anti-Russian propaganda which followed the opening of World War II succeeded in confusing the issues to the utmost. In this work, one can now follow the Russian foreign policy step by step from 1939 to 1942, and see its logical course, its rational directness and surprising diplomatic honesty.

What Wallace Carroll has to say on the subject supports this impression and adds a number of revealing details which permit us to see how steadfastly Chamberlain and Halifax craved an "understanding" with Hitler, and how every step in the Franco-British policy in relation to Russia in the fateful summer of 1939 was nothing more than shortsighted juggling in order to divert Hitler's appetite to the Dnieper and the Don and points east. The Russians, who were ready to meet Hitler but only on their own terms, proved to be masters of the diplomatic game, and they cheerfully sacrificed the Chamberlains and the Bonnets and Daladiers on the altar of realistic politics in favor of broader historical perspectives.

While Mr. Dallin's book is unoriginal and unimaginative, Wallace Carroll's is vibrant, human, keen, and alive. Mr. Carroll is an excellent reporter, but he is also a contemplative social thinker who is objective, progressive, a man with broad sympathies and a truly liberal outlook. Out of the spate of works on Russia which praise the U.S.S.R. with many reservations and condemn her with qualifications, Wallace Carroll's compact book is one of the very best, because his sympathies are genuine and his understanding true. He is a liberal; he disapproves of communism; he does not want it. But he sees Russia as she is and he does not disregard or deny the success of Russian communism in many respects of human endeavor. It is a very useful and enlightening book.

It is perhaps much more enlightening than the neat and sympathetic booklet by the Webbs. G. B. S. contributes a short, somewhat reminiscent essay on the Webbs, more contemplative than traditionally Shavian, but the old fire and incisiveness of approach are ever present. He recalls a few moments of the past history of Socialism in England and then yields the floor to the Webbs. The title of this book is a little misleading; it is more high-sounding than descriptive. The Webbs discuss the Russian economic organization, the political structure, and the value of the Russian regime from the standpoint of justice and democracy. They make out an excellent case. Some of the parallels between Russian and English political functioning are both amusing and telling. The booklet is written with great warmth and with that sense of loyalty and social faith which has characterized these young octogenarians for over half a century.

GREGORY ZILBOORG.

Final Court of Appeal

LET THE PEOPLE KNOW, by Sir Norman Angell, 245 *pages. Viking;* $2.50.

NORMAN ANGELL is untiring in his effort to present the case for world organization. While reading his book, this reviewer thinks of Paris, London, and Geneva, where Sir Norman tried to convince the French and English, as today he is trying to convince the Americans, of the logic and necessity of an international society. Before the outbreak of World War II, many Europeans had formed the habit of going to London to see him and to consult his judg-

ment on complicated political issues. Americans too have come to regard his acumen and vision as an invaluable resource.

This time, he has gathered together all the important questions which busy citizen John is asking. He has formulated some of those questions for him and has indulged occasionally in his hobby of putting into logical formulation the arguments of his opponents.

The questions vary from, "How can this war succeed in making the world safe for democracy when the last war didn't?" or, "Are American boys fighting in Africa, Burma, Ceylon, or India to maintain the British Empire?" to, "If we are fighting against dictatorship, what of Russia?"

The author has undertaken the difficult task of convincing people who are far away not only from the United Nations ideology but even from knowledge of elementary forms of co-operation with the immediate Allies of the United States. In making this attempt, he merits greater respect than many liberals who are satisfied to speak only to friendly audiences and who take for granted an understanding of the necessity of international co-operation. He proves to citizen John that he is not helpless, that he can do a great deal to avoid many mistakes of the past, that "his opinion is the final court of appeal in politics."

Sir Norman hates confusion, and he takes pains to clarify the thinking of his readers. He shows convincingly the importance in international affairs of creating machinery to stop aggression and of permitting no one to invoke the merits of a dispute as an excuse for aggression. The author wants, first of all, to end international anarchy and to put collective power behind international law. Just as the right of each individual to life is defended collectively by the community, so it must be safeguarded in international affairs.

Sir Norman brilliantly attacks a number of "natural" tribal instincts, which should be made subject to adult discipline. In examining many sources of international friction, he notes "the innate tendency of all of us to resent anything which is 'different' and does not belong to our tribe, our club, our church, our village, our nation, our race." He properly insists on the necessity of studying social sciences and of understanding that no decent civilization can be maintained on this small earth without co-operative effort. Two hates in particular have served Hitler, anti-Semitism and Anglo-phobia, as the author points out in the chapter entitled, aptly, Escapegoatism. The third hatred, one which Hitler is especially trying to make use of today—anti-communism—might have been added.

In the final chapter Sir Norman sums up his answers to questions which he had presented in the beginning. He shows that this war may very well not make the world safe for democracy unless all the nations stick together. He shows that American boys are not fighting to preserve the British Empire, but are fighting to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Axis and serving as a springboard against America itself. About Russian dictatorship, he gives the necessary answer, namely, that it was not Russia which attacked twenty States, but Germany.

As a matter of fact, Norman Angell not only attacks the arguments of the opponents of world co-operation or of the obscurantists, as Mr. Grafton would call them, but criticizes even the liberals and Socialists, and that is where this reviewer thinks he is to a certain extent unjust, because the liberal who demands social transformation does not forget the interdependence of social progress and world organization.

The Book of the Month Club is to be congratulated on having selected a book which should be read by hundreds of thousands of readers. It will be a powerful force for the education of vast popular groups in an understanding of real economic and political democracy and of world organization. (Norman Angell would have put world organization before democracy.)

LOUIS DOLIVET.

"The first cold-sober factual account we have yet had of the forces within Germany who, like ourselves, are working for Hitler's downfall." — *N. Y. Times Book Review*

THE SILENT WAR

By JON B. JANSEN AND STEFAN WEYL

"A fine and important book. This reviewer has seldom come across a more moving and inspiring story than this account of the underground's silent war. Jansen and Weyl have many stories to tell of the dangerous work done daily by their comrades . . . a book of simple heroes. They are not Germany's heroes alone — they are democracy's too." — Percival Knauth, *N. Y. Times Book Review* $2.75

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY : *Philadelphia*

The Peace We Fight For

By Hiram Motherwell

"A welcome addition to the rapidly expanding shelf of books on post-war problems. One of its chief merits is that it begins with a question which is frequently overlooked by arm-chair planners: 'What shall we be up against the day after an armistice is declared?' The answer Mr. Motherwell gives suggests that the success or failure of a stable peace will be determined by the way we handle such immediate problems as feeding and maintenance of order. He holds the American nose to the grindstone of immediate responsibilities that must be assumed in meeting human needs. Post-war study groups everywhere will find here much grist for the mills of discussion."

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The Ultimate Nazi Necessity Laid Bare!

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By STEWART W. HERMAN, Jr.

Here is a factual, first-hand account of how people in Germany are trying to preserve traces of their Christian tradition while being lured or coerced into pagan practices; how pastors are muzzled; how churches are stripped of their charitable, humanitarian functions. This is a book about people, not in theory, but in the actuality of the "new order," struggling to preserve their own souls, the last bastion of defense against Nazism, the last hope for the eventual regeneration of a whole nation. The author was pastor of the American Church in Berlin, 1936-1941.

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A Check List of Forthcoming Books on International Affairs

THE TRAGEDY OF EUROPEAN LABOR, 1918-1939, by Adolf F. Sturmthal. Columbia. Why European labor committed suicide in the period between wars and how, by acting as a pressure group, it refused to take responsibility. The question of the fate of organized labor in America.

ECONOMIC UNION AND DURABLE PEACE, by Otto T. Mallery. Harper. The economic approach of improved trade relationships: access to raw materials, international fair trade practices, the regulation of international cartels, labor standards, and banking facilities.

DYNAMITE CARGO: CONVOY TO RUSSIA, by Fred Herman. Vanguard. A merchant seaman's story of the biggest Arctic convoy that the British "punched through" to Russia. A participant's account of a torpedoing and rescue and coming to port in Archangel.

JAPAN'S WAR ECONOMY, by Ray Cromley. Macmillan. An evaluation of Japan's economic strength and her power to wage war. Fresh material on military and strategic problems as well as problems of economy and morale.

NEW YORK PLANS FOR THE FUTURE, by Cleveland Rodgers. Harper. A discussion of how to plan for the future of any large community in terms of analysis of its past and its organic needs. The policies under which present planning efforts go forward and the problems to be solved.

I SERVED ON BATAAN, by Juanita Redmond. Lippincott. The story of one of the few who escaped from Corregidor, a member of the American-Filipino army that fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds.

WAR IS PEOPLE, by Lorna Lindsley. Houghton Mifflin. Human interest stories about the fighting peoples in Spain, Palestine, and France. Details of bombing and parties, starvation and smuggled soldiers, underground soldiers and Nazis.

PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION, by Charles S. Johnson. Harper. A survey of the extent of racial segregation in various aspects of American life.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

The poems of *ROBERT P. TRISTRAM COFFIN* are well known to American readers. *There Will Be Bread and Love,* the title poem of his most recent volume was published in FREE WORLD in January, 1942, and in November we published *Younger Brothers,* which will be included in his forthcoming "American Primer," a book of ballads. He is Pierce Professor of English at Bowdoin College.

JOHN B. CONDLIFFE, Professor of Economics at the University of California, was born in Australia and educated in New Zealand and Cambridge. He was formerly research secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is now chairman of its International Research Committee. He is the author of "World Economic Survey" which was published by the League of Nations, and "The Reconstruction of World Trade." His most recent book, "Agenda for a Post-War World" was reviewed in our October issue.

HANS HABE, now a private in the United States Army, is a native of Budapest and fought in the French Army against the Nazis. He escaped in 1941, after three months in a German prison camp. His experiences as a refugee and as a soldier in the French forces furnished the material for his books, "Three Over the Frontier" and "A Thousand Shall Fall." A new novel, "Kathrine," will be published this summer. Among *PRIVATE HABE'S* accomplishments may be listed his discovery and publication of the family tree and name of Adolf Schicklgruber.

ALGO DONMYER HENDERSON exemplifies in his own career the combination of liberal education with practical application which is the basis of the famous Antioch College system. Besides being President of the College and President of the Ohio College Association, he is President of the Antioch Press Company, of the Antioch Shoe Project, Inc., and a member of the Board of Directors of the Ohio Pioneer Hybrid Corn Company. He served as sergeant and later as second lieutenant in the United States Army from 1917 to 1919, and was admitted to the Kansas bar in 1922.

COMMISSIONER WILLIAM HODSON is one of the outstanding civilian casualties of this war. He was killed in the crash of the airplane which was carrying him to North Africa where he was to begin his duties as Administrator of Relief. He was appointed to this post by former Governor Lehman, now the Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation.

To undertake this task *COMMISSIONER HODSON* took a leave of absence from his post at the head of the New York City Department of Welfare which he had held from January 1, 1934. Mr. *HODSON'S* activities went beyond the Welfare Department. In 1937, he was a member of the New York City Emergency Relief Administration and in 1941-42, he was President of the American Public Welfare Association. As a member of Mayor La Guardia's "War Cabinet," he was in charge of arrangements for air raid shelters and welfare and housing relief.

Before being called to head the Department of Welfare in New York City, *COMMISSIONER HODSON* was chief counsel of the Legal Aid Bureau in Minneapolis, executive secretary of the Child Welfare Commission of Minnesota, and director of the Children's Bureau of Minnesota. He came to New York as director of the Division of Child Welfare Legislation of the Russell Sage Foundation, and soon became director of the Department of Social Legislation of the same body. From 1925 until his appointment to the commissionership in 1934, he was executive director of the Welfare Council of New York City.

In writing *Retreat from the Four Freedoms? FRANCIS P. LOCKE* has crystallized the fears of those who feel that we must win the peace as well as the war. These fears are now largely allayed by President Roosevelt's recent speech. Mr. *LOCKE* is, in a sense, the sounding board of democratic opinion in the South where he is one of the editors of the *Miami Daily News.* After graduating from Harvard in 1933, Mr. *LOCKE* joined the staff of the *St. Louis Dispatch.* In choosing the newspaper as a profession, he was following a family tradition for his father is editor of the *Dayton Daily News.*

CHARLES E. NOYES is assistant director of the Division of Information of the War Pro-

duction Board and he has been doing information work for the Office for Emergency Management and the WPB since November, 1941. He has published articles on economics in *The Nation* and *Advanced Management* and has done writing and research for Editorial Research Reports in Washington. His article in this issue is a chapter from "Economic Freedom: A Democratic Program," a book which will be published by Harpers this spring.

Problems of migration, settlement, and rehabilitation are the special field of study interesting *MARTIN H. SCHWARZ.* He is the author of "The U. S. A. as a Country of Immigration."

During the war in Norway, *SIGRID UNDSET,* internationally famous novelist and winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1921, worked in the Government censorship office. Later she was a broadcaster and writer for free Norwegian newspapers. She escaped to America and is now living in Brooklyn.

Since 1907, the year of publication of her first novel, she has published many works of fiction, history, and translations from the Old Norse and English into Norwegian. Besides the Nobel Prize, her honors have been many: she was chairman of the Norwegian Authors' Union from 1933 until the invasion; she received the Cross of Islands Falk, St. Olav's Order, and Pro Ecclesia and Pontifice; she has honorary degrees from Russell Sage College and Rollins College. She considers it one of her greatest honors that her books were banned in Norway and Germany by Hitler in 1940. Her son is in the Norwegian Army in Scotland. *MRS. UNDSET'S* most recent book is "Happy Times in Norway."

DR. ALBERTO GUANI'S distinguished service to his country has been climaxed by his recent election as Vice President. Among his other posts, he was representative of Uruguay at the League of Nations. As Foreign Minister he was instrumental in forcing the withdrawal of the "Graf Spee" from the port of Montevideo where that warship sought refuge after her battle with English cruisers. The "Graf Spee" was scuttled by her own crew. *The Opposing Camps* was delivered as an address in Spanish at the FREE WORLD dinner given in honor of *DR. GUANI* during his recent visit to the United States.

News of the Month

What radio critics have characterized as one of the most interesting programs presented over the air today was begun on Tuesday, February 16, in the form of the Underground Reporter. This half-hour program, broadcast over WMCA every Tuesday at 8:03 P.M., is the dramatization of material which appeared originally in FREE WORLD. Acted with spirit and understanding, the first sketch of Underground activities in France communicated to the radio audience, not only the full dramatic character of the activities of the Underground movement but also the heroic sacrifices which the oppressed peoples are prepared to make to reconquer their freedom. It has called forth a remarkable response from the listeners. We request the readers of FREE WORLD to give the widest publicity to this program.

In accordance with the orders of the War Department, its Special Service Division is sending us lists of Army camp libraries which are instructed to place FREE WORLD on their magazine racks. We have already received the lists from the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Commands, totaling over 300 subscriptions. At the same time our readers are generously contributing the funds to pay for these subscriptions.

An expanding subscription list makes it necessary to request that FREE WORLD subscribers notify us at least four weeks in advance of any change of address, including both the old and the new addresses in their communications. We take this occasion to call to the attention of our subscribers that wartime curtailment of transportation facilities accounts for delay in the delivery of copies. FREE WORLD is printed and mailed on regular schedule. If your magazine does not reach you after a reasonable interval, however, please mail us a postcard and we shall send a duplicate copy immediately.

Not all those who participated in the discussions at the commission meetings of the December conference of the World Confederation of International Groupments have sent us their names to be included in the forthcoming book, "World Confederation: Peace and Order in Post-War Reconstruction," which will be published by L. B. Fischer. This information is urgently needed.

New Subscribers • New Editions • New Features

Since last November FREE WORLD has gained 3,000 new subscribers. This raises our total circulation to 14,000, plus an average of about 3,000 sold on the newsstands. It represents a phenomenal growth for a quality magazine—quality which is being recognized throughout the world.

For, after 17 months of existence, FREE WORLD now has five editions. A Chilean edition of *Mundo Libre* has just appeared; the French edition of *Le Monde Libre* will come out on the first of March—and now our American edition is being microfilmed by the Office of War Information and sent to India, and new editions in other languages are being planned by the democratic forces of various countries.

Beginning with the April Number—

"Progress of the Struggle"

by SIR NORMAN ANGELL

FREE WORLD is proud to announce that each month, under this title, Sir Norman Angell will contribute a commentary on the most important current aspects of the international situation. His book, "The Great Illusion," was honored by a Nobel prize and his most recent work, "Let the People Know" is the February selection of the Book of the Month Club. His opinions on international affairs are vital and enlightening.

In forthcoming issues:

Some Problems of the Post-War World
by BERTRAND RUSSELL

Democracy and Power
by PROFESSOR QUINCY WRIGHT

Confession of a Hundred Per Cent French Nationalist: Why I am a De Gaullist
by EMIL BURÉ

Britain's Educational Effort
by GILBERT MURRAY

A World Co-operative of Thought
by LI YU YING

The Fundamentals of a Democratic Foreign Policy
by LOUIS DOLIVET

International Co-operation—Pro and Con
by WALTER MILLIS AND ROBERT P. SKINNER

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